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Abstract 
This thesis examines the response of a representative agent investor to sequences (streaks) 
of quarterly earnings surprises over a period of twelve quarters using the United States 
S&P500 constituent companies’ sample frame in the years 1991 to 2006. This examination 
follows the predictive performance of the representative agent model of Rabin (2002b) – 
[Inference by believers in the law of small numbers. The Quarterly Journal of Economics. 
117(3).p.775 – 816] and Barberis, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998) – [A model of investor 
sentiment. Journal of Financial Economics. 49. p.307 – 343] for an investor who might be 
under the influence of the law of small numbers, or another closely related cognitive bias 
known as the gambler’s fallacy. Chapters 4 and 5 present two related empirical studies on 
this broad theme. 
In chapter 4, for successive sequences of annualised quarterly earnings changes over a 
twelve-quarter horizon of quarterly earnings increases or falls, I ask whether the models can 
capture the likelihood of reversion. Secondly, I ask, what is the representative investor’s 
response to observed sequences of quarterly earnings changes for my S&P500 constituent 
sample companies? I find a far greater frequency of extreme persistent quarterly earnings 
rises (of nine quarters and more) than falls and hence a more muted reaction to their 
occurrence from the market. Extreme cases of persistent quarterly earnings falls are far less 
common than extreme rises and are more salient in their impact on stock prices. I find 
evidence suggesting that information discreteness; that is the frequency with which small 
information about stock value filters into the market is one of the factors that foment earnings 
momentum in stocks. However, information discreteness does not subsume the impact of 
sequences of annualised quarterly earnings changes, or earnings “streakiness” as a strong 
candidate that drives earnings momentum in stock returns in my S&P500 constituent stock 
sample. Therefore, earnings streakiness and informational discreteness appear to have 
separate and additive effects in driving momentum in stock price. 
In chapter 5, the case for the informativeness of the streaks of earnings surprises is further 
strengthened. This is done by examining the explanatory power of streaks of earnings 
surprises in a shorter horizon of three days around the period when the effect of the nature 
of earnings news is most intense in the stock market. Even in shorter windows, investors in 
S&P500 companies seem to be influenced by the lengthening of negative and positive 
streaks of earnings surprises over the twelve quarters of quarterly earnings announcement I 
study here. This further supports my thesis that investors underreact to sequences of 
changes in their expectations about stock returns. This impact is further strengthened by 
high information uncertainties in streaks of positive earnings surprise. However, earnings 
‘streakiness’ is one discrete and separable element in the resolution of uncertainty around 
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equity value for S&P 500 constituent companies. Most of the proxies for earnings surprise 
show this behaviour especially when market capitalisation, age and cash flow act as proxies 
of information uncertainty. The influence of the gambler’s fallacy on the representative 
investor in the presence of information uncertainty becomes more pronounced when I 
examine increasing lengths of streaks of earnings surprises. The presence of post earnings 
announcement drift in my large capitalised S&P500 constituents sample firms confirms 
earnings momentum to be a pervasive phenomenon which cuts across different tiers of the 
stock markets including highly liquid stocks, followed by many analysts, which most large 
funds would hold.  
 
 
Keywords: earnings momentum, earnings momentum models, representative agent, streak 
of earnings surprise, sequence of quarterly earnings change, information uncertainty, 
gambler’s fallacy, law of small numbers, standardised unexpected earning, underreaction. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
1.1 Market efficiency and investor behaviour: neoclassical economics assumptions 
The neoclassical economics school of thought makes various assumptions about the 
efficiency of capital markets and how rational investors behave in these markets. This school 
of thought applies the concept of rational expectations in the pricing of risky assets. It 
requires that rational investors must meet a certain number of conditions when making 
decisions under uncertainty. Such individuals must meet a minimum set of conditions for 
rational decision-making, as set out by von Neumann-Morgenstern’s axioms of cardinal 
utility. Both concepts of rational expectations and axioms of cardinal utility are based on the 
belief in the standard economic assumption that people will behave in certain ways that 
maximise their utility or profits.  
The theory of rational expectations was mainly developed in the works of Muth (1960, 1961). 
In both works, Muth posits that it is difficult to obtain accurate information for the future 
outcomes of any random event. His theory further extends the description of various 
economic situations where outcomes usually depend on people’s expectations. A good 
example is the fact that current prices of securities depend partly on what buyers and sellers 
believe their value will be in the future. This belief may lead to a rush to buy or sell a certain 
stock, and this behaviour may cause the stock to either appreciate or depreciate in market 
value. In order to form expectations, people try to forecast what future outcomes such as the 
price of a security will be. The rational expectations theory reasons that outcomes do not 
depart systematically from their expected values. However, the theory implies that people 
could make forecasting errors, but the errors will not persistently occur on a particular side – 
forecasting errors over time are expected to be random in nature. According to Forsythe et al 
(1982), the rational expectation hypothesis predicts that the price of a security embodies the 
entire expected stream of future payoffs, and this includes the future value of the security 
when it is sold to another party. The implication of the rational expectation theory therefore is 
that capital markets are efficient, since security prices will reflect all available information 
(Copeland et al 2005 p. 360). It is therefore appropriate to say that rational expectations 
theory underlies the foundation upon which the efficient market theory of securities prices is 
built. 
One of the earliest applications of the concept of the rational expectations theory is the 
efficient market theory. The efficient market theory states that the price of a security reflects 
all relevant information that is available about its fundamental value (Roberts (1967), Fama 
(1970)). The fundamental value of a security is represented by the discounted future cash-
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flow streams which the holder of the security expects to receive. By implication, if a current 
security price reflects all relevant and available information, as the efficient market theory 
proposes, the future price cannot therefore be predicted. The implication for price is that 
current and past information cannot be used by investors to improve their forecasts of future 
security prices, or indeed be used in valuation models to forecasting security prices. This is 
more so because efficient market theory assumes that the current security price fully reflects 
current and past information, thus their implications for future security price distribution. As a 
consequence, investors, analysts, and fund managers cannot systematically beat the market 
in their predictions to make superior returns from their investments by using relevant and 
available price information. The theory also states that new relevant information about 
companies is instantaneously and fully assimilated into their stock prices. In other words, 
‘undervaluation’ and ‘overvaluation’ of securities are merely temporary, as the prices of such 
securities will quickly adjust to their equilibrium values in an efficient market. 
Although it may seem that markets can still be efficient, costless, and unbiased, if 
information is available, the question remains as to whether markets will still be efficient if 
investors are irrational, for example, if investors are influenced by one or more cognitive 
biases when making their investment decisions. If investors are overconfident about their 
valuation models, for instance, how will this influence a future security price? If the impact of 
overconfidence amongst investors on price is systematic and this causes the price to depart 
from equilibrium, how long does it take the price to return to rational equilibrium? 
Furthermore, sufficient conditions for market efficiency such as frictionless markets, no 
transaction costs and taxes, costless information, and the belief that all market participants 
have the same distribution for future security price are not characteristics of capital markets 
in the real world. We know that in practice, transaction costs, exchange fees, taxes, and 
other forms of charges are incurred by market participants. If this assertion is true, will the 
market be efficient if in practice it deviates from the conditions listed above? Will the effect of 
such deviations on price be random in nature and cancel each other out, or will they be 
systematic such that investors can form profitable trading rules based on them? In addition, 
the efficient market hypothesis and rational expectations theory do not predict a market 
where investors hold heterogeneous expectations of future security payoffs. However, we 
know that in the real world, markets comprise both informed and uninformed investors. What 
impact would the activities of both informed and uninformed investors in capital markets 
have on price discovery? Is the number of informed investors large enough to quickly 
arbitrage away the mispricing caused by uninformed investors, thus returning the price to its 
rational equilibrium value? Is arbitrage truly a riskless venture? The neoclassical economics 
theory does not provide plausible answers to the above questions. 
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1.2 Empirical challenges to the neoclassical model of market efficiency  
The publication of Eugene Fama’s seminal paper entitled “Efficient Capital Markets: A 
Review of Theory and Empirical Work” in 1970 was a defining moment in the study of the 
concept of market efficiency. In this work, Fama brings together existing research in this 
area and sets the stage for research in the coming years and decades. Throughout the 
1970s, the majority of studies using both empirical and theoretical approaches supported the 
efficient market theory. It was not until the late 1970s that another stream of studies 
emerged which contradicted and challenged the concept. Jensen (1978) proposes the need 
for the concept of market efficiency and the methodological procedure used in testing it to be 
reviewed, due to growing evidence from research showing the inconsistency of the theory. 
This proposal came as a result of both theoretical and empirical challenges to the efficient 
market hypothesis which became stronger with the availability of better data and as 
econometric techniques became more sophisticated.  
Some of the early empirical evidence that challenged the efficient market hypothesis 
preceded its theoretical challenges. The earliest amongst these pieces of evidence is the 
volatility of stock prices. Shiller (1981) documents that stock prices are far more volatile than 
can be explained by a model in which these prices are equal to the discounted expected net 
present value of future dividend streams. In this study, Shiller shows that the high volatility of 
stock price indices such as the S&P’s composite stock price index cannot be justified when 
those prices are compared to its expected net present value. The calculated expected net 
present value of prices seems smooth and stable over time, as against the volatility of the 
actual price series. In addition to this, the author documents that there is no associated new 
information about future real dividends to justify such large and frequent jumps in stock 
prices. What this finding tells us is that price movements are not always preceded by the 
arrival of new information about fundamental value as the efficient market theory states. If 
they were, there would not be such a large variation between actual prices and their 
expected values, and the frequency of price jumps would be much more nuanced. The 
author concludes that the failure of the efficient market model to explain this large price 
volatility is so dramatic that it cannot possibly be attributed to modelling error, price index 
problems, or changes in tax laws. Other academics whose works contributed much to this 
area include LeRoy and Porter (1981). 
Long-term stock return reversal is another return anomaly which challenges the propositions 
of the efficient market hypothesis. De Bondt and Thaler (1985) show that long-term stock 
returns reversal exists over a time horizon of between three and five years and is 
predictable. The authors compare the performance of the stocks of two groups of companies 
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- extreme losers’ and extreme winners’ stock portfolios. The group of extreme losers 
comprises those stocks which fall into the lowest return decile, whereas the extreme winners 
are those stocks that fall into the highest return decile in the past three years. By forming a 
trading strategy which buys past loser stocks in the prior three years and sells winner stocks 
over the same period, De Bondt and Thaler show that such a strategy is profitable in 
succeeding three to five years after portfolio formation. The authors show that the fate of 
winner and loser stocks is reversed in the three to five years after portfolio formation. In each 
year of their sample, the authors formed a portfolio of the best and worst performing stocks 
over the prior three years. Once the portfolios were formed, they computed the return on 
each of the two portfolios over the next five years. De Bondt and Thaler report that their loser 
portfolio showed a strong post-formation performance while their winner portfolio showed a 
relatively poor performance over the same period. Efficient market models such as the 
capital asset pricing model are not able to explain the difference between the returns of 
these two portfolios. For example, the improved performance of the loser stocks could not be 
explained by their risk profile using standard risk adjustment models. However, De Bondt 
and Thaler explain that the difference noted above is consistent with a behavioural finance 
interpretation of overreaction of stock prices following initial new information in the market. 
The authors explain that the market overreacts to both loser and winner stocks, i.e. on 
average, loser stocks become too cheap before bouncing back after the post-formation year, 
whereas extreme winner stocks become too expensive, resulting in lower future returns. The 
evidence from De Bondt and Thaler in this study poses a direct challenge to the weak form 
of EMH. 
Following the findings on long-term reversal in stock returns by De Bondt and Thaler (1985), 
researchers have documented other forms of stock return anomalies against the 
propositions of the efficient market hypothesis. Momentum in stock returns is one such 
anomaly, and can be described as a phenomenon in which stock prices show a continuation 
in a particular direction for a period of three to twelve months depending on the nature of 
earnings news or past stock performance. In simple terms, the momentum anomaly means 
that what goes up (down) in the recent past will continue to go up (down) in the near future. 
Stocks that have outperformed others in the past three to twelve months continue to do so in 
the succeeding three to twelve months. If continuation in stock price is a result of its 
company’s recent quarterly earnings outcomes, then the effect is referred to as earnings 
momentum. Similarly, if continuation in price is a result of the stock’s strong performance in 
the recent past, then the resulting effect is referred to as price momentum. Jegadeesh and 
Titman (1993) is one of the earliest empirical works to document the existence of momentum 
in stock returns. The authors examine the returns of individual stocks and report that past 
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stock returns in the last three to twelve months are able to predict future returns in the same 
direction. Essentially, this finding says that there is a short-run continuation in stock prices 
over a period of three and twelve months – stock prices continue to trend upwards for past 
winner-stocks and downwards for past loser-stocks. If markets are efficient, as held by 
Eugene Fama and other proponents of the efficient market hypothesis, past security prices 
and returns will not be able to predict future price, as the information contained in them is 
already fully reflected in the price. Since the publication of Jegadeesh and Titman (1993), 
there has been a deluge of publications on this subject which continues to grow. Jegadeesh 
and Titman (2001) provide evidence on the profitability of price momentum strategies which 
further supports their 1993 paper on momentum. This work seeks to provide alternative 
explanations for the profitability of momentum strategies. The authors document that their 
later evidence supports the idea that momentum profits can be attributed to investors’ 
underreaction to new information in the market. The paper also further posits that the 
existence of momentum in stock returns could be a result of delayed overreaction to prices 
which is eventually reversed. In a related paper, Chan, Jegadeesh, and Lakonishok (1999) 
evaluate the profitability of price momentum strategies based on past returns and find them 
to be profitable in a short- to medium-term horizon. However, the authors posit that although 
price momentum strategies are profitable, the extent of their profitability will also depend 
largely on how well trading costs are managed by investors. If investors must adopt 
momentum strategies, for such strategies to be attractive, they must be profitable after all 
the associated costs and fees have been taken into account. Further investigation into 
momentum profits is provided in another paper by Korajczyk and Sadka (2004). The authors 
test for the profitability of momentum trading strategies after taking the impact of trading 
costs on such strategies into consideration. The authors find that the robustness of 
momentum profits depends on the weighting type adopted during portfolio formation. Their 
results show that momentum strategies which are based on liquidity-weighted portfolios and 
a hybrid of liquidity/value-weighted portfolios of highly capitalised companies are profitable 
even after accounting for transaction costs. But the momentum profits of strategies based on 
equal-weighted portfolios dissipate when transaction costs are taken into consideration. 
Chan, Hameed, and Tong (2000) evaluate the profitability of momentum strategies in 
international equity markets. The authors also find that momentum strategies are profitable 
even in international stock markets. A more recent paper by Leippold and Lohre (2012) 
examines specifically the profitability of earnings and price momentum strategies in 
international stock markets. They find that momentum strategies are profitable in these 
markets and further state that these profits are improved in high information uncertainty 
markets. The last statement leads the authors to conclude that momentum profits may be 
rationalised by a model of investors’ underreaction to company fundamental news. This 
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assertion supports the argument that price momentum will be better explained by 
behavioural finance models.  
Most empirical works in the momentum literature are on the study of momentum profits 
derived from price momentum strategies, whereas very little has been done on earnings 
momentum and its strategies. One of the earliest works in literature to study the profitability 
of earnings momentum in detail is Chan et al (1996). By applying a trading strategy based 
on standardised unexpected earnings (SUE), Chan et al (1996) establish the existence of 
earnings momentum in stocks listed in United States exchanges. Stock prices of companies 
with positive SUE continue to drift upwards and those of companies with negative SUE 
continue to drift downwards for between three and nine months after earnings 
announcement. The standardised unexpected earnings (SUE) metric is a measure of the 
magnitude of information contained in the most recent quarterly earnings news. It is 
calculated as the difference between actual quarterly earnings per share and its expected 
counterpart scaled by its standard deviation in previous quarters. SUE therefore could be 
thought of as an ‘earnings surprise’ to market participants on the earnings announcement 
date. Earnings momentum therefore means that stocks of companies with large and positive 
SUE continue to outperform stocks of companies with large and negative SUE days, weeks 
and even months after earnings announcement. Chordia and Shivakumar (2006), in a slight 
departure from Chan et al (1996), examine the relationship between earnings and price 
momentum, both in time series and cross-section assets tests. The authors document that 
price momentum is subsumed by the systematic component of earnings momentum in a 
zero-investment trading strategy that takes a long position in stocks with high SUE and a 
short position in stocks with low SUE. This finding suggests that although earnings and price 
momentum are separate phenomena, they are both likely to start as a result of market 
underreaction to earnings news. Hong, Lee, and Swaminathan (2003) examine the 
profitability of earnings momentum strategies based on analysts’ forecast revisions in eleven 
international equity markets. They report that although analysts’ revisions are persistent in all 
the countries, the profitability of this strategy varies across them. 
The results of the empirical works described above elucidate the flaws inherent in the 
efficient market hypothesis. They clearly show the persistence of stock return anomalies 
over the years which therefore cannot be attributed to data snooping bias, improper risk 
adjustment, sample selection bias, trading costs, or methodology errors. The presence of 
some anomalies such as momentum has been found to exist across all stock markets 
around the world and continues to offer a profitable investment strategy to investors and 
managers. Momentum investment strategies should not be profitable since there is no 
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evidence that such stocks carry additional risk factors that make them earn extra returns in 
compensation. 
1.3 The advent of behavioural finance: a paradigm shift in financial economics? 
The empirical evidence against the efficient market hypothesis described in section 1.2 
above and others led researchers to seek alternative interpretations for various anomalies 
seen in stock returns. Behavioural finance seems to be an alternative paradigm that could 
offer a plausible explanation as to why these anomalies exist in stock returns. This paradigm 
shift began when researchers started seeking ways of improving standard finance theory by 
incorporating more realistic psychological assumptions into empirical finance models. The 
field of behavioural finance focuses on studies based on the empirical explanations of 
deviation from two main assumptions of neoclassical economics: investor rationality and 
homogenous investor assumptions.  
In his 2002 paper entitled “A Perspective on Psychology and Economics”; Rabin provides 
arguments on why greater psychological realism will improve the study and understanding of 
some phenomena in mainstream economics. He argues that economic models inspired by 
psychological evidence, which provide the reality of how human beings behave as opposed 
to theory on how they should behave, will improve the neoclassical economics models. The 
author shows that behavioural economics is gaining increasing acceptance by economists 
and the wider academic community. This is not because it is replacing traditional economic 
theory; rather it has come to improve our understanding of traditional economic assumptions 
and how economic agents behave. It is in this evolutionary, as opposed to revolutionary, 
manner that I undertake empirical work to understand the causes of stock market earnings 
momentum.  
Following Rabin (2002a) position above, remarkable progress has been made in providing 
evidence to support the behavioural finance approach to the study of the behaviour of 
economic agents. Such evidence comes from the empirical investigation of financial market 
data and economic-psychology laboratory experiments. Overwhelming results from these 
investigations show that human cognitive biases and heuristics influence individuals in their 
decision-making process. Most common amongst these biases and heuristics include the 
representativeness heuristic, conservatism, overconfidence, self-attribution bias, 
underconfidence, availability bias, extrapolation bias, the gambler’s fallacy, and the law of 
small numbers, amongst others. These biases and heuristics have been found to play a 
crucial role by influencing the way investors form judgement in financial markets (see 
Asparouhova et al (2009), Bloomfield and Hales (2002), Clotfelter and Cook (1993), De 
Bondt (1993), Kahneman and Tversky (1982). My thesis employs propositions provided by 
8 
 
two of these works to extend our understanding of what explains earnings momentum in 
stock returns. The models are the theoretical models of Rabin (2002b) and Barberis, 
Shleifer, and Vishny (1998). 
1.31 Evidence from economics and psychology experiments to support behavioural 
 finance theory  
A number of psychological laboratory experiments have helped economics and finance 
researchers to understand better how investors’ behaviour could be influenced by cognitive 
biases and heuristics. Incorporating assumptions based on these biases and heuristics into 
their models will no doubt help researchers to explain anomalies found in stock returns. 
Evidence from these experiments has led academics to believe that although an investor’s 
decision-making process might follow the concept of economic rationality and Bayesian 
principles, information processing could be influenced by biases and heuristics, thus, error 
could be introduced into such standard rational decision-making models. Moreover, 
evidence from these experiments simply shows that individuals do not always make their 
investment decisions in a manner that suggests that they have Von Neumann-Morgenstern 
preferences or form judgements in accordance with Bayesian principles. To a certain extent, 
people behave in a way that shows a systematic departure from both principles when they 
form judgements.  
In their seminal work entitled “Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk”, 
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) further provide insights into the process of decision-making 
under risk and a specific normative model of rational choice which embeds certain 
descriptive features regarding how we know these choices are typically made (e.g. loss-
aversion, risk-seeking in the loss domain). Their work criticises the expected utility theory 
and shows several cases of choice problems in which preferences systematically violate the 
axioms of the expected utility theory. The authors argue that the manner in which the 
expected utility theory is interpreted shows that it is not a sufficient descriptive model to 
account for choice under risk. In addition, Kahneman and Tversky (1974) report that when 
making predictions under uncertainty, individuals are more likely to violate Bayes’ rule and 
the tenets of probability theory. More often than not, people look to draw inferences from 
non-existent patterns in their decision-making processes. As Kahneman (2011) puts it, we 
have a profound need for ‘coherence’ which underlies our philosophical and religious search 
for a meaning / purpose in life. This leads us to see patterns and destiny, where in fact there 
is none.  
People tend to predict the future outcome of an uncertain situation by examining a small 
sample of historical data leading to a similar event and drawing a broader conclusion based 
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on it. In other words, people may see a small sample of historical data as being 
representative of the entire population from which the sample is drawn. In doing this, they 
commit the error of representativeness heuristic and do not think that the future outcomes of 
an event might be a simple random process generated by chance.  
Other studies have shown that people update their beliefs according to the ‘strength’ and 
‘weight’ of new evidence. The ‘strength’ of a piece of evidence focuses on the signal’s 
salience and extremity, while its ‘weight’ focuses on the reliability, validity and statistical 
inference that could be drawn from the evidence. In the face of low ‘strength’ and high 
‘weight’, individuals tend to react mildly to the evidence, as opposed to someone who is fully 
Bayesian1. According to Griffin and Tversky (1992), in revising forecasts, individuals depend 
much on the strength or the extremity of data and too little on the data’s weight, or influence 
relative to a Bayesian judgement. The authors maintain that, conversely, research shows 
that individuals are overconfident when there is evidence that shows high ‘strength’ and ‘low’ 
weight, and they react in the same manner in the presence of seemingly representative 
evidence. Often we see this pattern of behaviour in the popularity of those individuals with 
outlandish or very intriguing but ultimately baseless opinions. Human beings are rather slow 
when processing and adapting information which is contrary to the private information they 
hold about a situation. Therefore, people tend to trust their own individual assessment of a 
situation better than that suggested by statistical inference. All the behavioural patterns 
identified above are characteristics of human behaviour which are systematic in nature and 
not random as efficient market hypothesis suggests. 
1.4 Background and motivation for the thesis 
The main motivation for this study lies in the continued search for a unified, tractable, and 
parsimonious theoretical behavioural finance model which is able to explain future stock 
returns based on an earnings momentum strategy. In the same way that standard finance 
theory provides models of assets pricing such as the capital asset pricing model (CAPM), 
behavioural finance theory will have an increasingly relevant impact on the study of finance if 
it provides models for asset pricing. The contributions of such models in the study of finance 
should not necessarily be revolutionary in nature, but rather should be complimentary to the 
standard finance models. It is in this quest for a behavioural finance asset pricing model that 
I follow the theoretical propositions of Rabin (2002b) and Barberis, Shleifer, and Vishny 
(1998) to model the behaviour of a representative agent investor in order to explain patterns 
of future stock returns based on sequences or streaks of quarterly earnings surprise. Both 
                                                          
1 See Griffin and Tversky (1992) for a full description of the characteristics of the ‘weight’ 
and ‘strength’ of evidence. 
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models describe the behaviour of an investor whose judgement departs from rational, 
Bayesian principles when he observes a growing sequence of a binary signal such as 
quarterly earning outcomes. Both models propose that the departure of this investor from 
Bayesian principles is a result of the influence of biases and heuristics on the investor. 
Although the models differ in terms of the biases they believe to be at play in the investor’s 
model, their fundamental assumptions and conclusions are closely related to each other. 
This thesis therefore investigates the possibility that the predictions of the Rabin (2002b) and 
BSV (1998) models can be used in the empirical modelling of earnings momentum. 
In the behavioural finance literature, the standardised unexpected earning (or quarterly 
earnings surprise) is the most popular earnings metric used to capture investor behaviour 
(reaction to price) around earnings announcements. The logic behind this is that the size and 
sign of the unexpected component of earnings represent the ‘true’ information contained in 
the earnings news. The unexpected component of earnings therefore drives future investors’ 
response to earnings news. Following this line of reasoning, early researchers in this area 
believe that investors consider just the information contained in the most recent unexpected 
earnings in their earnings forecast models2. In contrast, the theoretical models of BSV 
(1998) and Rabin (2002b) postulate that investors in reality observe sequences or streaks of 
quarterly unexpected earnings over a period. Both models suggest that investors determine 
the probability distribution of future earning outcomes based on the distribution of rising or 
falling earnings in their series. It is at this point that valuation error is introduced into the 
investor’s model. In both the BSV and Rabin models, if an investor observes two 
consecutive earnings rises or falls, he reduces the probability of observing a similar outcome 
in the next earnings announcement. The investor does this without considering that the 
earnings-generating process is a random process and there are equal chances of a rise or 
fall occurring in future earnings. According to the Rabin (2002b) and BSV (1998) models, the 
introduction of this error is caused by cognitive biases and / or heuristics3. Thus, in this 
thesis, I model the impact of rising and falling streaks of quarterly earnings surprises on 
abnormal returns of S&P500 constituent companies. The thesis focuses more closely on the 
propositions of Rabin (2002b) than BSV (1998). This is because preliminary tests on my 
data support Rabin’s (2002b) position better than BSV’s (1998). Subsequently, I model the 
role of information uncertainty in the presence of growing streaks of earnings surprises. It is 
documented in the literature that high information uncertainty firms have lower future returns 
than low information uncertainty firms. However, if investors are influenced by biases when 
                                                          
2
 See Chan, Jegadeesh, and Lakonishok (1996), Chordia and Shivakumar (2006), Foster (1977) for 
full descriptions of the standardised unexpected earnings metric. 
3
 See chapters 2 and 4 of this thesis for full reviews of the Rabin (2002b) and Barberis, Shleifer, and 
Vishny (1998) models. 
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they observe streaks of earnings surprises, it will be interesting to understand the role that 
information uncertainty plays at that point. Any potential interaction effect between 
information uncertainty and streaks of earnings surprises could provide a profitable portfolio 
trading strategy for investors. 
In the past, empirical behavioural finance studies have focused on two broad groups of 
modelling strategies to study the behaviour of investors in stock markets. The first of these 
groups of models are referred to as noise trader models while the second group are referred 
to as representative agent models. With the first group of models, behavioural finance 
researchers believe that there are two categories of investors in capital markets – the 
informed investor and the uninformed (naïve) investor. In the second group of models, 
researchers treat all investors as possessing the same information set and behaving in a 
similar way. Both Rabin (2002b) and BSV (1998) model the representative agent type 
investor. Again, following in the footsteps of the models, I adopt the representative agent 
type model to examine the behaviour of investors4. 
1.5 Research gap 
It is established in the literature that standardised unexpected earnings (SUE) explains 
future stock returns5. By applying a trading strategy based on standardised unexpected 
earnings (SUE) Chan et al (1996) establish the existence of earnings momentum in stocks 
listed in United States exchanges. The authors show that stock prices of companies with 
positive SUE continue to drift upwards and those of companies with negative SUE continue 
to drift downwards between three and nine months after earnings announcement. SUE could 
be regarded as ‘earnings surprises’ to the market participants at the earnings announcement 
date. However, behavioural finance advocates attribute the ability of SUE in explaining 
returns to investor underreaction to earnings news. They argue that the sign and size of the 
unexpected component of earnings news determine the nature and level of investors’ 
response to the news. Underreaction to earnings news means that investors do not fully 
incorporate the implications of the information in current news into their forecasting models 
for future earnings. Behavioural finance tries to offer plausible answers as to why investors 
underreact to earnings news. Some researchers believe that investors underreact if they are 
influenced by biases and/or heuristics when they try to understand the information that 
earnings convey.  Understanding the true cause of investor underreaction to earnings news 
is a challenge for all finance researchers, and of great interest to behavioural finance 
researchers in particular. 
                                                          
4
 See chapter 2 of this thesis for the full description and review of the noise trader and representative 
agent type models. 
5
 See chapter 3 for references for works in the literature that use SUE to explain stock returns drift. 
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In attempt to further address investor underreaction to earnings news described above, the 
BSV (1998) and Rabin (2002b) models offer some plausible explanations. The propositions 
of the BSV (1998) and Rabin (2002b) models suggest that the influence of biases and 
heuristics on the investor is stronger when the investor observes a sequence or streak of 
earnings surprises (SUE) than a single earnings surprise at the most recent earnings 
announcement. But, in a slight departure from BSV (1998), Rabin (2002b) postulates that an 
investor observing a growing sequence of rising or falling signals at the arrival of each new 
rate behaves as though he is sampling from an ‘urn’ of red and blue balls without 
replacement. This leads the investor to believe that once a ball of a particular colour has 
been sampled in the current period, the probability of sampling a ball of the same colour in 
the next time period declines. This is despite the fact that the sampling is entirely a random 
process. The investor is, however, surprised if in the next time period, a ball of the same 
colour is sampled. Thus the investor overinfers if he observes three signals (e.g. earnings 
surprises) of the same sign in a row. Rabin (2002b) therefore argues that when the investor 
observes a signal of the same sign consecutively, he is likely to be influenced by the 
gambler’s fallacy. The gambler’s fallacy causes him to assign a higher probability of 
sampling that same signal during the third draw in the next time period. This means that the 
investor will be assigning a higher probability than another investor who is fully rational and 
Bayesian. The model posits the result of this type of investor behaviour if systematic could 
cause earnings momentum in stock price. 
The two theoretical models described above take our understanding of the investors’ 
response to quarterly earnings news a step further. They do this by proposing that the true 
driving force behind earnings momentum could be a combined effect of cognitive biases and 
heuristics on one hand and the distribution of streaks of earnings surprises on the other. The 
models argue fact that quarterly earnings news in itself (or the individual quarterly earnings 
surprise) offers little or limited information to investors and other market participants. For 
both models, the real informativeness of quarterly earnings news lies in its ability to confirm 
or terminate the continuation of a growing streak of earnings surprises of a particular sign. 
This confirmation or (termination) of a growing streak of earnings surprises seems to be the 
true force that drives momentum in stock prices. It is interesting to note that not once in the 
literature have researchers investigated this route as the possible source of underreaction 
and overreaction in security prices based on the predictions of these two models (at least as 
of the time when this research work began). Therefore this gap exists in the extant literature. 
My thesis seeks to fill this gap through the empirical testing of the impact of sequences or 
streaks of earnings surprises on the investor. Furthermore, since the existence of earnings-
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generated momentum is established in the literature, it is important to establish which of the 
existing theoretical models explains it best.  
Another gap identified in the literature is in the area of the resolution of value uncertainty 
around the earnings announcement date. Information uncertainty has been identified in the 
empirical literature to have a positive relation with earnings-generated momentum when it is 
conditional on the nature of the earnings news6. Uncertainty reduces the degree of 
anticipation of announced earnings and intensifies investors’ response to earnings at the 
announcement date when uncertainty is partially or fully resolved. An initial continuation of 
positive streaks will be good news to investors, while early termination of such streaks will be 
bad news. The converse is true for streaks of negative earnings surprises. This is another 
gap in the existing literature. My thesis seeks to fill this gap by conditioning information 
uncertainty on the streaks of negative or positive earnings surprises and examine its impact 
on earnings-generated momentum. In so doing, my thesis contributes to the larger stream of 
new research in the information uncertainty literature which sheds light on the way financial 
markets operate. 
1.6 Research objectives 
In order to fill the research gaps identified in section 1.5, my research objectives are set out 
below. Firstly, the objective of this study is to validate (or otherwise) the theoretical 
predictions of the representative agent’s investment behaviour using the two models 
identified in section 1.5. Furthermore, this study will amongst other things compare the BSV 
(1998) representative agent model with the Rabin (2002b) representative agent model based 
on how well their predictions fit within my S&P500 constituent sample companies. 
Additionally, I will employ the propositions of the Rain model to create streaks of earnings 
surprises (to be used as explanatory variables). Subsequently, these variables will be used 
to explain medium-term earnings-generated momentum and short-term post-earnings 
announcement drift in the returns of my sample stocks. Furthermore, I introduce information 
uncertainty variables conditional upon streaks of earnings surprises into the model to test for 
any interaction effect they may have on post-earnings announcement drift. Lastly, I 
investigate whether ‘streakiness’ in earnings is just a proxy for previously documented 
variables concerning the resolution of valuation uncertainty surrounding stocks. In order to 
achieve my objectives I have planned my empirical tests to cover the following: 
i. Modelling the medium-term earnings-generated momentum and reversion cycle from a 
representative agent’s perspective. Comparing the predictions of BSV’s model with that of 
Rabin’s model to ascertain which fits best with my data. 
                                                          
6
 I.e. on either bad or good news - see Zhang (2006a, 2006b), Jang et al (2005). 
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ii. Examine the influence of the gambler’s fallacy on the representative investor. This I do by 
examining his response to most recent earnings if he observes streaks of positive or 
negative earnings surprises over twelve quarters. 
iii. Examine the impact of streaks of earnings surprises on a three-day post-earnings 
announcement drift if the representative investor observes different lengths of streaks of 
positive and negative earnings surprises over a period of between two and twelve 
quarters. 
iv. Examine the interaction effect between streaks of earnings surprises and information 
uncertainty variables in explaining post-earnings announcement drift. I examine whether 
‘streakiness’ in earnings is just one way in which general valuation uncertainty is resolved 
or whether it constitutes a separate anomaly worthy of study in its own right. 
By performing the empirical tests enumerated above (given the hypotheses), I intend to 
show that streaks of positive (negative) earnings surprises represent that component of the 
earnings news which presages consistent rises or falls in stock prices. This component is the 
unexpected part of quarterly changes in earnings which forms the ‘true earnings news’ by 
confirming either continuation or termination of streaks of earnings surprises of a particular 
sign. That component (i.e. the innovation in quarterly earnings) predicts earnings-generated 
momentum which subsumes the systematic component of price momentum (Chordia and 
Shivakumar (2006)). If earnings are predictable, it means that the upcoming earnings 
announcement does not constitute news in its true sense (Bernard and Thomas (1990)). 
This is because the ‘news’ has already been anticipated by investors based on an on-going 
earnings streak. 
1.7 Research contributions 
My intention for this study is to show how models of representative agents (investors) form 
their beliefs about firms’ earnings. I also intend to show through this study that there is a true 
underlying component of unexpected earnings (innovation) which drives earnings-generated 
momentum in stock returns. In this case, I seek to show that the true innovation in quarterly 
earnings lies in the confirmation or termination of growing positive or negative streaks of 
quarterly earnings surprises.  Furthermore, this study demonstrates that the informativeness 
of this innovation in quarterly earnings is still valid even in very short holding periods of three 
days around the quarterly earnings announcement date. The presence of earnings-
generated momentum in stocks within this three-day window makes it far less likely that 
‘streakiness’ in quarterly earnings is only found to be value-relevant because of some error 
in benchmarking returns or in earnings expectations. This is because neither benchmark 
returns nor earnings expectations typically change much on any given day (Fama (1998)). 
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This is therefore a confirmation that the earnings-generated momentum in a longer holding 
period of three months is not a result of external noise in the market.  
This thesis makes a number of contributions to the existing literature. Broadly, it contributes 
to the empirical finance literature by contributing to the development of a richer forecasting 
model that could be used in practice. More specific contributions from this study to the 
literature include the following: 
 This study highlights potential portfolio strategies which could be exploited within the 
behavioural finance models by both researchers and practitioners. 
 
 Information uncertainty is known to exacerbate earnings-generated momentum when 
it is conditioned on the nature of earnings news (Zhang 2006a). With respect to 
information uncertainty, this study will illustrate the contribution of this characteristic 
of information uncertainty in improving the potential portfolio strategies when 
information uncertainty is conditioned on streaks of positive and negative earnings 
surprises and on their various lengths. 
 
 This study further illustrates that sequences or streaks of earnings changes in the 
behavioural research literature can be a possible candidate to be used as an 
explanatory variable for the study of earnings-generated momentum or post-earnings 
announcement drift. Prior to the time when this study began, there is no known 
research in the literature that has used this metric. Loh and Warachka’s (2012) paper 
on a cross-section of stock returns and streaks of earnings surprises is a path-
breaking endeavour in this area of research. However, my thesis and the study by 
Loh and Warachka (2012) are fundamentally different, as both follow different 
approaches. 
 
 One of the major arguments against earnings-generated momentum is that price 
reactions after earnings announcements and the subsequent momentum effect may 
not be related to investor underreaction to quarterly earnings news. Some 
researchers argue that inasmuch as investors may underreact to different news 
events about firms, it is difficult to single out the exact impact of investors’ 
underreaction to earnings news on stock prices. However, studies involving short 
window (e.g. daily) events have an obvious advantage in that the daily expected 
returns are very close to zero, therefore the choice of model for measuring expected 
returns does not have much impact on the interpretation and inference drawn from 
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the abnormal returns measured. In light of this argument, I test for the presence of 
earnings-generated momentum in a very short window of three days beginning a day 
before the earnings announcement date. The results of this test indicate that 
earnings-generated momentum is present in the three-day buy-and-hold Fama-
French three-factor model adjusted abnormal returns. Thus, the results confirm that 
earnings-generated momentum exists in both short- and medium-term market price 
adjustments and might not be attributable to external noise in the market. 
 
 Some researchers argue that because analysts provide forecasts of earnings for a 
fee, it is unlikely that most investors (especially individual investors) will be buying 
such information, and as such analysts’ forecasts are not representative of investors’ 
expectations of future quarterly earnings. Contrary to this position, my findings show 
that analysts’ forecast of earnings is an appropriate proxy for investors’ expectation 
of future earnings. However, it remains to be confirmed how information contained in 
an analyst’s forecasts disseminates across different investors given that not all 
investors subscribe to this information source. 
 
 The distribution of earnings surprises in my data sample does not reveal the kind of 
symmetry predicted in the BSV model. Hence my empirical results support Rabin 
model over BSV’s7. 
 
1.8 Outline of thesis 
The remaining part of this thesis is organised as follows: chapter 2 presents the literature 
review on theoretical representative agent earnings momentum models, medium-term 
earnings-generated momentum and short-term post-earnings announcement drift. The 
chapter also discusses the two broad classes of behavioural finance models and compares 
representative agent models with noise trader models. Furthermore, it discusses the various 
earnings and price momentum strategies and the relation between earnings and price 
momentum. Chapter 3 describes the data sample and the main methods employed in the 
empirical analysis. The chapter also discusses the major variables and proxies used in the 
empirical analyses. Chapter 4 introduces the first empirical analysis and shows the relation 
between the sequence of annualised quarterly earning changes and three-month buy-and-
hold Fama-French three-factor model adjusted returns. The chapter examines various 
investor responses to prices by regressing different lengths of positive (negative) sequences 
of earnings changes against the abnormal returns. The tests in this chapter show how the 
                                                          
7
 See Barberis et al (1998) for full details of symmetry between momentum and reversal regimes. 
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representative investor responds to stock prices when observing positive and negative 
sequences of quarterly earnings changes under the influence of the gambler’s fallacy over a 
period of twelve quarters. The chapter also compares the BSV (1998) model with the Rabin 
(2002b) model in terms of their predictions of symmetry in quarterly earnings surprises. I 
compare the symmetry of the sequences of earnings surprises in my S&P500 sample frame 
to the predictions of each of the two models. Chapter 5 draws from the conclusions of 
chapter 4 and tests for the representative investor’s response to stock price within three 
days around the earnings announcement date. This is the period when the influence of the 
gambler’s fallacy on the investor is most intense as he observes the arrival of an earnings 
surprise confirming or terminating a streak. Additionally, the chapter tests the price impact of 
positive (negative) streaks of earnings surprises as the streaks lengthen. It also shows the 
impact of the interaction effect between streaks of earnings surprises and information 
uncertainty on post-earnings announcement drift. The results of this chapter also show that 
earnings ‘streakiness’ is one component in the resolution of valuation uncertainty. Chapter 6 
concludes the study, outlines the limitations of this study, and offers recommendations for 
future research. 
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Chapter 2  
Literature review 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter comprises three main parts. The first part reviews the extant literature on 
momentum anomaly. The momentum anomaly literature covers two main sources of 
momentum in stock price – earnings momentum and price momentum. Chordia and 
Shivakumar (2006) define earnings momentum and price momentum thus: “Earnings 
momentum refers to the fact that firms reporting unexpectedly high earnings subsequently 
outperform firms reporting unexpectedly low earnings. The superior performance lasts for 
about nine months after the earnings announcement. Price momentum refers to the strategy 
that buys past winners and sells past losers, which earns abnormal returns for a period of up 
to one year after the execution of the strategy”. Earnings and price momentum are two 
amongst many of such phenomena in which stock prices depart from their fundamental 
value for weeks, months and even years after relevant information arrives in the market. An 
earnings momentum trading strategy shows that a portfolio which takes a long position on 
firms with unexpectedly high earnings (good news stocks) and a short position on firms with 
unexpectedly low earnings (bad news stocks) earns superior returns. Similarly, a price 
momentum trading strategy shows that a portfolio which takes a long position on stocks that 
outperformed in the past (winner stocks) and a short position on stocks that underperformed 
in the past (loser stocks) earns superior returns (see Chordia and Shivakumar (2006)). 
Earnings and price momentum remain two of the most pervasive stock returns anomalies in 
the study of modern finance. There is growing interest in the study of these phenomena: 
standard finance models have so far been unable to provide plausible explanations for their 
occurrence in stock returns.  
The growing literature on momentum can be classified into earnings and price momentum 
literature. Although price and earnings momentum are related anomalies, the primary focus 
of this thesis is on models that can be used to empirically study earnings momentum. I 
decided to review price momentum literature as it is a very important part of the entire 
momentum literature. The second part reviews some of the most popular theoretical and 
empirical behavioural finance models in the literature. The models of interest to this thesis 
are those we can use to study earnings momentum, hence the choice of the Rabin (2002b) 
and Barberis, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998) models. The hypotheses tested in this thesis are 
largely drawn from the propositions of the two models mentioned above. The third part of 
this chapter reviews the information uncertainty literature.  
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2.2 Stock returns predictability and return anomalies 
Stock returns predictability has received much attention in the literature over the years. This 
is not just because of its implications for investment practitioners but also because of its 
important implications for the efficient market models. Known variables with predictive ability 
in standard finance literature include the financial ratios, such as the earnings-price ratio, 
dividend-price ratio, and the book-to-market ratio8. Furthermore, there is growing evidence in 
the literature dating back to the early 1980s which shows that past stock returns and 
earnings surprises (earnings changes) predict stock returns both in time series and cross-
sectional data. The past returns and earnings surprises capture large drifts in future returns 
which other risk factors pertaining to market, size, and book-to-market (common risk factors) 
are unable to explain. 
Researchers have also shown that there is a pattern of return predictability with stock return 
anomalies such as seasonal anomalies like the January effect, Holiday effect, Halloween 
effect, day-of-the-week effect, turn-of-the-month, turn-of-the-year effects and others. While 
there is no consensus amongst researchers on potential explanations for this pattern of 
predictability, several researchers believe that behavioural finance theories could offer 
potential explanations for the occurrence of these anomalies. Some of these studies include 
Harris (1986), Jones, Pearce, and Wilson (1987), Haugen and Lakonishok (1988), Keim and 
Stambaugh (1984), Ball and Bowers (1986), Ariel (1987), Jaffe and Westerfield (1985), and 
Gibbons and Hess (1981). The findings of these studies challenge the tenets of market 
efficiency upon which the standard equilibrium models are formed. In addition, these findings 
make it important to develop new theories that can account for the anomalies, and this is 
where the study of behavioural finance becomes appropriate9. Some academics argue for 
the possibility that the presence of these anomalies in stock returns is a mere ignis fatuus 
resulting from incorrect models and data mining (Merton 1985). This makes it even more 
imperative to test the presence of anomalies in stock returns in out-of-sample data in order 
to affirm their existence and causes.  
Lakonishok and Smidt (1988), using ninety years of daily data from the Dow Jones Industrial 
Average find a pattern of returns predictability in the stock index. One unique characteristic 
of this study is the sample period, which is longer than the majority of the previous studies. 
The authors examine various anomalies including the monthly, semi-monthly, weekend, 
holiday, end-of-December, and turn-of-the-month anomalies. Their results show the 
existence of persistent anomalous returns patterns around the turn of the week, the turn of 
                                                          
8
 See Fama and French (1988), Campbell and Shiller (1988), Goetzmann and Jorion (1993), Hodrick 
(1992), Lewellen (2004), among others. 
9
 See Foster and Viswanathan (1987), Admati and Pfleiderer (1988a, 1988b). 
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the month, the turn of the year, and holidays. The results show that average returns are 
considerably negative on Mondays. There is also a sharp rise in the price of the index 
around the turn of the month, which is far more than the total monthly price increase. 
Moreover, there is anomalous price increase from the last trading day before Christmas to 
the end of the year. Furthermore, the return on the index before holidays is twenty times 
more than the normal rate of return. It is very unlikely that these anomalous returns 
behaviours, as documented by Lakonishok and Smidt (1988), are of random occurrence in 
nature, given the length of sample period. For the same reason, one can also argue that it is 
unlikely that the existence of these anomalies in returns can be attributed to data snooping, 
selection bias, or noise. This is more so because recent studies carried out using data 
samples from other markets show that these anomalies still exist. Such studies include 
Sharma and Narayan (2014), who find that the turn-of-the-month anomaly affects returns 
and volatility of returns; Huber and Kirchler (2013) who find positive abnormal returns in 
post-presidential elections in the United States amongst companies that contribute to the 
presidential campaign fund of the winner; and Swinkels and van Vliet (2012), who find that 
amongst portfolio strategies that are based on the five main calendar effects, the turn-of-the-
month and Halloween effects are the most profitable. More recently, some studies argue that 
seasonal anomalies are the result of the impact of investor psychology on stock prices at 
that time of the year. Bialkowski, Etebari, and Wisniewski (2012) investigate stock returns 
during Ramadan in fourteen predominantly Muslim countries. The study finds that returns 
during Ramadan are far higher than at any other time of the year. The authors attribute the 
superior return to the notion that Ramadan positively affects investor psychology by 
promoting solidarity and optimism, which extends to investment in these stock markets.  
Another set of studies find predictability in stock market returns around major firm events 
such as the earnings announcement. This is known in the literature as the post-earnings 
announcement drift (or earnings momentum) in stock returns. Ball and Brown (1968) were 
one of the first to document the predictability of stock market abnormal returns following 
earnings announcements. The authors show that after earnings announcements, the 
cumulative abnormal returns of ‘good news’ (‘bad news’) companies continue to drift 
upwards (downwards) in the days, weeks, and even months following earnings 
announcement. ‘Good news’ (‘bad news’) companies refer to those companies that report 
actual earning outcomes which are higher (lower) than expected. Reinganum (1981) posits 
that the predictability of abnormal returns by unexpected earnings is a consequence of poor 
specification of the benchmark model used in measuring expected returns. Other studies 
such as Merton (1985) and Ball (1978) take a similar stance to Reinganum. However, in 
response to Reinganum (1981), Rendleman, Jones, and Latane (1982) provide evidence to 
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show that abnormal returns following earnings announcements are predictable throughout 
the 1970s. Rendleman et al (1982), using a large data sample, find that the unexpected 
earnings component of earnings news predicts future abnormal returns. This finding 
contradicts the findings of Reinganum (1981). In addition to these papers supporting the 
predictability of returns following earnings announcements, there is a deluge of studies 
which document the predictability of returns following earnings announcements and proffer 
reasons for this predictability. They include Bernard and Thomas (1989), who document that 
their results could not be reconciled with the explanation of incomplete risk adjustment given 
by some researchers as the reason for the predictability of returns after earnings 
announcements. The authors rather posit that the delayed price response to new information 
explanation supports the observed predictability in returns. Furthermore, the authors suggest 
that the reason for the delayed response to information could be because investors do not 
fully recognise in their forecast models, the implication of the information in the current 
earnings news for future earnings. Other authors such as Foster (1977), Forster, Olsen, and 
Shevlin (1984), Watts (1978), and Jackson and Johnson (2006) amongst others document 
evidence to show that returns are predictable after earnings announcements. More recent 
studies using benchmark models such as the Fama-French three-factor models and Carhart 
(1997) four-factor model also document the presence of return predictability following 
earnings announcement. This finding is in contrast to the claims that return predictability can 
be attributed to misspecification in the capital asset pricing model (CAPM). 
A number of studies show evidence of predictability in medium- to long-term returns reversal 
and short-term returns continuation. De Bondt and Thaler (1985, 1987) are amongst the 
earliest set of studies to show that in long horizons, the reversal of stock returns is 
predictable. De Bondt and Thaler (1985, 1987) show that in the long term, the returns of 
extreme prior ‘winner’ or ‘loser’ stocks are reversed in the subsequent three to five years. 
The authors find that extreme prior loser stocks substantially outperform extreme prior 
winner stocks over a time horizon of about a five-year holding period. Prior ‘winner’ (‘loser’) 
stocks refer to those stocks which consistently posted high (low) excess returns over the 
past three to five years. The authors attribute the predictability of long-term reversal to the 
fact that people ‘overreact’ to series of dramatic and unexpected news events. The 
‘overreaction' hypothesis maintains that the predictability of long-term returns reversal can 
be attributed to the belief that investors are swayed by excessive optimism (pessimism) after 
a series of ‘good’ (‘bad’) news about the firm’s fundamentals. And, as the saying goes, 
“whatever goes up must come down and vice versa,” hence the long-term reversal. Bremer 
and Sweeney (1991) also document the predictability of returns reversals in a short horizon 
of ten days. The authors observe that large extremely large negative ten-day returns are 
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followed by larger than expected average positive returns in the following days. This price 
adjustment occurs within a short period of two days and so is devoid of any methodological 
errors in calculating expected returns. Other authors who document the predictability of 
return reversal include Chopra, Lakonishok, and Ritter (1992), Brown, Harlow, and Tinic 
(1988), and Brown and Harlow (1988), amongst many others. Short-term return continuation, 
otherwise known as momentum in stock price, is another predictable return anomaly widely 
studied in literature. Stocks that performed well (winners) in the past three to twelve months 
tend to perform well in the subsequent three to twelve months and vice versa10. 
If the assumptions of the efficient market hypothesis hold true, these anomalies should not 
be predictive for a number of reasons. First, since the efficient market hypothesis assumes 
new information is instantaneously incorporated into price, historical information should not 
be able to predict future prices. Second, if the anomalies in returns are random events, then 
they will cancel each other out and should not show systematic pattern in their occurrence. 
So far, there is no plausible explanation by the proponents of the efficient market theory to 
account for the predictability of returns around seasons and company events. Researchers 
find that empirical evidence does not support other arguments for the predictability of returns 
around these periods such as methodological flaws and the misspecification of benchmark 
models. The predictability of returns using past price and earnings information is particularly 
a direct challenge to the weak and semi-strong forms of efficient market hypothesis 
respectively. Additionally, the predictability of returns has been tested out-of-sample and 
found to be persistent over the years and across different markets, which rules out the 
possibility of data snooping being responsible for the predictability. 
2.3 Momentum anomaly and its trading strategies 
Although the primary focus of this thesis is earnings momentum models, it is however 
pertinent for me to review earnings momentum as well as price momentum literature, 
because, until recently, the, price momentum phenomenon remained the most widely 
studied and applied of the two momentum anomalies. However, this trend is changing as 
more research on earnings momentum emerges which shows new evidence both on its 
existence and how it can be exploited by investors and investment practitioners. 
Given the nature of the predictability of stock returns following earnings announcements and 
in periods of bad and good market performances, research shows that investors and 
investment practitioners seek to exploit any abnormal profit opportunities that may exist in 
these anomalies. They do this by creating stock trading strategies that are based on 
                                                          
10
 See Jegadeesh and Titman (1993, 2001). 
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predictable phenomena such as earnings momentum and price momentum. In this regard, 
momentum anomalies provide some of the most popular trading strategies. There are two 
fundamental momentum trading strategies – the price momentum and earnings momentum 
strategies. Between these two strategies, price momentum has received far more attention 
than earnings momentum both in research and as an investment strategy. The profitability of 
momentum strategies has also been the focus of various researchers across different 
markets. The evidence from these researchers shows that momentum strategies are 
profitable in the majority of stock markets in the world. 
2.3.1 Price momentum strategies 
Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) is one of the earliest empirical studies to document the 
existence of momentum in stock returns. The authors examine the returns of individual 
stocks, and report that past stock returns in the prior three to twelve months are able to 
predict future returns in the same direction. Put another way, this finding says that there is a 
short-run continuation in stock prices over a period of three to twelve months; stock prices 
continue to trend upwards for past winner-stocks and downwards for past loser-stocks within 
this time horizon. The authors find that the price momentum strategy, which is a strategy that 
buys (sells) prior winner (loser) stock, has positive returns over a period of between a three- 
and twelve-month holding-period. By employing various mixes of formation and holding 
period strategies (producing a total of thirty-two different portfolios), the authors show that 
the strategy produces positive returns throughout their sample period. Jegadeesh and 
Titman (1993) posit that price momentum is not related to delayed price reactions to 
common factors rather their finding suggests that price momentum relates to delayed price 
reactions to some particular firm-specific information. Given that the price momentum 
strategy is only positive within the first twelve months after portfolio formation and negative 
afterwards, Jegadeesh and Titman argue that the most likely explanation for this is that 
transactions by investors who buy past winners and sell past losers cause the price to move 
away from its fundamental value temporarily which then causes a subsequent price 
overreaction. An alternative explanation is that price momentum is a consequence of 
investors underreacting to information regarding the short-term prospects of firms and 
overreacting to information about their long-term prospects. This is more so because the 
nature of the information (such as earnings forecasts) which investors use to assess firms’ 
short-term prospects is different from the nature of the more complex information set which 
investors use to assess firms’ long-term prospects. Advancing their earlier study on price 
momentum, Jegadeesh and Titman (2001) further examine the findings in their 1993 paper 
to ascertain whether the strategy remains profitable. In this latter study, the authors seek to 
provide alternative explanations for price momentum profits using out-of-sample data. They 
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document that evidence from current findings supports the idea that momentum profits can 
be attributed to investors’ underreaction to new information about firms’ prospects. Again, 
patterns of returns similar to those in Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) are seen in their 2001 
study.  
In a study similar to Jegadeesh and Titman (1993, 2001), Chan, Jegadeesh, and Lakonishok 
(1999) evaluate the profitability of price momentum strategies and find them to be profitable 
in the short- to medium-term horizons. However, the authors posit that although price 
momentum strategies are profitable, the extent of their profitability depends largely on how 
well investors manage their trading costs. In contrast to Chan, Jegadeesh, and Lakonishok 
(1999), Korajczyk and Sadka (2004) test the profitability of price momentum trading 
strategies after taking into account the impact of trading costs on such strategies. The 
authors find that the robustness of momentum profits depends on the weighting type 
adopted during portfolio formation. Their results show that momentum strategies which are 
based on liquidity-weighted portfolios and a hybrid of liquidity/value-weighted portfolios of 
highly capitalised companies are profitable even after accounting for transaction costs. 
However, the momentum profits of strategies based on equal-weighted portfolios dissipate 
when transaction costs are considered.  
Chan, Hameed, and Tong (2000) evaluate the profitability of price momentum strategies in 
international equity markets. The authors also find that price momentum strategies are 
profitable even in international stock markets. The finding therefore supports the argument 
that price momentum anomaly cannot be thought of as a localised market effect. A more 
recent paper by Leippold and Lohre (2012) examines specifically the profitability of price 
momentum strategies in international stock markets. They find that price momentum 
strategies are profitable in these markets and further state that the profits improve in high 
information uncertainty markets. The last statement leads the authors to conclude that 
momentum profits may be rationalised with a model of investors’ underreaction to firms’ 
fundamental news. This assertion supports the argument that price momentum will be better 
explained by behavioural finance models. The findings on price momentum are in direct 
violation of the tenets of the efficient market hypothesis – the weak form of market efficiency 
in particular. If the markets are efficient, as described by Eugene Fama and other 
proponents of market efficiency in the 1970s, past security prices and returns will not be able 
to predict future prices, as the information contained in them is already fully incorporated into 
the price.  
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2.3.2 Earnings momentum strategies 
Early work on earnings momentum was first documented by Ball and Brown (1968). Ball and 
Brown indicate the existence of a possible relation between the sign and magnitude of the 
unexpected earnings and subsequent stock price adjustment. The authors document that 
following an earnings announcement, cumulative abnormal returns tend to drift upwards 
(downwards) for stocks that have good (bad) earnings news. Good earnings news is 
reflected in unanticipated earnings increases and bad earnings news is reflected in 
unexpected earnings decreases. If there is a possible relation between the sign and 
magnitude of unexpected earnings and a stock’s returns after earnings announcement, then 
a trading strategy may exists which will exploit this relation. Other studies such as Foster 
(1977), and Foster, Olsen, and Shevlin (1984) show that this relation exists in a time series, 
while Latane and Jones (1979), Bernard and Thomas (1989), Bernard, Thomas, and Wahlen 
(1997), Chan, Jegadeesh, and Lakonishok (1996), Chordia and Shivakumar (2006), and Liu, 
Strong, and Xu (2003) show that the relation also exists in a cross-section of stock returns. 
Chan, Jegadeesh, and Lakonishok’s (1996) paper is one of the earliest studies to provide in 
detail the effectiveness of an earnings momentum-based trading strategy. By implementing 
an earnings momentum-based strategy using standardised unexpected earnings (SUE), 
Chan et al establish the existence of earnings momentum anomaly in stocks listed in United 
States exchanges. Stock prices of companies with positive SUE continue to drift upwards 
and those of companies with negative SUE continue to drift downwards for between three 
and nine months following the earnings announcement. Therefore, the earnings momentum 
anomaly implies that stocks of companies with large and positive SUE continue to 
outperform stocks of companies with large and negative SUE in the days, weeks and even 
months after earnings announcement. The relation between the size and sign of SUE and 
the magnitude of drift in returns following earnings announcement is found to be a positive 
correlation. 
Chordia and Shivakumar (2006), in a slight departure from Chan et al (1996), examine the 
relation between earnings momentum and price momentum in both time series and cross-
sectional tests. The authors document that the explanatory power of the price momentum 
proxy is subsumed by the systematic component of the earnings momentum proxy in a zero-
investment trading strategy that takes a long position in stocks with high SUE and a short 
position in stocks with low SUE. According to the authors, both proxies individually explain 
abnormal stock returns, but the earnings momentum effect is more intense and dies out 
more quickly than the price momentum effect. This finding suggests that although earnings 
and price momentum anomalies are separate phenomena, they are most likely to start as a 
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result of market underreaction to earnings news. Furthermore, an alternative explanation for 
the above is that since momentum in the stock price is strongest around the earnings 
announcement, it is therefore not surprising that the earnings momentum strategy subsumes 
the price momentum strategy close to earnings announcement dates. This may be because 
the earnings momentum strategy is strengthened by an incomplete response to information 
in the short-term earnings announcement. Also, as Chan et al observe, the reason why the 
price momentum strategy may last longer than the earnings momentum strategy may simply 
be because it exploits the slow response to the market’s wider information set and even the 
firm’s longer-term profitability prospects. Hong, Lee, and Swaminathan (2003) examine the 
profitability of earnings momentum strategies based on analysts’ forecast revisions in eleven 
international equity markets. The authors report that although analysts’ revision is persistent 
in all the countries, the profitability of this strategy varies across them. Liu, Strong, and Xu 
(2003) test drift in returns using all earnings momentum metrics such as those based on time 
series of earnings (historical earning outcomes), market prices, and analysts’ forecasts. 
They find that each of these three measures individually explains the earnings momentum 
anomaly. 
2.3.2.1 Evidence of post-earnings announcement drift in the literature 
Post-earnings announcement drift means that stock returns drift in the same direction as the 
earnings surprise for some time after earnings announcement (Loh and Warachka (2012), 
Hew et al (1996)). Stock returns drift upwards for firms with positive earnings surprises while 
the opposite happens to firms with negative earnings surprises. This phenomenon has 
proved to be a challenge to the efficient market hypothesis. The existence of post-earnings 
announcement drift was documented in the literature even before the 1970s. Jones and 
Litzenberger (1970) in their study of two groups of firms find that there is significant post-
earnings announcement drift for firms with positive quarterly earnings and these firms 
outperform the market in ten different instances. They argue that if at quarterly earnings 
announcement dates, investors face earnings that are significantly higher than anticipated; 
this will lead the investors to make an upward revision of the fundamental value of the firms’ 
common stocks. 
Foster (1977), in his study of the times series behaviour of quarterly earnings, observes that 
there is a significant relation between the sign and size of the unexpected earnings and the 
cumulative residual (abnormal) returns in a -20 day to +20 day trading window around the 
earnings announcement. He finds that the time-series models that incorporate seasonality in 
quarterly earnings show more significant association with the cumulative residual returns 
than the non-seasonality forecasting models. Foster, Olsen, and Shevlin (1984) report that 
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the systematic post-earnings announcement drifts in returns are only found in a sub-set of 
earnings expectations models. They document that price-based earnings expectations 
models show no systematic post-announcement drifts within a [+1 to +60] trading day 
period. However, they also find that for the class of earnings expectations models that 
capture systematic drifts in returns in a [+1 to +60] trading day period, the drift is present in 
each year of the sample period (1974 – 1981). They report that the sign and magnitude of 
the unexpected earnings surprise explain the cumulative abnormal returns; the more positive 
(negative) the unexpected earnings change, the more positive (negative) the post-earnings 
announcement drift. In older literature, many arguments on why post-earnings 
announcement drift persists dwell mainly on whether the model used to capture the market’s 
expectations of earnings is appropriate or whether there is a misspecification of the 
regression model or the proxies for earnings surprises or the subsequent price movements 
are incorrect. Foster et al (1984) explore this line of argument fairly exhaustively and confirm 
the presence of post-earnings announcement drift in all, regardless of which expectation and 
benchmark models are used. So the question is more about why post-earnings 
announcement drift occurs rather than if it does. Another important piece of research by Hew 
et al (1996) finds evidence that post-earnings announcement drift is present amongst small 
firms but not large firms in 206 firms listed on the London Stock Exchange between 1988 
and 1993. The authors offer no explanation for the disparity between the small and large 
firms’ results. However, in contrast to the finding of Hew et al, Liu, Strong, and Xu (2003) 
report the presence of post-earnings announcement drift in the UK markets. They use 
various measures of earnings surprise based on time series, market prices, and analysts’ 
forecasts of earnings to confirm that stock returns drift in the direction of the earnings 
surprise after earnings announcement. They also document that each of the earnings 
surprise measures significantly explains post-earnings announcement drift in these stocks. 
Liu et al’s (2003) study is essentially an extension of Hew et al’s (1996) work, albeit their 
work covers a larger number of firms (835 firms) and over a longer period of time (1988 – 
1998). Unlike the Hew et al (1996) results, Liu et al (2003) find post-earnings announcement 
drift to be present in both small and large firms’ stocks. Truong (2011) shows evidence of 
post-earnings announcement drift in the Chinese stock market between 1994 and 2009.  
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2.3.2.2 Post-earnings announcement drift and earnings surprise measures 
There are many papers in the finance literature which show evidence that earnings surprises 
are able to explain the post-earnings announcement drift seen in stocks returns after the 
earnings announcement11. There are also divergent opinions amongst academics and 
practitioners as to what is the most appropriate measure of earnings surprise which will 
effectively capture investors’ expectations of future earning outcomes. It is absolutely crucial 
to find a metric which captures the full change in the market’s expectations of earnings when 
earnings numbers are revealed on announcement dates. Only such a measure can give an 
accurate explanation of stock price behaviour following earnings announcement. 
Livnat and Mendenhall (2006) show that post-earnings announcement drift is significantly 
larger when earnings surprise is calculated using analysts’ forecasts and realised earnings 
from the I/B/E/S database than when using models that are constructed based on times 
series of historical actual earnings. They report that the disparity between the two measures 
lies in the differences between analysts’ forecasts and the times series model as measures 
of investor expectations of future earnings. Furthermore, the authors document that since 
the two measures of earnings surprise lead to different return patterns around future 
earnings announcements, it is likely that they capture different types of mispricing in stock 
prices. Rather than following Livnat and Mendenhall’s (2006) mispricing line of argument, 
one may wish to consider the weight and strength of the information content of analysts’ 
forecasts in contrast to that of the time series of historical actual earnings. It is well known 
that investors regard forecasts by analysts and other investment professionals very highly 
(Gleason and Lee 2003). This is more likely because the large information set which is 
available to analysts to incorporate into their forecasts will be judged to be more informative 
than the stale historical earnings. Again, analysts revise their forecasts on a monthly basis to 
incorporate any new information that may change firms’ future prospects. By intuition, it is 
not surprising that analysts’ forecasts display a larger change in investors’ expectations of 
earnings outcomes than do the historical actual earnings. In a study closely related to Livnat 
and Mendenhall (2006), Lerman, Livnat, and Mendenhall (2007) compare the predictive 
ability of various earnings surprise proxies measured using historical time series of the 
earnings model and analysts’ forecast-based model. The authors show that the post-
earnings announcement drift is significantly larger when earnings surprise is measured using 
the analysts’ forecast model than when the historical time series model is used. They also 
report that combining both models improves the predictive power for post-earnings 
announcement drift over and above the individual models. Liu, Strong, and Xu (2003) 
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 See Liu et al (2003), Loh and Warachka (2012). 
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document that of the three measures of earnings surprise they used; the price-based 
earnings surprise measure captures the strongest drift in returns around earnings 
announcement. They also report that in a two-dimensional analysis, the drift associated with 
the price-based earnings surprise measure subsumes the drift associated with the other two 
earnings surprise measures. This may suggest that the price-based measure of earnings 
surprise contains a broader information set encompassing the information sets of both the 
times series and analysts’ forecasts-based measures of earnings surprise. 
Loh and Warachka (2012) take the study of post-earnings announcement drift to a new level 
with their introduction of a new metric which has not been previously used in post-earnings 
announcement drift research. The new metric is the streaks of earnings surprises, put into 
different categories according to their length and sign. The authors find that investors 
underreact to streaks of earnings surprises of the same sign in similar manner to how they 
underreact to individual quarterly earnings surprises, but with higher intensity. The authors 
argue that if the most recent earnings surprise confirms an existing streak, the post-earnings 
announcement drift is significant and strong, whereas the post-earnings announcement drift 
is weak if a streak is terminated at the arrival of the most recent earnings surprise. They 
conclude that post-earnings announcement drift has a time series component that is 
consistent with the gambler’s fallacy, as Rabin (2002b) predicts12.  
Zolotoy (2012) models the relation between stock prices and accounting earnings by 
allowing for divergent opinions amongst investors and other market participants in 
measuring the expected company earnings. In a number of ways this work is similar to the 
work of Lerman et al (2007) reviewed earlier. Zolotoy introduces a new measure of earnings 
surprise which he terms ‘implied earnings surprise’. This measure is a weighted average of 
the random walk, time series, and the analysts’ measures of earnings surprise. The weights 
of the individual earnings surprise measures are directly taken from the stock price. The 
author finds that measures from the random walk and the analyst forecast models have 
different forecast accuracy. The implied measure of earnings surprises is associated with the 
highest post-earnings announcement drift, over and above that associated with the 
measures of both the time series and analysts’ forecast models. He argues that using the 
implied earnings surprise model encompasses the beliefs of different types of investors in 
the market. For example, the implied earnings surprise measure incorporates the level of 
investor sophistication as well as the type of model that the investor uses in forecasting 
earnings. He goes further to note that the announcement day stock returns will reflect a 
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mixture of earnings news, as measured by the plethora of earnings forecast models used by 
market participants. 
The debate amongst academics and researchers on the best measure of earnings surprise 
that fully captures investors’ expectations about company earnings is as old as the post-
earnings announcement anomaly itself. There is no consensus as to which of the models 
best captures investors’ change in expectations when the earnings outcomes are 
announced. 
2.3.2.3 Is post-earnings announcement drift an underreaction to changes in analysts’ 
 and investors’ expectations? 
Although there are many studies on post-earnings announcement drift, the question still 
remains as to what causes the phenomenon. There are divergent opinions as to what 
causes stock prices to drift for days or even months after earnings announcement in the 
same direction as the earnings surprise. Many academics argue that post-earnings 
announcement drift occurs as a result of the analysts’ and investors’ underreaction to stock 
prices as a result of the change in their expectations of earnings at the earnings 
announcement date. Others argue that post-earnings announcement drift occurs as a result 
of misspecification in models that academics and researchers use to calculate the investors’ 
ex ante earnings expectations (Bernard and Thomas (1989), Jacob et al (2000)). Still others 
argue that post-earnings announcement drift is explained by risk factors, such as liquidity, 
which the expectation models do not capture (Sadka 2006). Sadka explains that the 
unexpected systematic component of firm-level liquidity risk is priced within the context of 
post-earnings announcement drift portfolio returns. 
The most common explanation for the cause of post-earnings announcement drift in the 
research literature is analyst and investor underreaction to earnings news. Underreaction to 
earnings announcements means that the average stock return in the period following good 
news (higher than expected earnings realisation) is larger than the average stock return in 
the period following bad news (lower than expected earnings realisation ). The difference in 
average returns between the two groups of stocks shows that the market does not fully 
incorporate the information contained in current earnings news for future earnings forecasts. 
Evidence in the literature shows that both analysts and investors underreact to earnings 
news, and this underreaction leads to post-earnings announcement drift in the short term13. 
Bernard and Thomas (1989, 1990), Freeman and Tse (1989), Mendenhall (1991), and 
Wiggins (1991) are among some of the early papers to show that post-earnings 
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 See Abarbanell and Bernard (1992), Constantinou, Forbes, and Skerratt (2003), Mikhail, Walther, 
and Willis (2003). 
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announcement drift could be a result of an incomplete initial response of market participants 
to the earnings announcement. Mande and Kwak (1996) find strong evidence suggesting 
that Japanese analysts underreact to information in earnings announcements and this 
underreaction leads to post-earnings announcement drift in the Japanese market. The 
authors argue that the underreaction is strongest amongst firms with predominantly 
permanent components in their earnings. Comparing the level of underreaction amongst 
earnings prepared under Japanese GAAP and US GAAP, the authors show that analysts’ 
underreaction (and consequently post-earnings announcement drift) is stronger when US 
GAAP is used. They also find that US analysts discount information contained in earnings to 
a larger degree than their Japanese counterparts do. Bernard (1992) reviews a variety of 
evidence present in the prior literature on market efficiency and company earnings. The 
survey concludes that on average the initial response to earnings announcements is an 
underreaction. This underreaction to earnings announcements by investors is the cause of 
the subsequent drift in stock prices. 
Abarbanell and Bernard (1992) argue that analysts’ underreaction to earnings 
announcements can explain about half of the magnitude of drift in stock prices following 
earnings announcements. The authors believe that security analysts’ behaviour partially 
explains stock price underreaction to earnings news. In a review paper, Kothari (2001) 
shows that post-earnings announcement drift (which has been persistent in tests carried out 
over the prior thirty years) appears to be consistent with the investor underreaction 
argument. The author suggests that post-earnings announcement drift is a result of 
investors’ underreaction to value-relevant information in earnings announcements. He 
suggests that alternatively post-earnings announcement drift may be a result of investors’ 
sluggishness in the processing of earnings information. Chordia and Shivakumar (2005) 
argue that part of the underreaction to earnings surprises can be attributed to the ‘inflation 
illusion’ hypothesis proposed by Modigliani and Cohn (1979), which posits that stock market 
investors fail to take into consideration the effects of inflation on nominal earnings growth 
when valuing stocks. Modigliani and Cohn (1979) maintain that investors do not adjust their 
forecasts for earnings growth when inflation rises, even though they adjust their discount 
rates. Chordia and Shivakumar (2005) claim that there is a possibility that earnings growth 
measured by SUE in response to inflation will vary across stocks and this may in part be the 
cause of post-earnings announcement drift. 
So far there is no consensus among academics and practitioners as to the exact cause of 
post-earnings announcement drift. A majority of the studies carried out in this area over the 
years suggest strongly that the post-earnings announcement drift anomaly is at least in part 
caused by analysts’ and investors’ underreaction to value-related information in earnings 
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news. However, the objective of this study is not to find what causes post-earnings 
announcement drift. It is rather about demonstrating whether this pervasive anomaly is 
present in large stocks as represented by my S&P500 constituent companies by employing 
the Rabin (2002b) propositions.  
2.3.3 Momentum strategies: payoffs and profits 
The interest in the study of earnings and price momentum anomalies does not just arise 
because their existence in security returns remains a puzzle for the efficient market theory 
but also because they can be exploited to form profitable portfolio trading strategies. Both 
earnings and price momentum strategies have shown to be profitable in most developed 
markets, especially in the United States, United Kingdom, Australia, etc. There are also 
reported cases of earnings and price momentum anomalies in international, emerging, and 
frontier markets such as China and South Africa, although both strategies are profitable in 
only a handful of these markets. Moreover, the quest to explain momentum profits continues 
to attract differing opinions from behavioural finance theorists and efficient market 
supporters. Therefore, the task of finding models that can better explain momentum profits 
lies at the centre of this interest in the study of momentum anomalies. Providing plausible 
behavioural answers that fully explain momentum profits will be a major contribution to the 
finance literature. 
Behavioural finance theorists argue that profits from momentum strategies could be 
attributed to systematic mispricing of securities by investors due to psychological bias14. In 
contrast, efficient market researchers such as Conrad and Kaul (1998) argue that the 
profitability of momentum strategies could be entirely due to cross-sectional variations in 
expected returns rather than any predictable time series dependence in stock returns as 
Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) indicate. Furthermore, Fuertes et al (2009) argue that since 
momentum profits are not normally distributed, they could be partial compensation for 
systematic negative skewness risks. This line of argument is in accord with the efficient 
market theory. The authors further argue that although non-normality risks are matter for 
consideration in their analysis, a large proportion of the momentum profit still remains 
unexplained. And, as they indicate, the unexplained part of momentum profits may find 
explanation in the behavioural finance models.  
Some proponents of the efficient market hypothesis argue that the profitability of Jegadeesh 
and Titman’s (1993) price momentum strategies could be attributed to data snooping or 
some other unexplainable market microstructure effects. They argue that techniques such as 
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 See Barberis, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998), Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam (1998), Hong 
and Stein (1999). 
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‘skipping’ weeks between formation and the test portfolios adopted by Jegadeesh and 
Titman could be viewed as an attempt at data snooping15. However, to establish that the 
original results in Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) are not a product of data snooping, 
Jegadeesh and Titman (2001) evaluate different explanations for the profitability of their 
1993 study using an extended data sample. Their results are consistent with that of their 
earlier work, and show that price momentum strategies are still profitable even in the late 
1990s. In this later study, Jegadeesh and Titman show that past winner stocks continue to 
outperform past loser stocks by about the same margin documented in Jegadeesh and 
Titman (1993). The six-month price momentum strategy of Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) 
earns abnormal returns of about 1% per month over the 1965 to 1989 sample period. 
Additionally, Jegadeesh and Titman (2001) find that the price momentum strategy is 
significantly profitable in the first twelve months following the portfolio formation date, and 
the cumulative returns declines thereafter.  
Chan, Jegadeesh, and Lakonishok (1996) present evidence which shows that both earnings 
and price momentum strategies are profitable. By creating a price momentum strategy which 
sorts stocks using prior six-month returns, the authors show that this strategy yields spreads 
in returns of 8.8% over the subsequent six months. Again, an earnings momentum strategy 
which ranks stocks using a moving average of past revisions in analyst consensus estimates 
of earnings produces a spread of 7.7% cumulatively over the next six months. The authors 
find that in general, the price momentum strategies tend to be stronger and more long-lived 
than the earnings momentum strategies. In a related study, Chordia and Shivakumar (2006) 
find that the SUE portfolio (earnings momentum strategy) over a sample period from January 
1972 to December 1999 yields a monthly average abnormal returns of 0.9% while a past 
return portfolio (price momentum strategy) yields an average of 0.76% per month. The 
above result (price momentum strategy) is consistent with Grundy and Martin (2001), who 
document a return of 0.86% per month over the sample period 1962 to 1995 and Chordia 
and Shivakumar (2002) who report a return of 0.73% per month over the sample period 
1963 to 1994 for price momentum strategies. Foster et al (1984) document that an 
annualised payoff of 25% is realised from earnings momentum strategies.  
In contrast to other studies, Chordia and Shivakumar (2002) show that profits from 
momentum strategies are explained by common macroeconomic variables that are related 
to the business cycle. They report that their analysis uncovers the time variation exhibited by 
momentum strategy payoffs and claim that returns to momentum strategies are positive 
during expansionary periods and negative during recessions. More recent literature 
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continues to show that both earnings and price momentum strategies are profitable across 
different markets, including international equity markets16. This is despite the fact that 
different methodologies have been used both to construct the earnings momentum proxy in 
particular, and benchmark models for ex ante returns. Therefore one cannot argue that 
momentum profits are a consequence of data snooping or methodological error. What is 
certain from the literature is that there is no consensus amongst academics as to the 
sources of momentum profits. Behavioural finance advocates the belief that momentum 
profits are down to investor sentiments and the argument for the influence of heuristics and 
cognitive biases seems very plausible. 
2.3.4 Relation between earnings and price momentum anomalies 
There are not many studies in the literature that have examined the relation between 
earnings and price momentum anomalies. However, it is vital to examine the relation 
between the two anomalies, since the interest in both as trading strategies lies in the fact 
that there is a continuation in the price of the stock, and the trader may want to take 
advantage of such continuations. Evidence shows that there is some relation between 
earnings and price momentum. Chordia and Shivakumar (2006), studying the relation 
between earnings and price momentum, create an earnings momentum portfolio that 
capture price momentum using a cross-section of stocks on the NYSE-AMEX markets. The 
authors document that price momentum is subsumed by the systematic component of 
earnings momentum, whereas price momentum does not subsume the earnings momentum 
component. They argue that this finding may suggest that ‘earnings surprise’ (the earnings 
momentum proxy) is really a part of the overall non-diversifiable (systematic) risk. They find 
that the predictability of future returns based on past returns is subsumed by the systematic 
component of the earnings surprise proxy (in a well-diversified portfolio) in cross-sectional 
tests. The firm-specific part of the earnings surprise cannot subsume the price momentum, 
which itself is likely caused by a collection of non-firm-specific factors.  
In addition to the findings of Chordia and Shivakumar (2006), more studies document that 
different proxies of earnings momentum show different levels of predictability on a cross-
section of stock returns. Again all the different proxies show that price momentum is 
subsumed by the systematic component of earnings momentum anomaly17.This finding is 
consistent with that of Chan et al (1996) which documents that since earnings provide on-
going information about the performance of a firm and its prospects, market reactions are 
highest around earnings release. Therefore it not surprising that the momentum effect is 
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 See Hou, Peng, and Xiong (2009), Leippold and Lohre (2012). 
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 See for example Liu et al (2003). 
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usually strongest around subsequent earnings announcements when investors are 
reconciling their forecasts with the earnings figures. Chan et al further show that in a 
univariate analysis, the prior return (price momentum proxy) and earnings surprise (earnings 
momentum proxy) variables both have marginal predictive powers for future returns. 
However, in a cross-sectional regression, they find the explanatory power of prior returns to 
be 5.7%, but on introducing past earnings surprises into the regression model, the predictive 
power of prior returns drops to 2.9%. This confirms evidence reported in Chordia and 
Shivakumar (2006) that price momentum is subsumed by the systematic component of 
earnings momentum. Therefore, one can say that price and earnings momentum are two 
separate phenomena. Both are, however, additive security returns anomalies and not 
different faces of one anomaly. They are not one phenomenon viewed from alternate 
perspectives or able to be subjected to a common explanation. Furthermore, if the price 
momentum anomaly can be subsumed by the earnings momentum anomaly that suggests 
that both anomalies draw upon the market’s underreaction to information about firms’ future 
earnings and prospects.  
Hong, Lee, and Swaminathan (2003) find that an interesting relation exists between price 
and earnings momentum in eleven international equity markets. The authors show that price 
and earnings momentum are present in six of the eleven countries studied (momentum is 
present in Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Hong Kong and the United Kingdom but not 
in Malaysia, South Korea, Japan, Singapore or Taiwan). One remarkable finding of this 
paper is that price momentum exists only in those markets where earnings momentum is 
profitable. This is a clear indication that there is a strong link between the two momentum 
anomalies. In a more recent paper, Schneider and Gaunt (2012) examine the relation 
between price and earnings momentum in the Australian stock market. They provide a 
comprehensive examination of earnings momentum in the Australian market and also 
analyse its interaction with price momentum. However, unlike the findings of Chordia and 
Shivakumar (2006), the authors document that neither earnings momentum nor price 
momentum subsume each other. They find the relation between the two momentum 
anomalies is such that each of them has independent explanatory power for future stock 
returns. 
2.3.5 Observed differences in the persistence of the two momentum strategies 
Chan et al (2006) observe that there is a difference in persistence between the two broad 
momentum strategies – price and earnings momentum. They argue that the uncertainty 
underlying the short-horizon measures of profitability used in earnings momentum strategies 
is resolved relatively quickly. This is because the frequency with which quarterly earnings 
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announcements are made means that uncertainty about a firm’s future prospects is either 
partially or fully resolved with every future announcement. On the other hand, prior returns 
(price momentum strategy) reflect a more broad set of market expectations that are not 
related to near-term profitability alone. However, the price momentum strategy incorporates 
a far larger information set (including earnings news) than the earnings momentum strategy. 
This information set includes all other news about a firm’s events that reflect the totality of its 
long-term profitability expectations. Thus, with the price momentum strategy, one can see 
why it takes longer for the new information ‘package’ to play out fully in stock prices.  
Jackson and Johnson (2006) report that although the behaviour of the two momentum 
strategies differs; they share a common intuitive interpretation that the market underreacts to 
information. They document that the different underreaction anomalies appear to have 
different characteristic time scales in terms of how long the drift persists. Jackson and 
Johnson argue that price momentum strategy persists in a twelve-month returns but declines 
rapidly afterwards. However, an earnings momentum strategy using analysts’ forecast 
revisions as a proxy shows that earnings momentum effects persist for at most six months. 
Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) report that price momentum payoffs persist significantly for as 
much as twelve months after portfolio formation. This result is consistent with the finding of 
Chordia and Shivakumar (2006), who test the robustness of Jegadeesh and Titman’s result 
by varying the holding period between three, six, and twelve months. Hong et al (2003) 
document that the results of their analysis of eleven international equity markets are 
consistent with the predictions of Barberis, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998) that price momentum 
exists only in those countries where earnings momentum is profitable. In countries where 
momentum strategies are profitable, they report that the magnitude of price momentum 
profits is stronger than that of earnings momentum profits.  
With respect to the persistency of price and earnings momentum strategies, a number of 
inferences can be made. First, the earnings momentum strategy generates more abnormal 
returns than the price momentum strategy very early after formation date. The reason is not 
clear although, as mentioned earlier, the earnings momentum strategy is formed based on a 
single piece of firm information which arrives more frequently. Second, although the earnings 
momentum strategy brings more intensity than the price momentum strategy, its profitability 
declines more rapidly. From the literature, evidence shows that the earnings momentum 
strategy is not profitable beyond a six-month holding period, whereas the price momentum 
strategy is profitable for up to twelve months. 
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2.4 Behavioural finance models of investor overreaction and underreaction to new 
 information 
Building on psychological and empirical evidence, behavioural finance scholars have come 
up with theories which seek to explain the anomalies of both continuation in short- to 
medium-term returns and long-term reversals in a cross-section of stock returns. Evidence 
shows that there is a positive autocorrelation of stock returns for a period of between three 
and twelve months after a positive ‘earnings surprise; (Bernard and Thomas (1990)). This 
phenomenon, otherwise known as earnings momentum (post-earnings announcement drift), 
is thought to be the result of investors’ underreaction in processing the information contained 
in earnings news. On the other hand, overreaction to a string of good or bad news events 
leads to a long-term reversal in stock returns over a horizon of between three and five years 
(De Bondt and Thaler (1985)). 
In behavioural finance, we can identify two broad contrasting types of modelling strategies 
that researchers employ in studying investors’ behaviour in reaction to information about 
firms and their stocks. These modelling strategies are the representative agent models and 
the noise trader models. These two types of model each have their own strengths and 
weaknesses.  A selected list of theoretical papers is reviewed in the sections that follow to 
demonstrate the attributes of these two model types. 
2.4.1 Representative agent type behavioural finance models  
In representative agent type models, investors’ behaviour is studied by looking at their 
various investment preferences. An investor’s investment preference becomes an object by 
which the investor is assigned to a group for the purpose of the study. Sometimes the 
cognitive biases that influence investors’ financial decision-making under different economic 
or financial states are also investigated using this type of model. All investors are treated as 
possessing a homogenous information set as well as behaving in similar ways with regard to 
their learning ability, correcting past mistakes, or even applying the same reasoning in 
predicting future outcomes of their investments. In addition, they possess the same payoffs 
for alternative investment choices. As Forbes (2009, p. 229) notes, “Representative agent 
type models are better at capturing the impact of biases in individual traders’ utility behaviour 
but often do so at the expense of ignoring how these biases work themselves out in the 
process of trading an asset”. Representative agent models are good at capturing investors’ 
behaviour such as herding. I will review a few representative agent type theoretical models 
in the following sub-sections. 
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2.4.1.1The Barberis, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998) model: model description 
The Barberis, Shleifer and Vishny (1998) paper (henceforth BSV) entitled “A model of 
Investor Sentiment” presents a behavioural finance representative agent type model. The 
authors postulate a model in which representativeness heuristic and conservatism (a 
cognitive bias) influence an investor’s behaviour in forming beliefs about his investment 
decisions. In this model, when an investor observes two successive earning rises, the 
influence of the representativeness heuristic leads him to believe that he is in a trending 
(momentum) regime. On the other hand, conservatism leads him to believe that he is in a 
mean-reverting (reversal) regime when he observes an earnings rise followed immediately 
by an earnings fall. The model therefore proposes that an investor will always find himself in 
either of the two regimes. The regime in which the investor perceives himself to be depends 
on which of the two dominates. He believes that he understands the earnings cycle and 
knows which of the regimes dominates because he also believes that the two regimes rarely 
switch. So we can say that the BSV model essentially depicts two different models for the 
two regimes (or states). 
The model posits that the investor does not perceive earnings as a true random walk 
process (according to the authors, the earnings-generating process in the true model is a 
random walk); rather he believes that the earnings-generating process switches between 
two states of the world. The investor believes that the two models generating earnings in 
each of the two states are different from one another. Both models (for the trending and 
mean-reverting regimes) exhibit the Markov process. This means that the change in 
earnings in period 𝑡 is solely dependent on the change in earnings in the immediate past 
period 𝑡 − 1. The difference between the trending and reversal models lies in their transition 
probabilities. A set of transition probabilities controls the switching from the trending regime 
to the mean-reverting regime and vice versa. The investor sees the switching process 
between the two different regimes as being controlled by an underlying regime-switching 
process. In the first regime, he believes that earnings are more likely to be mean-reverting, 
while in the second, earnings are likely to trend in the next time period. The investor also 
believes that next period earnings are more likely to mean-revert rather than trend: he 
assigns more ‘weight’ (probability value) to the mean-reverting model (model 1) than on the 
trending model (model 2). The transition probabilities between the two regimes and the 
statistical properties of the earnings process are fixed in the investor’s mind as a result of his 
prior experience and beliefs.  
The investor observes his earnings each time and updates his beliefs about the earnings 
based on the information he received last period. Subsequently, he tries to update his model 
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in a Bayesian fashion, although his model is incorrect ex post. When there are two 
successive positive earnings surprises, the investor believes he is in the trending regime, 
while if a negative earnings surprise follows a positive earnings surprise; he raises the 
likelihood of being in a mean-reverting regime. Thus, he makes his forecast for future 
earnings. 
One interesting thing about this model is that it does not make room for the investor to learn 
through time about the true earnings-generating process and therefore understand that the 
process is a random walk. Hence, his only task is to figure out which regime he is in in the 
current period and to use the appropriate model to forecast earnings. Something unusual 
about this particular characteristic of the model is that experience shows that human beings 
have the ability to learn and do make corrections from their past experience. So, one finds 
the idea that the investor never learns that he is using the wrong model somewhat far-
fetched, and the assumption that one never learns seems a particularly odd for an academic 
rather than a professional to hold. 
2.4.1.1.1 Evidence of underreaction and post-earnings announcement drift in the BSV 
    model 
BSV use their model to show how underreaction to earnings announcements occasioned by 
the influence of the representativeness heuristic on the investor could generate post-
earnings announcement drift (a short-term continuation in stock price otherwise known as 
earnings momentum) following earnings announcement. The model shows that when a 
positive earnings surprise is followed by another positive surprise, the investor believes he is 
in the trending regime and raises the likelihood of model 2 prevailing, whereas if a positive 
earnings surprise is followed by a negative surprise he raises the likelihood that he is in the 
mean-reverting (reversal) regime and hence would use model 1 to forecast earnings. In the 
BSV model, underreaction is modelled to show that the average realised return following a 
positive shock to earnings is larger than the average realised return following a negative 
earnings shock. Underreaction occurs in this model as long as the investor, on average, 
believes that his earnings are generated by the mean-reverting model and places more 
weight on it than the trending model. Since the investor places more weight on the mean-
reverting model than the trending model, he believes that the realised return following a 
positive earnings shock will be reversed in the next time period. However, if in reality 
earnings is a random walk process, then a positive earnings shock in this time period is 
equally likely to be followed by either a positive or a negative earnings shock in the next time 
period.  
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The model demonstrates that it can capture underreaction by showing that if the investor 
observes a positive earnings shock in this period, since he believes that the models rarely 
switch; he will believe that the mean-reverting model will generate earnings in the next time 
period. However, if the earnings shock turns out to be negative in the next time period, the 
realised returns will not be large, since this is what the investor had expected ex ante. On 
the contrary, however, if the earnings shock in the next period turns out positive, the realised 
returns are large and positive since this is unexpected. In a similar way, the average realised 
returns following a negative earning shock will be negative, hence the difference the two 
average realised returns is positive. This is consistent with the evidence of post-earnings 
announcement drift generated by investor underreaction. 
In the BSV model, underreaction occurs insofar as the investor places, on average, more 
weight on model 1 (mean-reverting model) than in model 2 (trending model). The empirical 
implication of the BSV model is that underreaction occurs when the average realised stock 
return following a positive earnings shock is positive and higher than the average realised 
stock return (which is negative) following a negative earnings shock. The difference between 
the average realised stock returns following a positive earnings shock and the average 
realised stock returns following a negative earnings shock is positive. This is the 
underreaction effect, and this forms the basis of the authors’ claim that post-earnings 
announcement drift is empirically evident in their model. In the BSV model, underreaction is 
seen as a consequence of the investor’s conservative behaviour in adjusting his model when 
new earnings information is released.  
Since in the BSV model the investor is supposedly rational and Bayesian, one would have 
thought that the investor would not expect that earnings are more likely to reverse every 
quarter. This is because in the real world, those indices by which companies’ success are 
measured do not reverse so often, and so profitable (unprofitable) companies are more likely 
to remain profitable (unprofitable) at least for a few quarters or even years. Additionally, in 
the real world, as opposed to theoretical economic models, history does matter. It is 
therefore unlikely that this assumption made in the model can capture the true patterns that 
investors exhibit in real-world data. 
2.4.1.2 The Rabin (2002b) model: model description 
Rabin (2002b) models how believers in the ‘law of small numbers’ draw inferences from 
small samples of randomly distributed signals, believing that they are representative of the 
parent population from which they are drawn. The model is based on Tversky and 
Kahneman’s (1971) work entitled “The Law of Small Numbers”. In that work, Tversky and 
Kahneman show that people often exaggerate how representative a small sample is 
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compared with the parent population from which it is drawn. The Rabin model shows how 
people make this common error and how their decision-making process differs from a 
Bayesian inference process. It also shows that believers in the law of small numbers have 
the tendency to overinfer from a short sequence of independently identically distributed 
signals and to believe in a non-existent variation in the rate generating those signals. The 
rate here refers to a stationary probability by which each value of a signal is randomly 
generated. The model makes an economic application of the law of small numbers in three 
different situations to explain:  
 Short-run underreaction by investors to recent corporate performance 
 Medium-term overreaction by investors to recent corporate performance 
 The tendency of investors to exaggerate the variation in skill among mutual-
 fund managers or analysts predicting earnings. 
The investor’s behaviour is influenced by psychological ideas such as the law of small 
numbers which presages the gambler’s fallacy effect and overinference. The gambler’s 
fallacy is an individual’s mistaken belief that a second draw of a signal will be negatively 
correlated with the first draw. In the Rabin model, if the investor observes a sequence of 
binary signals of some underlying quality, for example, a series of good or bad investments 
by a mutual-fund manager (which the investor sees as a measure of the manager’s level of 
competence) or a series of a firm’s good or bad performance (e.g. quarterly earning 
outcomes), the investor infers the long-run prospects of the fund or the firm from the series. 
The model assumes that each value of this signal is generated randomly from a stationary 
probability. The model presents the investor as a Bayesian who holds correct probabilistic 
priors about the rate. However, while in reality the signals are generated by an independent 
identically distributed process, the investor believes that they are generated through random 
draws from an ‘urn’ which is sampled without replacement. An example is a draw from an 
urn of two signals, where the urn contains different proportions of values of the two signals 
corresponding to the rate. The example above captures belief in the ‘law of small numbers’, 
since the investor believes that the proportion of different signals must balance out to the 
population rate before any signals are observed. As the number of samples over some time 
period becomes large, the investor gets closer to being fully Bayesian. The smaller the 
sample, the more the person believes in the law of small numbers since for a one-off, event, 
the sample is also the population. So, for example, under the law of small numbers, if one 
rise in quarterly earnings has just occurred and has just been ‘used up’, there remains one 
less quarterly earnings rise to be observed in the future. 
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2.4.1.2.1 Evidence of underreaction and post-earnings announcement drift in the     
     Rabin (2002b) model 
The Rabin model demonstrates that it can capture an investor’s underreaction to a series of 
a firm’s quarterly earnings under the influence of the gambler’s fallacy. Under the influence 
of gambler’s fallacy, the investor underpredicts the chance of repetition of short ‘strings’ of 
performance signals in the model. This is because believers in the law of small numbers act 
as though short ‘strings’ or sub-sequences (with all the characteristics of the long 
sequences) are always embedded within the long sequences. This is a form of psychological 
bias known as the ‘local representativeness bias, as reported by Bar-Hillel and Wagenaar 
(1991). 
In the Rabin model, the investor underreacts when he observes a repetition of similar signals 
because he believes that the signal has less chance of occurring in this period. If the 
investor observes an earnings rise in this quarter, he underreacts if he observes another 
earnings rise in the next quarter. This underreaction stems from the fact that under the 
influence of gambler’s fallacy, the investor expects an earnings fall in the next time period. It 
is interesting to note that with the arrival of the initial earnings signal, the belief of this 
investor (who believes in the law of small numbers) is the same as that of a Bayesian, since 
both possess the same probabilistic priors about quarterly earnings outcomes at that point in 
time. However, their belief diverges if this same signal reoccurs in the next time period. If 
subsequently the investor observes more of the same signal, he becomes more extreme in 
his predictions than a true Bayesian. Extreme prediction by the investor here marks his 
departure from the true Bayesian procedure of updating prior probabilities. This represents 
the effect of the gambler’s fallacy on the investor, which is the source of the underreaction in 
the model. So we can say that when the investor observes a short sequence or streak of a 
firm’s recent performance, he underreacts to it. 
The way in which the Rabin model captures underreaction and overreaction is different from 
the way in which the BSV model captures them. In the BSV model, for instance, 
underreaction and overreaction are thought to occur as a result of two psychological 
influences – the conservatism bias and the representativeness heuristic – whereas in the 
Rabin model, underreaction and overreaction are caused by the gambler’s fallacy. This 
characteristic of the Rabin model embeds a kind of an attractive parsimony into it. In the 
Rabin model, underreaction occurs in the short run while overreaction occurs in the medium 
to long run. In the model, both the underreaction and overreaction anomalies are connected 
by the investor’s belief in the non-existent variation of the underlying rate generating the 
signals. The Rabin model believes that underreaction is most likely a natural outcome of the 
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gambler’s fallacy, which comes as a result of a belief in the law of small numbers. The model 
demonstrates in this case how the bias influences an investor as he observes a single 
earnings-generating regime. 
The Rabin model sees overreaction as a manifestation of a belief that there is more variation 
in intrinsic corporate performance than there actually is. In this way, investors would believe 
that there is more to learn than there really is from a time series of a company’s performance 
indicators such as long sequences of quarterly earnings outcomes. When investors observe 
a long streak of the same signal, they overreact and exaggerate the likelihood that the 
observed signal is representative of the firm’s long-term performance. This overreaction is a 
result of the influence of the gambler’s fallacy on the investor when he observes a long 
sequence or streak of good or poor company performance.  
Underreaction and overreaction occur in the Rabin model under the assumption that all 
investors live infinitely and invest randomly in one stock for four months. This process is 
repeated again, with the investors not re-investing in stocks in which they have invested 
earlier. The Rabin model then determines their belief about the distribution of the underlying 
quality of the stocks, where one of the two different signals a or b (positive and negative 
signals respectively) is either a positive or negative shock to a company’s value. But in 
reality, these shocks do not predict more positive or negative shocks to the company’s value, 
since the earnings-generating process is random. 
For the investor observing the historical performance of a company, his average belief is a 
function of the company’s recent earnings history. The investor determines his beliefs by 
considering all the possible historical performances of the company that he could observe in 
the next time period. The most recent company performance also falls within this historical 
data. The model shows that for short sequences of recent quarterly earnings performance, 
believers in the law of small numbers will underreact to a streak of one or two positive 
shocks to earnings and will generate momentum in price. On the other hand, long 
sequences of three or more positive earnings shocks in a row will cause investors to 
exaggerate the likelihood that the observed company is good. This is consistent with the 
finding of Barth, Elliott and Finn (1999). 
Unlike the BSV model, the outcome of the Rabin model does not depend on the proportions 
of different signals that the investor observes. Rather, it depends on the actual sequence 
and sign of those signals. This fundamental property of the model marks an important 
divergence between the BSV and Rabin models. Moreover, it is intuitively more appealing to 
view the Rabin model as being more likely to capture true investor behaviour in real-world 
data. Therefore, as the model posits, it is more plausible that even rational investors are 
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prone to underreact to short sequences of signals, but are able to update their model as 
more information about the firm becomes available. In the real world, market participants 
update their forecasting models once they receive more value-relevant information about 
firms. Similarly, the ‘hot-hand fallacy’, which is related to the law of small numbers, may 
cause investors to overreact when they observe a long sequence of identical signals. This is 
because a long sequence, even when randomly generated, may induce a belief that the 
investor can separate stocks into ‘stars’ and ‘dogs’, even though, in fact, he cannot.    
 2.4.1.3 The Rabin and Vayanos (2010) model: model description 
The Rabin and Vayanos (2010) model has a very simple structure. The model investor 
observes an earnings outcome, 𝑺𝒕, over periods, 𝑡 = 1, 2, … … as shown by equation 2.1 
below: 
𝑺𝒕 = 𝜽𝒕 + 𝝐𝒕 ………………………………………………………………………...……………. (2.1) 
where 𝜽𝒕 is the state of the earnings outcome, be that a rising or falling trend in quarterly 
earnings and 𝝐𝒕 is a normally distributed shock with a mean of zero and constant variance 
i.e. 𝜖𝑡~(0, 𝜎𝜖
2) .The most compelling insight from the model is the assumption that the signal 
concerning company value, 𝜽𝒕,  which the investor receives follows an auto-regressive 
process of the type shown by equation 2.2 below: 
𝜽𝒕 = 𝝆𝜽𝒕−𝟏 + (𝟏 − 𝝆)(𝝁 + 𝜼𝒕) …………………………..….…………………………….……. (2.2) 
where the value of 𝝆 lies in the interval 0<𝝆<1, 𝝁 is the long-run mean of the signal and 𝜼𝒕 is 
a specific temporal shock to that average value in time period 𝑡 with variance 𝜎𝜂
2. 
In this model setup, the ‘gambler’s fallacy’, a cognitive bias based on the ‘law of small 
numbers’, influences the investor to believe that the sample closely mimics the parent 
population from which it is drawn. This mistaken belief leads him to believe that the 
sequence {𝜖𝑡}𝑡 ≥ 1 is not independently identically distributed, but rather exhibits reversals 
via a process of the form described by equation 2.3 below: 
𝝐𝒕 = 𝝎𝒕 − 𝜶𝝆 ∑ 𝜹𝝆
𝒌∞
𝒌=𝟎 𝝐𝒕−𝟏−𝒌 …………………………….…………………………………….. (2.3) 
where the sequence {𝜔𝑡}𝑡 ≥ 1 is independently identically distributed with a mean of zero 
and a constant variance 𝜎𝜔
2 , so 𝜔𝑡~(0, 𝜎𝜔
2 ), and (𝛼𝜌, 𝛿𝜌) are model parameters defined on the 
interval [0, 1], which itself is a function of the value taken by 𝝆 .The primary difference 
between the ways in which 𝜶𝝆 and 𝜹𝝆 influence the investor’s valuation expectations is that 
while 𝜶𝝆 has a simple multiplicative effect in offsetting the current earnings surprises by the 
history of the past ones, 𝜹𝝆 enters as a polynomial 𝜹𝝆
𝒌 where 𝑘 denotes the number of 
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periods in the past when the particular earnings surprise being considered occurred (so for 
example a value of 𝜹𝝆 = 0.9, an earnings surprise issued in the same quarter last year will 
take a reduced weighting  𝜹𝝆
𝟒 of 0.6561).  
While the difference between the multiplicative weighting on past earnings surprises, 𝜶𝝆, and 
the exponentially declining weighting 𝜹𝝆
𝒌, may seem a trivial technical detail in the model, it 
underpins one of the model’s central results. This is the ability of the model to capture two 
stock market phenomena often seen to stand in tension to each other. These are: 
 In the short run, when 𝑘 is low, the multiplication of 𝜶𝝆 and 𝜹𝝆
𝒌 ensure considerable 
power for the ‘gambler’s fallacy’ that influences the mistaken belief that earnings 
surprises must be reversed in the future and this facilitates short-run momentum. 
Prior errors 𝝐𝒕−𝟏,  offset the effect on the value of the current earnings surprise 𝜔𝑡. 
This netting off is captured by the second term on the right-hand side of equation 2.3. 
 
 In the long run, when 𝑘 is large, the impact of past earnings surprises, 
𝜖𝑡−1, 𝜖𝑡−2, … … . , 𝜖𝑡−𝑘  on the current earnings surprise is minimised because higher 
powers of 𝜹𝝆
𝒌  are so small in absolute value that they have minimal effect in offsetting 
the current earnings surprises embedded in  𝜔𝑡 . According to the Rabin and Vayanos 
model, it is in this latter phase of earnings dynamics that the influence of the 
‘gambler’s fallacy’ is curtailed and replaced by another cognitive bias termed the ‘hot-
hand fallacy’. The hot-hand fallacy influences people to believe that some stocks are 
inherently ‘stars’ or ‘dogs’. It is this latter feat of recognition that presages the 
reversion / correction phase in stock market returns that serves to unwind the earlier 
momentum effects. 
In accordance with the gambler’s fallacy, the investor believes a high value of the 
disturbance 𝝐 in equation 2.3 above is likely to be reversed in the next time period. The 
parameter vector (𝛼𝜌, 𝛿𝜌)  captures this characteristic in the model. Much of the model’s 
predictions concerning investors’ evaluation of quarterly earnings changes derive from the 
interaction of 𝜶𝝆 and 𝜹𝝆 and how that interaction characterises the misperception of the 
signal about the value that the quarterly earnings announcements send across. The degree 
to which shocks to earnings expectations are self-sustaining is clearly a function of the size 
of 𝝐 relative to the underlying signal regarding value 𝜽, which is interpreted here as the most 
recent quarterly earnings announcement. A high ratio of signal 𝜽𝒕,  to noise 𝝐𝒕  in equation 
2.1 above 
𝜃𝑡
𝜖𝑡
 intensifies the investor’s response to a quarterly earnings announcement. 
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The empirical implication of the Rabin and Vayanos model is that the model captures the 
impact of the behaviour of the investor when he observes short or long sequences of 
historical earnings surprises. According to the model, when the investor observes this 
sequence, he is likely to adjust his valuation model (caused by his misperception) in such a 
way that shows he is under the influence of either the gambler’s fallacy or the hot-hand 
fallacy, depending on the length of the sequence. When the investor is under the influence 
of the gambler’s fallacy, his investment decisions based on his model leads to earnings 
momentum in returns, whereas if he is under the influence of the hot-hand fallacy, that leads 
to long-term reversal in returns. Thus the resultant miss-specification of his model 
subsequently gives rise to incorrect forecasts.  
2.4.2 Noise trader type behavioural finance models  
Those behavioural finance models that consist of different types of investors are referred to 
as noise trader type models. In these models, investors are classified based on how 
sophisticated they are with respect to the collection and use of value-relevant information. 
Basically, there are two different types of investor – the informed (smart) and the uninformed 
(or not-so-smart or misinformed). Uninformed investors (traders) trade on noise and without 
regard for the fundamental values of the securities. They trade in this way because of the 
influence of certain cognitive biases and heuristics on their investment decision-making 
processes. When they trade in this manner, they make errors which lead to mispricing of 
securities in the financial markets. In this model, the role of the informed investors is to 
arbitrage away the trading errors created by uninformed investors. According to Forbes 
(2009, p.119 - 120), “noise is self-generated and creates its own space” and does not refer 
to other random events or shocks that cancel each other out over long periods of time18. 
Black (1986) observes that a large number of small pockets of noise are more effective than 
a small number of large events as a causal factor of market inefficiency. The author argues 
that noise somewhat causes markets to be inefficient and at same time makes it more 
difficult for arbitrageurs to take full advantage of such inefficiencies. De Long et al’s (1990b) 
model shows that the unpredictability of noise traders’ beliefs creates risk in asset prices and 
thus arbitrageurs are not willing to trade against such beliefs. Hence noise traders “create 
their own space” in the markets. This means that prices of assets can move away 
significantly from the fundamental value (because arbitrageurs are unable to curtail this 
divergence) even in the absence of fundamental risks. Therefore, for noise trader models to 
perform well, a good proportion of the ‘noise’ modelled must come from within and must be 
self-generated. This means that the types of ‘noise’ in this model must not cancel each other 
                                                          
18
 See also De Long et al (1990b). 
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out in different trading sessions. This sort of ‘systemic risk’ which trading does not eliminate, 
but may indeed magnify, was perhaps at the heart of the recent financial crisis. I review a 
few theoretical noise trader type behavioural finance models in the following sub-sections. 
2.4.2.1 The Hong and Stein (1999) model: model description 
The Hong and Stein (1999) model provides a noise trader type model that comprises two 
types of investor. The authors term these traders ‘newswatchers’ and ‘momentum’ traders. 
Both types of trader are rational but suffer from limited or bounded rationality. Bounded 
rationality implies that each type of trader is only able to process a sub-set of information 
available to them (and not the full set of information). The newswatchers trade on their 
private information about firm fundamentals. At the same time, each individual newswatcher 
is unable to extract information from other newswatchers’ prices. The newswatchers make 
their forecasts based on private signals about the firms’ future fundamentals that they 
receive but do not condition their forecast on current or past price changes. They receive 
these signals in a clearly defined ‘rotation’, as each valuation signal is released to its 
receiver. On the other hand, momentum traders condition their forecasts only on past price 
changes. For the momentum traders, their forecasts must be simple univariate models 
conditioned on price. 
If the actions of the newswatchers cause security prices to diffuse slowly across investors in 
security markets, prices will underreact in the short run. The momentum traders then trade 
on the trending prices resulting from the underreaction effect.  When newswatchers are 
active, but not momentum traders, the price moves and adjusts slowly to private information 
– this is the source of underreaction in the model. The price moves and adjusts slowly as a 
result of the rate of information flow. It is appealing to think that momentum traders will 
arbitrage away all the mispricing opportunities created by the newswatchers, thereby 
pushing the market back to rational equilibrium. However, since momentum traders are 
limited to simple and uncomplicated forecasting models, this does not happen. They simply 
do not possess the expertise to exploit all the available mispricing. Rather, as momentum 
traders continue to arbitrage away the mispricing caused by investors’ underreaction to 
price, the price moves further away from the fundamental value, leading to long-run reversal. 
The Hong and Stein (1999) model assumes that all the newswatchers have constant 
absolute risk aversion utility with the same risk-aversion parameter and hold their security 
until the terminal date. In contrast, the momentum trader does not hold the security until 
liquidation; rather, as a short-term trader, he holds it for 𝑗 periods. This becomes his target 
holding period. Hence, the contrasting behaviour of both types of trader feeds into the 
continuous cycle of mispricing the security. The model also assumes that the momentum 
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trader looks at past price data in determining whether to follow the price in making his 
investment decisions. The authors demonstrate the behaviour of the momentum trader by 
illustrating how the trader at time 𝑡 must base his decision to trade on past price changes 
over time period intervals of say between 𝑡 − 2 and 𝑡 − 1.  
Hong and Stein (1999) show that the momentum trader’s attempt to take advantage of the 
resulting underreaction caused by newswatchers leads to further mispricing. The price of 
stock, which hitherto has been moving according to the forecast based on the stock’s 
fundamentals, is accelerated by the actions of the newswatchers, who by jumping in on the 
existing price trends cause a price overreaction in the long run. The model shows that a 
momentum trader’s trading strategy earns the bulk of its profit early in the cycle; that is, 
shortly after substantial news arrives with the newswatchers entering the market. The 
momentum traders, however, lose money later in the trading cycle, by which time prices are 
believed to have overshot the long-run equilibrium values and the correction phase has set 
in. One interesting aspect of the model is that although the fundamental cause of 
underreaction and overreaction anomalies are not thought to be based on individually held 
psychological biases, the model is able to capture both underreaction and overreaction 
anomalies through the interactive actions of the two types of trader. In this model, the 
emphasis is on how the heterogeneous agents interact with each other and the resultant 
underreaction and overreaction anomalies.  
2.4.2.1.1 Evidence of underreaction and overreaction in the HS model 
In the Hong and Stein (1999) model, momentum traders earn abnormal returns as a result of 
mispricing caused by the activities of the newswatchers. This mispricing stems from the fact 
that newswatchers observe only private information and do not condition their models on 
current or historical prices. This model attempts to capture the effect of heterogeneous 
agents in the market and to show how their investment decision-making causes mispricing in 
the market. Essentially, the model shows the actions of two different types of agent in the 
market and how they process their information sub-sets. However, both types of agent are 
not fully rational. They suffer limitations from bounded rationality, in the sense that they are 
only able to use a certain sub-set of information available to them. In the model, momentum 
traders use past prices while newswatchers use certain chosen fragmentary elements of 
value to predict firms’ future fundamental value. 
In the model, when only the newswatchers are active, prices adjust slowly to new 
information and this causes underreaction. This follows from the fact that newswatchers by 
their nature are unable to extract information from the prices of other newswatchers. 
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Furthermore, there is a gradual diffusion of private information about the price across 
investors in the markets. The model shows that this slow diffusion of information across the 
market creates momentum in price. Subsequently, there is a positive autocorrelation of 
returns in short horizons. However, when the momentum traders enter the market, the model 
shows that because they condition on current and past prices, they partly exploit any 
mispricing opportunities caused by underreaction left behind by the newswatchers. The rate 
of information flow across the market in the model has another implication for the cross-
section of stock returns. The slow diffusion of information in the model causes higher short-
run return corrections. This makes stocks attractive to momentum traders, but at the same 
time causes pronounced overshooting of stocks from fundamental values, which leads to 
stronger reversals in the long run. The action of the momentum traders does not move the 
market back to the fundamental value, because their actions lead to price movements being 
accelerated and eventually cause overreaction to any news. So in the model, momentum 
traders may move the price back to value and even far beyond the true value. This could 
motivate a ‘correction phase’ following the overshooting of a reasonable long-run price. The 
underreaction and overreaction anomalies occur at different points in the cycle and are set 
off by the activities of newswatchers and momentum traders. Unlike in the BSV model, they 
do not occur in two different regimes or cycles. This implies that the stocks that are more 
prone to momentum are the same stocks that will face more severe reversals later on in the 
future. 
2.4.2.2 The Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam (1998) model: model description 
Daniel, Hirshleifer and Subrahmanyam (1998) (henceforth DHS) propose an alternative 
theory of security market underreaction and overreaction which centres around two cognitive 
biases.  The biases are investors’ overconfidence about the precision of the private 
information they receive and the self-attribution bias. Overconfidence is the tendency of 
individuals to overestimate their own knowledge, underestimate risk, and exaggerate their 
abilities. On the other hand, self-attribution bias is the tendency for individuals to attribute 
their success to their own ability and failure to external factors. The authors show that 
overconfidence could lead to long-run reversals and excess volatility, when the actions of 
managers of a particular firm are correlated with the mispricing of the firm’s stock or with 
public event-based predictability of returns. In addition, they show that the self-attribution 
bias results in positive short-lag autocorrelation; that is, momentum and short-run earnings 
drift (post-earnings announcement drift). The emergence of momentum in the model is a 
result of the self-attribution bias causing asymmetric shifts in investors’ confidence in 
response to the outcomes of their investments. The central theme of the DHS model is that 
stock market prices overreact to private information signals and underreact to public signals.  
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The DHS (1998) model posits that individuals attribute events which confirm the validity of 
their actions to their own ‘high’ ability, while they attribute any refutation to sabotage or 
external noise. DHS theory asserts that the investor’s confidence rises if the public 
information he receives confirms his private information signal, but his confidence does not 
fall commensurately if the public information contradicts his private information. The authors 
also assume that investors view themselves as more able to value securities better than they 
actually are and underestimate the magnitude of their forecast errors. The model assumes 
that the investor is quasi-rational, in that, although he is Bayesian, he incorrectly 
overestimates the precision of his private information. He is also biased in the way in which 
he updates this information. He knows the private signal but is confused about its value in 
predicting earnings. Investors tend to ‘overweight’ confirmations from public signals and at 
same time ‘underweight’ contradictions in their own revision processes. In the model, the 
investor is only overconfident about the private signals, and this behaviour captures both the 
underreaction and overreaction anomalies. This is a model of an ‘outcome-dependent 
confidence’.   
 2.4.2.2.1 Evidence of underreaction and overreaction in the DHS model 
The DHS model believes that investors underreact to each firm’s public information in a 
manner which is time inconsistent. The self-attribution bias causes investors with confirming 
public information (in accord with their private signals) to overreact, and their continuing 
overreaction will cause momentum in the short term. However, if the overreaction continues, 
there is a long-term reversal or a correction phase. In the long run, the correction phase 
pushes the security price back to the fundamental as further public information slowly filters 
into the market. Thus, the self-attribution bias leads to momentum in the short run and long-
term reversal in securities prices in the long run. 
The model considers the fact that the investor’s confidence varies over time and this causes 
continuous overreaction to private signals over the time horizon. In the DHS model, the 
investor’s overconfidence in the private signal causes the date 1 stock price to overreact to 
the new private information. However, at date 2, when public information arrives, the 
inefficient deviation of price before this date due to excessive reliance on the private signal is 
partially corrected on average (at least on average). This correction continues when further 
public information arrives at a future date; say date 3. The resulting overreaction and 
correction phase imply that the covariance between date 1’s price change and date 2’s price 
change is negative. Although there is a partial correction of the private signal overreaction 
phase by the arrival of the public signal on date 2, full correction of this overreaction occurs 
on date 3 with the arrival of another public signal. The price change reversal occurs as a 
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result of the arrival of public information on date 2 which continues and ends on date 3. The 
price changes in the two correction phases are positively correlated. In the DHS model, it is 
important that an earnings announcement or another ‘price trigger’ event is ‘selected’, in the 
sense that it signals the difference between what managers and the outside investors know. 
2.4.2.3 Other noise trader type models 
There are other noise trader type models of underreaction and overreaction in the 
behavioural finance literature. Some of the earliest and most prominent research work 
includes Stein (1987), Shleifer and Summers (1990), and De Long, Shleifer, Summers, and 
Waldmann (1990a, 1990b). De Long et al (1990a) model comprises three types of investor: 
positive feedback traders, informed rational traders, and passive investors. The total number 
of the second and third type of investors is kept constant in the model as a control measure. 
The model shows that early positive feedback trading from rational investors could trigger a 
herding effect from ‘noise’ or irrational traders. This in turn could lead to an increase in the 
volatility of the fundamental value of the asset. A positive feedback trading strategy is one 
that buys when prices rise and sells when prices fall. The model shows that in a situation 
where positive feedback trading triggers the herding effect; there is a positive correlation of 
asset returns in the short run and an overreaction of asset prices to news leading to negative 
correlation in assets returns in the long run. As this process of correction continues, prices 
eventually return to their fundamental values. De Long et al (1990b) create a model which 
shows how the activities of irrational noise traders (not fully rational investors) with 
erroneous beliefs about prices could lead to more risk in the price of the asset. This 
increased risk could lead rational investors to reduce their activities, since the price will 
diverge from the fundamental values even when there is no accompanying fundamental risk. 
Stein’s (1987) model shows that even though speculators in the market are all rational 
investors, introducing more speculators after the initial ones have arrived can change the 
information content of prices. Stein examines the impact of a ‘staggered execution’ of trades 
and its impact upon price formation. The arrival of late investors introduces an externality 
into the price for those traders who are already in the market and who make inferences 
based on price. The entry of new speculators lowers the infomativeness of the price, and this 
can lead to price destabilisation and welfare reduction.  
Similarly, Shleifer and Summers (1990) provide a noise trader type model which comprises 
two types of investor. The first set of investors is not fully rational, whereas the second set is 
fully rational. The model posits that investors who are not fully rational are influenced by 
sentiments (or their beliefs) when demanding risky assets. The actions of the not fully 
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rational investors create inefficiency in price, but because this is risky, fully rational investors 
are not able to fully arbitrage away this mispricing.  
One common argument amongst the noise trader type models is the belief that the security 
markets comprise more than one type of investor or trader. They believe that the activities of 
irrational or not fully rational or ‘noise’ investors create inefficiency in prices which then leads 
to short-run momentum and a subsequent long-run reversal in asset returns. There is a kind 
of consensus amongst the proponents of these models that the heterogeneous noise trader 
type models are in many ways superior to the efficient market models. This is because in the 
real world, investors are likely to hold different information sets, and their abilities to analyse 
and understand the market will also be different. 
2.5 Information uncertainty 
Several studies in the literature document the effects and influence of information uncertainty 
on both stock returns and expected stock returns. Others examine the influence of 
information uncertainty on both earnings and price momentum. The question remains as to 
whether information uncertainty exacerbates the earnings and price momentum anomalies, 
and to what extent that influence might be. 
Information plays a very important and central role in the financial markets. Most of the 
economic models base their propositions on the rationality of the economic agent, who is 
expected to possess every useful piece of information about the market through which he 
can make informed choices. The asset pricing models such as Sharpe’s (1964) Capital 
Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), Merton’s (1973) Inter-temporal Capital Asset Pricing Model 
(ICAPM), and Ross’s (1976a) Arbitrage Pricing Theory (APT) are constructed based on a 
perfect and frictionless market where information flow is efficient and available to all market 
participants. 
Zhang (2006a) defines information uncertainty as the level of ambiguity associated in 
ascertaining a firm’s fundamentals at a point in time when new information about the firm is 
released. Information uncertainty, as used here, does not mean the same as information 
asymmetry, as the latter denotes the case where some market participants have more 
information about a firm’s fundamental values than others. The author documents that 
ambiguity with respect to the implications of new information about a firm most likely stems 
from two different sources: the volatility of a firm’s underlying fundamentals and the poor 
quality of information or ‘noise’. The level of information uncertainty in a firm’s fundamental is 
measured by the variance of the observed signal of the firm’s fundamental and the quality of 
the information. In other words, the uncertainty about a firm’s underlying fundamental value 
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is measured as the volatility of the firm’s underlying fundamentals, such as dividends, cash-
flows, earnings outcomes and/or the variance of the noise accompanying the new 
information. Jiang, Lee, and Zhang (2005, p.185) define information uncertainty as “the 
precision with which firm value can be estimated by knowledgeable investors at a 
reasonable cost”. The authors define high information uncertainty firms as those firms whose 
expected fundamental values can be predicted with less certainty. This could be a result of 
the nature of the business in which the firms are engaged or the environment in which they 
operate. According to the authors, high information uncertainty firms are usually firms 
associated with a higher cost of acquiring information and the forecasts of their 
fundamentals are more likely to be less reliable and more volatile.   
2.5.1 Price Momentum, post-earnings announcement drift and information uncertainty 
Most studies in the literature agree that high information uncertainty exacerbates the post-
earnings announcement drift anomaly when conditioned on the nature of earnings news. 
Zhang (2006a, 2006b) is amongst the pioneering studies in literature to document the 
influence of different levels of information uncertainty on both stock market returns and 
analysts’ forecast behaviour. Other studies such as Chen and Zhao (2012), Francis et al 
(2007), Gerard (2012), Gyamfi-Yeboah et al (2012), and Jiang, Lee, and Zhang (2005) also 
document that information uncertainty exacerbates investor underreaction to earnings 
announcements.  
We know from prior studies that investors underreact to new information about firms’ 
fundamentals such as earnings announcements, dividend initiation or omission, cash-flow, 
etc. The common argument is that if investors and other market participants underreact to 
new information, such as a quarterly earnings announcement, the effect is post-earnings 
announcement drift in stock prices. However, in a moment of uncertainty regarding a firm’s 
fundamental, considerable levels of information uncertainties will most likely cause investors 
to underreact even more to the new information. Jiang, Lee, and Zhang (2005), in their study 
on information uncertainty and the cross-section of stock returns, document that, on 
average, unconditional high information uncertainty firms have lower future stock returns. 
The authors also report that conditional information uncertainty exacerbates earnings and 
price momentum effects in firms with high levels of uncertainty, and this leads to strong drifts 
in price. They claim that high information uncertainty has a dual effect on investors by driving 
up their confidence and at the same time limiting rational arbitrage among knowledgeable 
investors. In other words, it appears there is an interaction effect between information 
uncertainty and momentum effects that generates higher future stock returns for firms with 
high information uncertainty regarding their future fundamentals. It is not difficult to 
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understand why high information uncertainty will limit rational arbitrage, since high 
information uncertainty will drive up the risk-premia demanded by arbitragers. Furthermore, 
Jiang et al (2005) posit that since classical asset pricing models propose that idiosyncratic 
variations in firms’ fundamentals should not explain the cross-section of returns, it is 
therefore puzzling that high information uncertainty proxies conditioned on the nature of 
news are able to predict future stock returns. The ability of information uncertainty 
conditioned on the nature of news to explain returns is puzzling, because if variations in a 
firm’s fundamental uncertainty are not systematic, it should not be able to explain a cross-
section of returns in a well-diversified portfolio. 
Zhang (2006a, 2006b) investigates the roles of information uncertainty in price continuation 
anomalies, such as investors’ and analysts’ underreaction to analyst forecast revisions. 
Investor underreaction to the earnings announcement manifests in stock prices by pushing 
prices in the direction of recent quarterly earnings surprises in the period following the 
earnings announcement. Consequent upon this, Zhang (2006a) observes that when price 
drift is attributed to behavioural biases, the drift becomes more intense if there is high 
uncertainty about the firm’s fundamentals. The direction of this drift will depend on the nature 
of news – price will drift upwards (downwards) for good (bad) news firms. The author uses 
information uncertainty proxies such as firm size, firm age, analyst coverage of firms, 
dispersion in analyst forecasts, return volatility, and cash-flow volatility to show that high 
(low) information uncertainty leads to large (small) drift in stock returns following good (bad) 
news in a way that suggests that information uncertainty delays the flow of information into 
stock prices. The author documents that evidence from his study shows that on the arrival of 
new information, low information uncertainty stocks do not draw any dramatic reaction from 
the market and there is therefore little news-based return predictability. He also documents 
that price momentum and other trading strategies that buy good-news stocks and sell bad-
news stocks perform better when conditioned on higher information uncertainty stocks. This 
position is consistent with the findings reported in Jiang, Lee, and Zhang (2005). The authors 
find that there is no significant relation between information uncertainty proxies, such as 
cash-flow and stock volatility, and unconditional expected stock returns. This finding 
suggests that variations in information uncertainty proxies themselves are only able to 
explain returns when conditional on the nature of earnings news. Again this supports the 
behavioural argument that information uncertainty only magnifies the impact of earnings 
news on post-earnings announcement drift. 
Zhang (2006b) investigates how information uncertainty and cognitive biases influence a 
sell-side analyst’s recommended decision. The author shows that high information 
uncertainty predicts positive (negative) forecast errors and future forecast revisions following 
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good (bad) news. This suggests that information uncertainty delays the flow of ambiguous 
information into analyst forecasts. The author also shows that information uncertainty has 
opposite effects on good and bad news firms. This anomalous behaviour is consistent with 
the hypothesis that analysts underreact more strongly to good and bad earnings news in the 
presence of high uncertainty. He finds that the effect of information uncertainty on analyst 
behaviour is stronger following bad news than following good news. Therefore, analysts are 
more prone to apply a harsher downward revision to bad news firms and a less generous 
upward revision to firms with commensurate good news. This behaviour has a link to a 
psychological principle known as loss-aversion, which suggests that individuals attach more 
weight to losses than they do to gains of equal magnitude (see Kahneman and Tversky 
(1984), Tversky and Kahneman (1991)). Another interesting finding of the paper is that as 
the forecast horizon decreases and more information becomes available, analysts’ forecasts 
tend to improve (worsen) for good-news (bad-news) firms. 
Francis, LaFond, Olsson, and Schipper (2007) examine the role of information uncertainty in 
explaining the properties and returns of a post-earnings announcement drift trading strategy. 
The authors find that unexpected earnings components of high information uncertainty firms 
show no dramatic market reactions. High unexpected earning portfolios are found to contain 
more high uncertainty stocks than low unexpected earning portfolios. Within portfolios of 
high unexpected earnings stocks, high uncertainty stocks earn larger abnormal returns than 
low uncertainty stocks. This shows that high information uncertainty when conditioned on 
good news (high unexpected earnings) leads to a strong upwards drift in returns. This finding 
is consistent with the findings of Jiang et al (2005), who report that the effects of price and 
earnings momentum are much stronger in high uncertainty than low uncertainty stocks.  
Price, Gatzlaff, and Sirmans (2012) examine the effects of information uncertainty on the 
post-earnings announcement drift anomaly for real estate investment trusts (REIT). We 
expect the earnings announcement to be a more certain signal for REITs due to the 
presence of a parallel (private) asset market (which implies an additional source of 
information for REITS investors) and therefore should imply less uncertainty and ultimately 
lower drifts for REITs. But contrary to this logic, the authors find that the size of drift is larger 
for REITs than in ordinary common stock (non-REITs). The authors conclude that despite 
the fact that there exists a parallel (private) asset market which provides a rich information 
environment for the investors, the flow of information from private market to the public 
market seems to be delayed. The authors attribute this to information uncertainty, which they 
argue inhibits the rate of flow of publicly announced earnings signals into stock prices in a 
timely manner. 
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2.6 Summary 
The predictability of returns around earnings announcements constitutes a very interesting 
area of research in the finance literature. The reason for this is that first, if the arguments of 
the efficient market hypothesis are valid, returns should not be predictable; second, the 
persistence of such predictability could imply that they might be useful trading strategies that 
might be profitable; and third the quest to understand the true phenomenon that causes the 
predictability of returns around this important firm event. These are some of the major 
reasons that drive research on the predictability of returns around earnings announcement. 
Earnings and price momentum are the two major return anomalies that are predictable. 
Although both anomalies show an upwards drift in the stock prices, the processes that 
initiate them are separate from each other. Research shows that while the earnings surprise 
measure explains earnings momentum (post-earnings announcement drift) in returns, 
historical price data explains the price momentum anomaly. However, there remains a 
relation between the two anomalies, in that the systematic component of the earnings 
momentum subsumes the price momentum anomaly in a multivariate regression analysis19. 
Furthermore, trading strategies based on both anomalies are separately profitable, again 
suggesting that although both anomalies are related, they capture two different kinds of 
reaction in the market. 
A number of theoretical behavioural finance models propose theories for the study of 
momentum anomalies. The fundamental similarity between these models lies in their belief 
that momentum occurs as a result of influence of certain cognitive biases and/or heuristics 
on investors’ decision-making processes. Another belief that is common amongst these 
models is that market participants do not always hold the same information set and do not 
possess the same level of expertise in the collection, processing, and use of value-relevant 
information. These theoretical models can be broadly divided into representative agent and 
noise trader type models. The underlying difference between the two groups of models is 
that representative agent models study the investor through a representative ‘everyman’ kind 
of investor, while noise trader models study investors as a heterogeneous group with 
different levels of information processing powers. This study adopts the representative agent 
type model for the reasons given previously. 
The study of earnings momentum generally centres around the impact of new earnings 
information on price. This information comes in the form of innovation in the most current 
earnings announcement. The innovation in earnings is the difference between the actual 
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 See Chordia and Shivakumar (2006). 
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earnings outcome and the expected earnings. So, innovation to earnings can be seen as the 
‘shock’ to the announced earnings. Various earnings momentum models adopt diverse 
methods to measure earnings innovation. The common name adopted in behavioural 
finance literature for this innovation is ‘earnings surprise’. The most popular measures of 
earnings surprise in literature are the standardised unexpected earnings and analyst 
forecast revision. In this study, I adopt a new metric to measure the impact of earnings 
innovation on price. The new metric is the sequences or streaks of earnings surprises 
calculated over many quarters. Here, the new information that comes with the earnings 
announcement is either confirmation or termination of the lengthening streak of quarterly 
earnings surprises. The change in quarterly earnings or the earnings surprise is used to 
proxy the change in investors’ expectations of earnings at the time when earnings are 
announced. Moreover, from the behavioural finance point of view, it is during the processing 
of the information contained in the earnings surprise that investors become vulnerable to the 
influence of biases and heuristics. My thesis focuses on how sequences or streaks of 
earnings surprise impact on stock returns after the earnings announcement. The Rabin 
(2002b) and BSV (1998) models propose that under the influence of different biases and 
heuristics, investors observing sequences of earnings surprises will produce incorrect 
earnings forecasts with their models. This will subsequently result in the abnormal behaviour 
of stock prices. 
Closely related literature is reviewed in chapters 4 and 5 and the hypotheses follow directly 
from them. 
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  Chapter 3 
Data and methodology 
3.1 Introduction and data description 
The main objective of this chapter is twofold: the first part discusses the nature and sources 
of various data used in this research and the second part of the chapter is devoted to the 
various methods employed in carrying out the empirical analyses. The quality of empirical 
research very much depends on the dataset used and the methods followed at the analysis 
stage. It is also equally important to ensure that variables and proxies used in research are 
measured in a way that will minimise error. For this reason, I use the S&P500 sample frame, 
which is likely to comprise high quality data with few reporting errors.    
This chapter introduces the sources of data used in this research work. It also describes the 
data collection process and the ‘make-up’ of any individual piece of data used in this 
investigation. Although the data collected are secondary data, nevertheless, the majority of 
them are not used in the exact form in which they were initially collected. Some of the data 
have undergone several transformations to obtain the required proxies from them. Once a 
company enters the S&P500 index, I do not remove it from my dataset even if it exits the 
index before the end of my sample period. In this way, I try as much as possible to reduce 
the incidence of survivorship bias20. I have a total of 837 constituent companies in my 
S&P500 index over the sample period from January 1991 to December 2006. This reflects 
the turnover and attrition of the 500 companies present in the index in any particular month.  
The second objective of this chapter is to describe the main methodology applied in this 
research work. For methods that are not common to the two major empirical chapters of this 
study, their description will be in their respective empirical chapters. Here I present the main 
list of methods of analysis that are followed in both chapters 4 and 5. 
3.2 Description of data sources 
The sample data used in the research work is collected from various data sources and 
databases, which include Standard & Poor’s Financial Services LLC, The Institutional 
Brokers Estimate System (I/B/E/S), Thomson financial DataStream, and the Professor 
Kenneth French Data library webpage. The quarterly earnings-per-share announcement 
dates, company market capitalisation, book value of equity, weekly return on the S&P500 
index, company cash-flow from operations, daily and monthly stock price data are collected 
from DataStream. Additionally, the quarterly earnings-per-share, consensus analysts’ 
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 See Brown et al (1992). 
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forecast of earnings-per-share, analysts’ coverage of companies, analysts’ forecast revision, 
and consensus analysts’ forecast dispersion are collected from the Institutional Brokers 
Estimate System database. The index services of Standard & Poor’s Financial Services LLC 
provides the dates when companies were added and/or deleted from the S&P500 index. 
Finally, the Fama-French size and book-to-market benchmark portfolios and factors are 
collected from Professor Kenneth French’s online data library webpage. 
3.3 Methodology 
In this section I discuss methods used to measure variables and proxies used for analysis in 
the empirical chapters. However, the sections that follow discuss the measurement of 
proxies and variables common to both empirical chapters. Here, I discuss in more detail the 
main measures and proxies that I set out to use in my analyses: 
 The first among the measures is the sequences of changes in annualised 
quarterly earnings over a period of twelve quarters. This measure captures the 
various levels of investor behaviour in response to various lengths of rising or 
falling sequences or streaks of earnings surprises over twelve quarters. This test 
allows me to examine how belief in the law of small numbers, as proposed by 
Rabin (2002b), might influence investors’ decisions following quarterly earnings 
announcements. The test shows the association between the ‘streaks’ of changes 
in investors’ earnings growth expectations, over many quarters, and the 
subsequent market response. The sequences of quarterly earnings changes are 
calculated using the annualised quarterly earnings change normalised by prior 
year-end stock price. This price is the stock price on the last day of quarter t-4. 
The sequence of quarterly EPS change metric is used in chapter 4. 
 
 Second, market response to streaks of changes in investors’ earnings 
expectations around quarterly earnings announcement dates are examined in 
chapter 5. Again, I measure the quarterly earnings surprise (ESURP) by 
subtracting the most recent consensus analyst forecast from the actual quarterly 
earnings in the relevant quarter. This is then normalised by the prior year end 
stock price. Again, the year-end stock price is the stock price on the last day of 
quarter t-4. I use this metric to examine whether the stock prices are following the 
same direction as the streaks of ESURP in terms of both their sign and intensity. 
This is done by examining the response of three-day buy-and-hold abnormal 
returns to the streaks of ESURP three days around the earnings announcement. 
The holding period begins a day prior to the earnings announcement date and 
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ends a day after. It is believed that market reaction towards quarterly earnings 
announcements is most intense in this period, as market participants are working 
out the implication of earnings information for stock price. Jegadeesh and Titman 
(1993) document that analysing stock returns within a short window around the 
earnings announcement date (a period when key firm-specific information is being 
disseminated) ensures that they have a sharp test which is able to assess the 
potential biases in market expectations. Bernard and Thomas (1989, 1990), 
Freeman and Tse (1989), and Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) also employ a three-
day holding period around the earnings announcement date to test for post-
earnings announcement drift. This focuses interest in the period during which the 
market incorporates new earnings information.  
 
 Third, previous work in the literature, notably Zhang (2006a), posits that when 
investors underreact to earnings announcements from high information 
uncertainty firms, this induces larger price drift in their stocks. In chapter 5, I 
introduce Zhang’s (2006a) information uncertainty proxies and variables to 
investigate whether they will produce larger post-earnings announcement drift in 
the presence of streaks of quarterly earnings surprises of my S&P500 sample 
companies. I also test whether individual information uncertainty proxies have a 
significant univariate impact on post-earnings announcement drift. 
3.4 Variables and proxies: definition and measurement 
I measure investors’ expectations in two different ways. Investors’ expectations are 
measured first using earnings growth, (E (Et) =Et-1) and second using expected earnings 
from consensus analysts’ forecasts of quarterly earnings. These two are used to construct 
two different earnings surprise metrics which are used to investigate a representative 
investor’s response to earnings realisations. I also use analysts’ consensus forecast 
revisions, which is an alternative earnings surprise metric used to measure change in 
investors’ earnings expectations, to check for the robustness of the results from the first two 
earnings surprise metrics.  
3.4.1 Earnings announcement and the ‘earnings surprise’ metrics 
There is a vast body of literature showing that the market responds to earnings surprises in a 
manner that suggests incomplete, or delayed, flows of information into stock prices. Previous 
research works, for example those of Ball and Brown (1968), Foster, Olsen and Shevlin 
(1984), and Bernard and Thomas (1989, 1990), show that the market response is more 
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intense when the earnings surprise is negative (so, bad news travels quickly). It is not 
surprising that the market seems to respond more strongly to the news of those firms that 
are making losses or those to which earnings are declining. Obviously loss-making firms are 
more likely to declare bankruptcy in the long run than profit-making firms.  
There are different schools of thought on the reason(s) for the delayed response of stocks 
prices to the earnings news. Bernard and Thomas (1989) document that there are different 
competing arguments amongst researchers as to why stock prices continue to drift long after 
earnings announcement dates. First, some argue that the delay could be because investors 
are unable to assimilate the information contained in the earnings news quickly. Second, 
others argue that the cost of implementing a certain trading strategy could be responsible. 
The third group argues that the reason could be because the opportunity cost of immediate 
exploitation of the earnings information exceeds the gains for a greater number of traders. 
Furthermore, others argue that the benchmark models used in calculating abnormal returns, 
such as the Capital Asset Pricing model (CAPM), are either incomplete or miss-estimated 
and as a result, realised returns are not fully adjusted for risk. Jacob, Lys, and Sabino (2000) 
argue that post-earnings announcement drift is a result of researchers over-differencing an 
already stationary time series. Over-differencing of a time series occurs when the original 
time series which is already stationary is inadvertently differenced in order to achieve 
stationarity. The authors document evidence that shows that post-earnings announcement 
drift in their sample is driven by a sub-set of firms where over-differencing of quarterly 
earnings has occurred while estimating earnings surprise. However, the authors do not 
explain why Freeman and Tse (1989) find post-earnings announcement drift in stocks using 
the actual earnings and analysts’ forecast measure. The finding of Freeman and Tse 
therefore refutes Jacob et al (2000) argument and shows that the presence of post-earnings 
announcement drifts in stocks cannot be attributed to methodological flaws. 
I employ different tests to examine how investors respond to sequences or streaks of 
changes in expected earnings over different horizons. I ask if investors monitoring firms’ 
earnings are just interested in the raw changes in quarterly earnings, or if they are more 
interested in the consistency of sequences (streaks) of such changes over many quarters 
(between two and twelve quarters). In the first empirical analysis (chapter 4), I create 
sequences of each company’s quarterly earnings changes using the company’s historical 
time series of quarterly earnings. This measure shows if a company’s quarterly earnings 
change is consistently rising or declining across twelve quarters. I examine the intensity or 
the strength of this continuation/reversal in quarterly earnings and the investors’ response to 
them. Furthermore, I use the different sequence lengths to examine the behaviour of 
investors at different points as the sequence intensifies or resolves. I show how ‘surprised’ 
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the investor is when companies consistently post positive or negative earnings changes over 
many quarters.  I also show investors’ response to companies that consistently post 
declining earnings over many quarters. I compare this with investors’ response to companies 
that post positive earnings over the same length of time. For companies which consistently 
post declining or negative earnings, I examine if investors demand a premium to invest in 
such firms or whether companies that post consistently strong earnings performances enjoy 
discounts to their cost of capital. 
In chapter 5, I test the investors’ response to changes in earnings expectations around 
earnings announcement dates using streaks of quarterly earnings surprises (ESURP) to 
capture this change. I construct the quarterly earnings surprise metric by subtracting the 
most recent consensus analyst forecast of earnings from the actual quarterly earnings in the 
most recent quarter. This is then normalised using the prior year end stock price. Streaks of 
quarterly earnings surprises are constructed from the quarterly earnings surprise metric 
(ESURP) in the most recent quarter. A streak of quarterly earnings surprises occurs when 
there are rising, or declining, quarterly earnings surprises for at least two consecutive 
quarters. A streak of rising (declining) quarterly earnings is denoted as positive (negative) 
streak. I demonstrate the investor’s response to streaks of good quarterly earnings news 
(when there is a growing ESURP for at least two consecutive quarters) and to streaks of bad 
quarterly earnings news (when there is a declining ESURP for a minimum of two 
consecutive quarters). The strength of price response to the streak lengths demonstrates the 
level of surprise that investors have towards the confirmation or termination of a growing 
streak at earnings announcement. I also introduce Zhang’s (2006a, 2006b) information 
uncertainty proxies to examine the impact that the uncertainty generated by the firms’ 
underlying fundamentals would have on the post-earnings announcement drift within a three-
day window around the earnings announcement date. It has been argued severally in prior 
studies that some of the post-earnings announcement drift could be explained by the 
volatility of a firm’s valuation fundamentals21. Information uncertainty consists of two 
components – the volatility of a firm’s underlying fundamentals and poor information (Zhang 
(2006a)). 
I use the firms’ earnings announcement dates to determine my cut-off dates for the 
calculation of the earnings surprise metric (ESURP) and determine my sample firms’ 
estimation and event windows around which performance is evaluated. I also use the 
monthly consensus analyst forecast of earnings from the I/B/E/S database and the actual 
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 See Cao and Narayanamoorthy (2012). 
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quarterly earnings announcement date to determine the change in earnings expectations for 
each monthly period in my sample. 
3.4.2 Sequences of quarterly earnings-per-share changes  
I measure quarterly earnings-per-share change following the Chan et al (2004) procedure for 
measuring performance proxies. I use quarterly earnings per share excluding interest and 
extra-ordinary items for my computations. This earnings-per-share type excludes special 
items or one-time large items which may otherwise affect the true size of realised earnings 
per share. I use an annually smoothed quarterly earnings (an annualised quarterly earnings 
change of four rolling quarters) metric of the form in equation 3.1 below to calculate change 
in quarterly earnings: 
∆𝑄𝑖𝑡 = [(𝑄𝑖𝑡+𝑄𝑖𝑡−1+𝑄𝑖𝑡−2+𝑄𝑖𝑡−3) − (𝑄𝑖𝑡−4+𝑄𝑖𝑡−5+𝑄𝑖𝑡−6+𝑄𝑖𝑡−7)] ……………………….... (3.1) 
where (𝑄𝑖𝑡) is the earnings per share for company 𝑖 in the most recent quarter (i.e. 
quarter 𝑡),  while 𝑄𝑖𝑡−𝑘 are the lagged values of 𝑄𝑖𝑡 from periods 𝑡 − 1 and 𝑡 − 7.  I adopt this 
method to measure the quarterly earnings change to avoid seasonality in the time series of 
the data. By using this metric, it is assumed here that investors usually compare growth in 
earnings-per-share across analogous quarters in a four-quarter period. While I exclude a few 
extremely large changes in earnings per share which could be attributed to errors in the 
I/B/E/S database, I do not generally winsorise the data sample, because I assume S&P500 
constituents usually have accurate reports of their earnings and prices. 
To ensure that the quarterly earnings-per-share change for all companies are comparable to 
each other, I deflate the quarterly change in earnings-per-share equation with the prior stock 
price 𝑃𝑡−4  (which is the stock price on the last day of the immediate past analogous quarter) 
from four calendar quarters prior to the most recent earnings announcement, as shown in 
equation 3.2 below: 
 𝑄𝑖𝑡 = [(𝑄𝑖𝑡+𝑄𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝑄𝑖𝑡−2 + 𝑄𝑖𝑡−3) − (𝑄𝑖𝑡−4+𝑄𝑖𝑡−5+𝑄𝑖𝑡−6+𝑄𝑖𝑡−7)] 𝑃𝑖𝑡−4⁄    ………………. (3.2) 
The choice of 𝑃𝑖𝑡−4  is to ensure that the stock price, used in normalising quarterly earnings 
change, is free from any sort of information contamination from the most recent earning 
announcement news. I use the above metric to measure the change in the representative 
investor’s expectations of earnings growth. This represents a measure of the surprise that 
the investor faces each time a firm’s quarterly earnings are announced.  
The Consistency metric is the sequence of quarterly earnings changes and is constructed by 
using the most recent annualised quarterly earnings change deflated by prior year end stock 
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price. Consistency is the quarterly earnings change sequence lengths of  2, 3, ……., and 12 
denoting either consistent rising, or declining in quarterly earnings changes lasting for 2 
quarters, 3, ……., and 12 consecutive quarters respectively. Sequences of consecutive rises 
in quarterly earnings change are denoted as positive while the converse is true for 
sequences of consistent quarterly earnings falls. 
The investor’s response to the ‘Consistency’ proxy will depend on both the sign and intensity 
of the sequence of quarterly earnings change. Intensity here refers the length of the 
sequence. The consistency of the quarterly earnings change sequence for each of the 
companies is measured over a period of twelve calendar quarters. The consistency of a 
sequence of earnings changes forms a time series for each company over the sample 
period. For each of the companies, I compute the consistency of earnings change rises or 
falls, looking at each company’s sequence over a period of twelve calendar quarters. The 
rationale for choosing twelve quarters is because it is known in the finance literature that 
momentum hardly lasts for more than three years; in fact, it is documented that long-term 
reversal of trends usually sets in after three years from when the initial trend started22. 
3.4.3 The standardised unexpected earnings (SUE) 
I construct the standardised unexpected earning (henceforth SUE) metric to measure the 
level of change in expected earnings that the representative investor faces at quarterly 
earnings announcements using consensus analysts’ forecasts and actual quarterly earnings. 
Foster et al (1984) provide methods for constructing different kinds of SUE metrics along 
with their scaling formats. In the behavioural finance literature, the magnitude and sign of the 
SUE is used to explain the investors’ (market) response to earnings news while they adjust 
to the difference between the announced earnings and expected earnings (Bernard and 
Thomas (1989, 1990), Brown et al (1987a, 1987b)). In other words, the information in SUE 
captures the intensity of the sentiment that investors display as they underreact to the most 
recent quarterly earnings news. In the past four decades, different measures have been 
used by researchers to calculate the standardised unexpected. In early research literature, 
SUE is constructed using the quarterly earnings first order auto-regressive data-generating 
model of the type shown in equation 3.3 below: 
 𝐸[𝑄𝑖𝑡] =  𝛿𝑖 + 𝑄𝑖𝑡−4 + Θ𝑖(𝑄𝑖𝑡−1−𝑄𝑖𝑡−5) + Θ𝜀𝑖𝑡−4 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡   ……………………..……………… (3.3) 
where 𝑄𝑖𝑡 is the company 𝑖′𝑠 quarterly earnings per share in quarter 𝑡 and 𝛿𝑖 is the drift term, 
while 𝑄𝑖𝑡−1 to 𝑄𝑖𝑡−5  represent the prior earnings-per-share value in periods 𝑡 − 1  and 𝑡 − 5.  
Bernard and Thomas (1989, 1990) document that although equation 3.3 is the true data-
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 See De Bondt and Thaler (1985), Jegadeesh and Titman (1993). 
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generating process, when forecasting earnings, investors omit the first order auto-regressive 
term [Φ(𝑄𝑖𝑡−1−𝑄𝑖𝑡−5)] from their model and think that quarterly earnings are generated by 
[𝐸[𝑄𝑖𝑡] =  𝛿𝑖 + 𝑄𝑖𝑡−4] instead. By doing this, the investors introduce error into their 
forecasting models. Liu et al (2003) observe that equation 3.3 contains a seasonal random 
walk, with or without a drift, as seen in a special case where Θ𝑖=0 or 𝛿𝑖=0. Using this model, 
SUE is defined as the unexpected earnings deflated by the standard error of unexpected 
earnings.  This measure of SUE calculates the earnings surprise based on the time series of 
the historical earnings realisations. Earlier works in the literature that adopt this model in 
calculating SUE include Latane and Jones (1977, 1979), Foster (1977), Foster et al (1984), 
Bartov (1992), and Brown (1993). These earlier models calculate SUE as: 
                                𝑆𝑈𝐸𝑖𝑡 =
𝑈𝐸𝑖𝑡
𝜎𝑈𝐸𝑖
                …………………………………………………... (3.4) 
where 𝑈𝐸𝑖𝑡 = 𝑄𝑖𝑡−𝐸[𝑄𝑖𝑡], 𝐸[𝑄𝑖𝑡] is the expected earnings from the univariate time series 
model, 𝑄𝑖𝑡 is the company 𝑖 actual earnings in time 𝑡, and  𝜎𝑈𝐸𝑖 is the standard error from 
the time series regression equation. 
In chapter 5, I adopt similar metric (SUE) but measure it differently to reflect a more recent 
practice in literature. Furthermore, there is a general consensus in the literature that the 
earnings surprise metric constructed from the consensus analyst forecast explains stock 
returns better than that constructed with a univariate time series models of quarterly 
earnings-per-share23. The method involves the use of the most recent consensus monthly 
analysts’ forecast figure to proxy investors’ expectation of future earnings. Based on the 
consensus monthly analysts’ forecast and actual quarterly earnings per share in the most 
recent quarter, I calculate the standardised unexpected earnings, SUE, using the following 
model: 
                               𝑆𝑈𝐸𝑖𝑡 =
𝐴𝑖𝑡−𝐹𝑖𝑡
𝑃𝑖𝑡−4
            …………………………………..…..…………… (3.5) 
In equation 3.5 above, 𝐹𝑖𝑡 represents the consensus monthly analysts’ forecast for company 
𝑖 in the most recent month before the earnings announcement in time 𝑡. 𝐴𝑖𝑡  is the company 
𝑖′𝑠 actual quarterly earnings-per-share in time 𝑡 , 𝑃𝑖𝑡−4 is the prior year end stock price of 
company 𝑖′𝑠 share. Brown and Zmijewski (1987) is one of the early works to observe that 
analysts’ forecasts of earnings are better at capturing earnings expectations than earnings 
forecasts made from time series models. The authors posit that the reason is because 
analysts are able to recognise and distinguish between permanent, transitory, and irrelevant 
earnings shocks, and therefore can adjust their forecasts more accurately. Furthermore, 
                                                          
23
 See Livnat and Mendenhall (2006). 
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analysts have more information about the political, regulatory and technology risks that 
companies face. In addition, other early work in the literature, such as Brown et al (1987a), 
Fried and Givoly (1982), Brown, Foster, and Noreen (1985), and Elton et al (1984), 
document that analysts’ consensus forecasts of earnings capture the market’s  expectation 
of future earnings better than time series models. Brown et al (1987b) show that the reason 
for the superiority of the consensus analysts’ forecast to the forecasts from the univariate 
time series models is not certain. However, the authors find that earnings surprises from the 
consensus analysts’ forecast model explain the association between earnings expectation 
and stock returns better than time series models. In more recent literature, authors such as 
Livnat and Mendenhall (2006) document that consensus analyst forecast of earnings 
provides a better forecast than those of time series models in measuring SUE.  Nguyen and 
Quang (2012) test the Livnat and Mendenhall (2006) model on the German stock market 
and their report suggests that consensus analysts’ forecasts provide a better explanation of 
post-earnings announcement drift than the forecast derived from time series models. 
However, it is good to note that although time series forecasts might be less accurate, they 
might also be less biased, as analysts can be swayed by the ‘bubble psychology’. 
3.4.4 Computation of stock returns 
Single period stock returns are calculated following the ‘simple’ returns measure from 
equation 3.6 below. 
  𝑅𝑖𝑡 =
𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝐷𝑖𝑡−𝑃𝑖𝑡−1
𝑃𝑖𝑡−1
       ………………………………………….………….….. (3.6) 
where  𝑅𝑖𝑡 is the company 𝑖′𝑠 stock return at time t and 𝑃𝑖𝑡  is the company 𝑖′𝑠 stock price at 
time t, 𝑃𝑖𝑡−1 is the stock price in the immediate past period (the beginning-of-period stock 
price), and 𝐷𝑖𝑡 is the dividend paid on the share during this period (for modelling purposes, I 
assume the dividend to be zero in all cases – this is a popular practice in literature). There is 
no consensus in the literature as to which method of calculating returns is preferred between 
the two main methods – the simple returns method and the compounding (logarithmic) 
returns method. Some researchers argue that the method the investor employs depends on 
the investment strategy that he follows. Others argue that for those investors that employ 
trading rules which involve rebalancing their stock portfolios periodically, the logarithmic 
returns method is the preferred method, while for those investors using a buy-and–hold 
strategy, the simple returns metric is the appropriate method. As documented by Barber and 
Lyon (1997), continuously compounded returns have negatively biased abnormal returns 
because of cross-sectional variation in the returns of common stocks. I do not consider the 
Dimson procedure of calculating stock returns appropriate for my sample. While the Dimson 
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procedure is appropriate for small and illiquid stocks, my data sample is composed of the 
S&P500 stock index constituent companies which represent the most capitalised and liquid 
stocks not just in the United States but in the whole world. 
3.4.5 Benchmark expected returns (performance evaluation) 
There is apparently no consensus in the literature as to which model is the best benchmark 
for measuring expected returns. Various forms of benchmarking that have been used in the 
literature include the control firm method; for example as used in Barber and Lyon (1997), 
Ang and Zhang (2004), and Kim, Klein, and Rosenfeld (2008). However, Ang and Zhang 
(2004) argue that the benefits of the control firm approach seem to be limited to small firms. 
Kim et al (2008) support the position of Ang and Zhang (2004) by observing that the control 
firm approach addresses the problem seen in standard models in that they do not capture 
the left tails of the distribution of firm size and trading prices. Barber and Lyon (1997) show 
that test statistics of abnormal returns calculated using benchmarks or reference portfolios 
such as the market index are miss-specified. The authors show that this miss-specification 
can be corrected by matching sample firms with control firms of similar sizes and book-to-
market ratios. Moreover, Loughran and Ritter (2000) observe that this approach will be best 
for benchmarking in those studies where portfolio rebalancing is assumed. This is not the 
case with the portfolios in my thesis as they are buy-and-hold portfolios. 
There are other types of models for measuring stocks’ expected returns such as the Market 
model, the Market-adjusted model, the Capital Asset Pricing model (CAPM), and the factor 
models such as Fama-French’s three-factor and Carhart’s four-factor models. Ball (1978) 
and Fama (1991) document that there are large variations in the expected returns estimates 
across different benchmarks and that long-horizon results are sensitive to the model used in 
estimating expected returns. Fama and French (1993) also observe that the use of incorrect 
benchmark models in generating expected returns could result in systematic biases and 
miss-specification. However, Kothari and Warner in their 1997 paper posit that long-horizon 
tests for abnormal performance over a 36-month horizon produce similar results under the 
Fama-French three-factor model and other benchmark procedures. The authors examine a 
variety of abnormal returns from different models and document that the degree of miss-
specification is not highly sensitive to the benchmark model employed, as suggested in 
earlier work. 
More recent behavioural finance studies have adopted Fama-French’s three-factor model 
and Carhart’s (1997) four-factor models.  Evidently, this is often because the robustness of 
the benchmark models which researchers previously used to calculate expected returns has 
been called into question. Fama-French (1992) observe that beta loses its explanatory 
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power in the presence of size and book-to-market ratio in a cross-section of stock returns 
and by implication the two-parameter capital asset pricing model (CAPM) is not the most 
robust benchmark model. In the literature, the more recent Carhart’s four-factor model, 
which includes a momentum-related factor in addition to the Fama-French three-factor 
model, is argued to explain returns better than the Fama-French three-factor model. Ang and 
Zhang (2004) document that Carhart’s four-factor model is inferior to a well-specified Fama 
and French three-factor model in a calendar-time portfolio because the four-factor model 
over-rejects the null hypothesis relative to the specified significance level. Furthermore, Ang 
and Zhang (2004) note that the Fama and French three-factor model has a relatively high 
power in detecting abnormal returns when compared with other benchmark models. 
Loughran and Ritter (2000) argue that if one uses positive (empirically based) models such 
as the three-factor model as a benchmark, it is not market efficiency that is being tested on 
this occasion. It is rather a test to ascertain whether a pattern exists which has already been 
captured by other well-known patterns. The authors argue that multifactor models such as 
the Fama-French three-factor model can be used as a benchmark only if the researcher 
believes that such models are equilibrium models, otherwise it is incorrect to use them as 
benchmarks. The size and book-to-market factors in the Fama-French three-factor model 
are regarded as priced systematic factors. The pattern of the anomaly (earnings momentum) 
I test is very distinct from the size and book-to-market effects in the Fama-French model. In 
studies of firm events involving managers’ behavioural timing, such as stock splits, equity-
financed acquisitions, seasoned equity offerings, and share repurchases, the Fama-French 
three-factor model tends to underestimate the abnormal returns (e.g. Loughran and Ritter 
(2000)). Of course my thesis examines the impact of earnings momentum on traded prices, 
so controlling for price momentum in benchmark portfolios could be interpreted as assuming 
what I seek to prove. Therefore, Carhart’s four-factor model is not considered as an 
appropriate benchmark for my study. 
3.4.5.1 The construction of the Fama-French type benchmark portfolios 
I follow the Fama-French three-factor model (1992, 1993) in constructing the Fama-French 
type benchmark portfolios for my sample. The Fama-French three-factor estimation model is 
given by equation 3.7 below. 
  𝑅𝑝𝑡 −  𝑅𝑓𝑡 =  𝑎𝑖 + 𝑏𝑖(𝑅𝑚𝑡−𝑅𝑓𝑡) + 𝑠𝑖𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + ℎ𝑖𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                 …………………..…….. (3.7) 
𝑖 = 1, … … 𝑁; 𝑡 = 1, … . . , 𝑇    
𝑅𝑝𝑡 is the simple return on the calendar-time portfolio 𝑝 at time 𝑡, 𝑎𝑖  is the regression 
intercept term, 𝑅𝑚𝑡 is the return on the value-weighted market index, 𝑅𝑓𝑡 is the monthly 
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return on a three-month Treasury bill. 𝑆𝑀𝐵 is the size premium (small minus big) and 
represents the difference in returns of value-weighted small stocks portfolio and big stocks 
portfolio, while 𝐻𝑀𝐿 is the value premium (high minus low) and represents the difference in 
returns of value-weighted portfolios of stocks with high value (high book-to-market ratio) and 
portfolios of stocks of low value (low book-to-market ratio); 𝑏𝑖,𝑠𝑖, and ℎ𝑖 represent the 
parameter estimates of the regression equation, while 𝜀𝑖𝑡   is the error term of the regression. 
The Fama-French factor loadings (betas) are estimated using weights from rolling annual 
regressions for each of the six stock portfolios over five years of monthly data. My procedure 
for creating the six portfolios follows the Fama-French (1993) approach. First, I sort my firms 
into two portfolios by using their market equity (ME) to divide them into two equal big and 
small portfolios. Subsequently, each of the small and big ME portfolios are further sorted into 
three portfolios using their book-to-market ratio (the ratio of book equity to market equity). 
The market equity is based on a stock’s market equity at the end of June in each year of my 
sample period. The BE/ME breakpoints are at the 70th and 30th percentiles which represent 
the growth, neutral or medium, and low or value portfolios respectively. This exercise creates 
six stock portfolios: the Big-High (BL), Big-Medium (BM), Big-Low (BL), Small-High (SH), 
Small-Medium (SM), and Small-Low (SL) portfolios at the point of intersection of the size 
(ME) and BE/ME breakpoints.  
I form 96 different Fama-French type calendar-time portfolios across 16 different portfolio 
formation periods (years) to estimate factor loadings for my sample period of between 1991 
and 2006. For the estimation of the Fama-French betas, I use sample data beginning from 
January 1986 in order to obtain enough data (60 months) for the estimation of factor 
loadings for the year 1991, the first year of my sample period. I use the estimated factor 
loadings (betas) and the corresponding Fama-French benchmark factor returns to calculate 
the expected returns for each of my six portfolios above (in each year of my sample period). 
To measure the expected return on each of the stocks, I match each stock to the relevant six 
Fama-French benchmark portfolios. I use the market capitalisation of each stock and its 
book-to-market ratio as criteria for matching the stocks to their appropriate portfolio returns. 
Each of the stocks must have 60 months of contiguous pre-estimation returns, or at least 
have a minimum of historical contiguous returns for 24 months. 
I employ the value-weighted approach in the construction of the portfolios. Some previous 
research argues that the returns of equal-weighted portfolios outperform both the value-
weighted and price-weighted portfolios (see Plyakha, Uppal, and Vilkov (2012)). However, 
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the majority of researchers also observe that this is more likely to happen with small stocks 
rather than large stocks like the S&P500 constituents stocks I study here24. 
In chapter 5, the estimation of beta or the Fama-French factors loading are repeated 
following the same procedure as above but using daily data in place of monthly data. 
3.4.5.2 Measuring abnormal returns  
In the literature, many researchers recommend the buy-and–hold abnormal returns (BHAR) 
strategy over the cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) strategy. Researchers such as Roll 
(1983), Blume and Stambaugh (1983), and Conrad and Kaul (1993) argue that the additive 
nature of the cumulative abnormal returns strategy means that it is usually positively biased 
because of the effect of the bid-ask spread. Barber and Lyon (1997) document that the 
apparent contradictory results findings between cumulative abnormal returns and buy-and-
hold abnormal returns may be down to the impact of a number of biases such as new listing, 
rebalancing, and skewness on cumulative abnormal returns and buy-and-hold abnormal 
returns (see also Dissanaike (1994)). However, Barber and Lyon (1997) favour buy-and-hold 
abnormal returns over cumulative abnormal returns and posit that buy-and-hold abnormal 
returns perform better in the short to medium-term horizon than the long-run horizon. 
Although I employ buy-and-hold abnormal returns in this investigation, my method of 
computing the expected returns differs slightly from Barber and Lyon’s (1997) procedure. 
While they employ the use of appropriate asset/portfolio expected returns, I use the same 
sample firms (S&P500 constituent firms) to construct the expected returns using the Fama 
and French three-factor model, hence the problem of new listing bias does not arise. 
Fama (1998) argues that the problems associated with drawing statistical inferences from 
long-term returns increase as the return horizon lengthens. He, however, posits that 
inferences of long-term returns should be made based on averages or cumulative abnormal 
returns (CAR), rather than buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHAR). In similar studies, Barber 
and Lyon (1997) and Kothari and Warner (1997) argue that the problem of drawing statistical 
inferences with BHARs usually occurs with a long horizon of greater than three years. In this 
study, I employ time-horizons of up to three months, which means that I am unlikely to face 
the problem outlined by the authors above. 
In chapter 4, I use the buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHAR) strategy to measure the 
abnormal returns between the expected return and the raw return in the month following a 
quarterly earnings announcement. In chapter 5, I use the BHAR strategy to measure 
abnormal returns around a three-day event window surrounding the quarterly earnings 
                                                          
24
 See Plyakha, Uppal, and Vilkov (2012). 
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announcement date. Some previous studies argue that the buy-and-hold strategy reflects 
how investors calculate abnormal returns in practice better than the alternative strategy 
(cumulative abnormal returns – CAR) (see Barber and Lyon (1997)). The cumulative 
abnormal returns strategy requires that investors continuously rebalance their stock 
portfolios by selling loser stocks and buying winner stocks, and this comes with attendant 
large trading costs. For the first empirical chapter, I measure my buy-and-hold abnormal 
returns over a medium-term period of between one and three calendar months after the 
earnings announcement. In the second empirical chapter, I calculate the buy-and-hold 
abnormal returns over a window of three days beginning a day prior to the earnings 
announcement date to measure the post-earnings announcement drift associated with the 
earnings announcement. 
To calculate the abnormal returns, I match my sample stocks with each of the six size/value 
portfolios I created in section 3.4.5.1 above. I use the individual stocks’ market equity and 
book-to-market ratio to sort them into six different groups, directly matching them to each of 
the six portfolios.  
I follow Barber and Lyon’s (1997) and Ang and Zhang’s (2004) approach in calculating my 
abnormal returns and subsequently the buy-and-hold abnormal returns. I define 𝑅𝑖𝑡  as the 
simple returns for firm 𝑖 at time 𝑡 ,  and calculate the firm 𝑖 abnormal returns at time 𝑡 as 
𝐴𝐵𝑅𝑖𝑡, and 𝐸(𝑅𝑖𝑡) as the expected return on my sample firm 𝑖 at time 𝑡 .   
           𝐴𝐵𝑅𝑖𝑡 =  𝑅𝑖𝑡 −  𝐸(𝑅𝑖𝑡)     ……………………………………………………………….. (3.8) 
I also calculate the cumulative abnormal returns (CAR), for a robustness check with my main 
strategy, the buy-and-hold abnormal returns. 
                    𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 = ∑ 𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡
𝑇
𝑡=1  …………………………………………………..……………. (3.9)                                   
where 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 is the company 𝑖 abnormal returns cumulated from time 𝑡 to time 𝑇. 
3.4.5.3 Buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHAR)  
I calculate the buy-and-hold abnormal returns on my sample stocks over three calendar 
months beginning with the month of the most recent earnings announcement and the two 
months following the earnings announcement month. The buy-and-hold abnormal returns 
are computed as shown in equation 3.10 below: 
           𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡(𝑡1, 𝑇) = ∏ (1 + 𝑅𝑖𝑡
𝑇
𝑡=1 ) − ∏ (1 + 𝐸(𝑅𝑖𝑡
𝑇
𝑡=1 ))  …………………….…………. (3.10) 
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𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡(𝑡1, 𝑇) is company 𝑖′𝑠 buy-and-hold abnormal return from 𝑡1 to 𝑇, 𝑅𝑖𝑡 is the actual 
return for company 𝑖 at time 𝑡, and 𝐸(𝑅𝑖𝑡) is the expected return for company 𝑖 at time 𝑡. My 
cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) are highly correlated to the BHAR, suggestive of the fact 
that similar results are likely if CAR, rather than BHAR, is used in the regression and test 
analysis. So the return metric chosen is expected to alter the quantitative but not the 
qualitative nature of my reported results in chapters 4 and 5.  
3.4.5.4 Buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHAR) (short window) 
I repeat the procedure in section 3.4.5.3 above to calculate the buy-and-hold abnormal 
returns for the short window of three days in chapter 5. This is to capture the post-earnings 
announcement drift over the days around the earnings announcement date. I use a day prior 
to the earnings announcement date as the starting point and cumulate/multiply returns up to 
a day after the announcement date. This approach follows Bernard and Thomas (1990), who 
document that a delayed market reaction to earnings news is captured within the three-day 
window around the earnings announcement date. The authors reported that although the 
three-day window represents only 5% of the total trading days in a quarter, their results show 
that the announcement period reactions in the three-day window represent a 
disproportionate share of the post-earnings announcement drift. Similar approaches are 
reported by Bernard and Thomas (1989), Freeman and Tse (1989), and Jegadeesh and 
Titman (1993). 
3.4.6 Information uncertainty 
Information uncertainty, also known as value ambiguity, is defined as the ambiguity 
surrounding the implications of new information on a firm’s fundamental value. Zhang 
(2006a) posits that information uncertainty is brought about by poor information and the 
volatility of a firm’s underlying fundamentals. In their paper, Jiang, Lee, and Zhang (2005) 
document that firms with high information uncertainty are very likely to show strong price 
momentum and post-earnings announcement drift when conditioned on the nature of the 
news. This follows directly from the fact that high information uncertainty is likely to lead to 
greater expected returns after good news and smaller, or even negative, expected returns 
after bad news when compared to firms with lower information uncertainty. This is the 
interaction effect between information uncertainty and the nature of news (measured by the 
sign and magnitude of earnings surprise). The authors also show that high information 
uncertainty firms earn lower future stock returns than low information uncertainty firms in a 
univariate regression analysis. This is the mean effect of information uncertainty on stock 
returns. Zhang (2006a) argues that if investors underreact to new information about firms 
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such as earnings announcements, the underreaction will be stronger in the presence of high 
information uncertainty, which an earnings announcement might be expected to partially 
resolve. In a similar study, Jiang et al (2005) document that information uncertainty proxies 
have high interaction effect with earnings momentum proxies, i.e. SUE, and consensus 
analysts’ revision strategies show a much stronger effect with high information uncertainty 
firms than with low information uncertainty firms. 
In chapter 5, I introduce information uncertainty variables into the original model, for two 
reasons: first, to examine how much of the abnormal performance can be attributed to the 
level of information uncertainty surrounding the firm’s underlying fundamentals; second, to 
examine by how much the abnormal performance attributed to the influence of the gambler’s 
fallacy (as proxied by the streaks of earnings surprises) still remains in the presence of the 
uncertainty of a firm’s value. Put another way, I seek to ascertain whether the information 
uncertainty about firms’ fundamentals subsumes (or magnifies) the effect of streaks of 
earnings surprises on prices in very short windows. Are streaks in companies’ quarterly 
earnings surprises subject to high informational uncertainty more or less likely to help 
resolve that uncertainty and so intensify the streak’s impact on prices?  
3.4.6.1 Information uncertainty proxies  
I employ a number of fundamental measures to capture the information uncertainty 
surrounding the firm’s stock value at the arrival of earnings news. The proxies include the 
firm’s Market Capitalisation (MCAP), firm age (AGE), analyst coverage of a firm (ACOV), 
analysts’ forecast dispersion (AFORD), cash-flow volatility (CVOL), and standard deviation 
of the stock’s weekly excess market returns (SVOL). I follow Zhang’s (2006a) procedures in 
measuring the selected information uncertainty proxies. I use the information uncertainty 
proxies for two major reasons: first, because they capture the fundamental volatility 
associated with the stocks, and second, because they capture the noise. Noise in itself 
magnifies the level of ambiguity around a firm’s fundamental value. 
I use information uncertainty proxies in order to examine: 
 Their mean effects on post-earnings announcement drift and  
 Their interaction effects on post-earnings announcement drift with streaks of 
quarterly earnings surprises.  
 
 
74 
 
3.4.6.1.1 Market capitalisation (MCAP)  
This is the market value of the company’s stock (in millions of dollars) at the end of the last 
month (December) of the prior year. It is my opinion that this measure of information 
uncertainty clearly distinguishes companies from one another, since smaller companies will 
have less information available to investors than larger companies. This is a slightly different 
interpretation to the ‘size’ effect documented by Fama and French (1992), who stress the 
riskiness of small stocks. Smaller firms (some of which are often young firms as well) may 
have a less-established business history, lower or narrow customer base, and shorter 
dividend payment or omission history. As a result, there may not be much information about 
them in the public domain. This comes with a challenge, in that investors who are keen on 
obtaining certain key and important information about these firms will have to incur search 
and information acquisition costs. Zhang (2006a, 2006b) argues that although firm size may 
be a good proxy for information uncertainty, it is likely to be noisy. It is likely to contain other 
information about various firm events and issues, hence any inference coming directly from it 
is likely to be contaminated. Nevertheless, the size of a firm carries a great deal of 
information about the firm, and so it is intuitive that I should include it as a proxy for 
information ambiguity. Hong, Lim, and Stein (2000) posit that with information acquisition 
costs fixed across firms of different sizes, paying for information for small firms would not be 
attractive to investors. The authors argue that this will lead to less information on smaller 
firms being available in the market, which will increase information uncertainty around those 
firms. In this study, I focus on the substantial size variation within the largest US companies 
listed on the US S&P500 stock index. 
3.4.6.1.2 Firm age (AGE) 
I define firm age here as the number of years starting from the date the company was added 
to the S&P500 list of constituent companies to the sample date. Older firms in the S&P500 
index will have a significantly longer history of available public information than younger 
firms in the index. Most often, the older firms are the more established in terms of business 
history and are more likely to be run by highly respected management teams than younger 
firms (Zhang 2006a). I therefore use the firm’s age as one of the proxies to capture the 
information uncertainty brought about by the length of time through which a firm has 
‘survived’ in the S&P500 index. It is expected that only profit-making and well-managed firms 
will stay in the index for a long period of time without being deleted. I hypothesise that 
younger firms have high information uncertainty as compared to older firms. Pastor and 
Veronesi (2003) document that individual firm’s uncertainty decreases during their lifetime 
and that the stocks of young firms are more volatile than those of old firms. In addition, Barry 
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and Brown (1985) observe that firms for which there is relatively little information (young 
firms) show higher parameter uncertainty. Put in a different way, there is higher uncertainty 
in model parameters measured for firms with limited information. 
3.4.6.1.3 Analyst coverage (ACOV) 
Analyst coverage is the total number of analysts following a company. It is the number of 
analysts providing fiscal year earnings forecasts for the company in each month. Investors 
and other market participants sometimes depend on analysts’ opinions and 
recommendations about firms’ future performance for investment decisions. Analysts do not 
follow and report on all firms equally. The number of analysts following firms and the amount 
of information and analysis they provide on these firms differ widely across firms. It is widely 
known in the literature that the higher the analyst coverage for a firm, the more information 
on the firm is available to market participants. This is likely to lead to less information 
uncertainty about those firms that have high analyst coverage. Lang and Lundholm (1996) 
report a relation between firms with more information disclosures and a large number of 
analysts following them, and also that those firms have more accurate analyst earnings 
forecasts. Thus, there is less divergence in individual analyst forecasts of a firm’s earnings 
and less volatility in analysts’ forecast revisions for such firms. However, it is important to 
remember that analysts are affected by ‘herd’ behaviour, in that they agree ‘too much’ with 
the most popular forecasts, as observed by Gleason and Lee (2003). This shows that the 
informativeness of analysts’ reports and information disclosures are complementary to each 
other, even though they should be substitutes. Bhushan (1989) links the cross-sectional 
variation in information content of firms’ earnings announcements with differences in the 
number of analysts following those firms. Gleason and Lee (2003) document that in post-
revision drift, the stock price adjusts faster for firms with large analyst coverage and their 
price shows less drift. Hong, Lim and Stein (2000) support the idea that the effect of large 
analyst coverage is more pronounced for stocks that are past losers than for past winners. 
This assertion suggests that investors are keener to quickly assimilate analysts’ information 
on past loser stocks than that on winner stocks. However, it is important to note at this point 
that these authors have deleted the smallest companies from their sample data prior to 
carrying out their analysis. 
3.4.6.1.4 Analysts’ forecast dispersion (AFORD) 
I use the dispersion in analysts’ forecasts of quarterly earnings as one of my information 
uncertainty proxies. This is defined as the standard deviation of consensus analyst forecasts 
about a firm’s quarterly earnings in the most recent month, deflated with the prior year end 
stock price. If a firm has large (small) analyst forecast dispersion, this is an indication of high 
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(low) uncertainty about the firm’s future earnings. A number of researchers have used 
analyst forecast dispersion as a proxy to measure the level of consensus across analyst 
forecasts or market participants or uncertainty about a firm’s future earnings. These include 
Zhang (2006a, 2006b), Barron et al (1998), Barron and Stuerke (1998), Diether, Malloy, and 
Scherbina (2002), Imhoff and Lobo (1992), and Lang and Lundholm (1996). Barron and 
Stuerke (1998) find a positive relation between analyst forecast dispersion and stock price 
reaction around subsequent earnings announcements. Imhoff and Lobo (1992) document 
that there is a systematic relation between ex ante uncertainty (proxied by the variance of 
analyst forecast dispersion) and the information content of earnings announcements. These 
pieces of evidence show that dispersion in analyst forecasts is a measure of ambiguity about 
a firm’s fundamental value around the earnings announcement date. 
3.4.6.1.5 Cash-flow volatility (CVOL) 
Cash-flow volatility is measured as the standard deviation of monthly cash-flow from 
operating activities over a period of three years. Following Zhang’s (2006a) approach, I treat 
stocks that have less than three years data as missing. This is the cash from the firm’s 
operating activities representing cash receipts and disbursements resulting from the 
operations of the firm. The cash-flow which is calculated indirectly from the firms’ financial 
statements is likely to capture volatility surrounding the fundamental value of the firm. Huang 
(2009), using standard deviations of cashflow-to-sales and cashflow-to-book equity to proxy 
for cash-flow volatility, finds a strong relation between cash-flow volatility and future stock 
returns. According to him, the least volatile decile portfolio outperforms the most volatile 
decile portfolio by 13% per annum, using the Fama and French three-factor model as a 
benchmark. 
3.4.6.1.6 Standard deviation of stock weekly excess market returns (SVOL) 
This is a measure of a stock’s return volatility. It is measured as the standard deviation of the 
stock’s weekly excess market returns over the S&P500 index. Again, following Zhang 
(2006a), I estimate the standard deviation of a stock’s weekly excess market returns over 
one year period. This is a measure of ‘total risk’, like the Sharpe ratio, and not just the 
idiosyncratic risk which might not expect to be priced in an efficient market. Ang et al (2009) 
consider volatility in stocks from around the world and argue that those stocks with recent 
high volatilities have low future average returns. 
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3.5 Robustness check 
3.5.1 Monthly analyst forecast revision  
To check the robustness of my measures of earnings surprises in the first and second 
empirical chapters, I introduce the monthly analyst forecast revision which captures the 
change in the investors’ expectation of earnings. In the same manner as other earnings 
surprise metrics, the analyst forecast revision here is used as a measure of earnings 
surprise (or at least innovations in investors’ expectations about future earnings). It is 
measured based on the changes in the median in the analyst earnings forecast over the 
most recent six months (reported monthly). Liu, Strong and Xu (2003) document that analyst 
forecast revision has the advantage of providing a timely measure of the earnings surprise. 
Chan et al (1996) document that since analysts do not necessarily revise their forecast every 
month, some months will have zero value for the analyst revision. To overcome this problem, 
they use a six-month moving average of past revisions in analysts’ earnings forecasts rather 
than using the raw monthly figures. I follow Chan et al’s (1996) approach to measure the 
analyst forecast revision. 
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𝑅𝐸𝑉6𝑖𝑡 is the six-month moving average of past months’ analysts’ forecast revisions, 𝑓𝑖𝑡 is 
the consensus mean I/B/E/S estimate in month 𝑡 of firm 𝑖′𝑠 earnings for the current fiscal 
year. The analysts’ monthly revisions of earnings are deflated by the prior month’s stock 
price 𝑃𝑖𝑡−𝑗−1. 
3.6 Estimation and testing techniques 
Panel data fixed effects and pooled ordinary least squares multivariate regression models 
are employed to estimate the effects of sequences of quarterly earnings changes and 
streaks of earnings surprises on the abnormal returns of my S&P500 sample stocks. The 
parameter estimates are tested at a medium-term window of three months and a short-term 
window of three days. The panel data estimation method is the main estimation method 
employed, while the pooled ordinary least squares estimation method is only employed for 
robustness checks. 
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3.6.1 Regression analysis 
Panel data regression is the main regression model employed in this research work. I 
employ the fixed effects panel data model estimation method in both empirical chapters. 
Based on the fact that my model is a representative agent model, fixed effect panel data 
estimation is the estimation method of choice because it is able to eliminate fixed effects 
(individual firm unobserved effects). Notwithstanding the fact that my data sample is 
composed of the S&P500 constituent companies, these are companies from different 
industry sectors of the US economy. Using the fixed effects estimation method ensures that 
the idiosyncratic characteristics (heterogeneity effect) of firms that might affect the response 
variable are controlled. Klevmarken (1989) and Hsiao (2003) enumerate the benefits of 
panel data estimation: 
 Controls for individual heterogeneity. 
 Panel data give more informative estimates, more variability, less collinearity 
among the variables, more degrees of freedom and more efficiency. 
 Panel data are better able to capture the dynamics of adjustment. 
 Panel data are better able to identify and measure effects that are simply not 
detectable in pure cross-section or pure time series data. 
 Panel data models allow us to construct and test more complicated behavioural 
models than pure cross-section or pure time series data. 
 Micro panel data gathered on individuals, firms, and households may be more 
accurately measured than similar variables measured at macro level. Biases 
resulting from aggregation over firms or individuals may be reduced or eliminated 
(Blundell (1988); Klevmarken (1989)).  
 Macro panel data on the other hand have a longer time series, and unlike the 
problem of nonstandard distributions typical of unit root tests in time-series 
analysis, Baltagi (2005) shows that panel unit root tests have standard 
asymptotic distributions. 
In general, I estimate a one-way fixed effects panel data regression model of the type shown 
in equation 3.12 below: 
     𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝑥𝑖𝑡𝛽 + 𝑎𝑖+𝑢𝑖𝑡  ……………………………………………………………….….. (3.12) 
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where 𝑦𝑖𝑡 is the dependent variable BHAR observed for company 𝑖 at time 𝑡, 𝑥𝑖𝑡  is a vector of 
independent variables for individual company 𝑖 across different time periods 𝑡 , 𝑎𝑖 is the 
unobserved effect (e.g. management philosophy, management quality etc. for each 
individual company) for company 𝑖 which is fixed over time, and 𝑢𝑖𝑡 is the error term. The full 
model specifications are shown in the respective empirical chapters. To eliminate company-
specific unobserved effects from the estimation, for each company 𝑖 equation 3.12 is 
averaged over time to get: 
?̅?𝑖 = 𝛽?̅?𝑖 + 𝑎𝑖 + ?̅?𝑖 ……………………………………………………………………..………. (3.13) 
where ?̅?𝑖 = 𝑇
−1 ∑ 𝑦𝑖𝑡
𝑇
𝑡=1   ,?̅?𝑖 = 𝑇
−1 ∑ 𝑥𝑖𝑡
𝑇
𝑡=1 ,  ?̅?𝑖 = 𝑇
−1 ∑ 𝑢𝑖𝑡
𝑇
𝑡=1  
Subtracting equation 3.13 from equation 3.12 for each 𝑡 gives: 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 − ?̅?𝑖 = 𝛽(𝑥𝑖𝑡 − ?̅?𝑖) + 𝑢𝑖𝑡 − ?̅?𝑖   t = 1, 2…. T 
or 
?̈?𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽?̈?𝑖𝑡 + ?̈?𝑖𝑡    ………………………………………………………………….…….…….. (3.14) 
Where ?̈?𝑖𝑡 , ?̈?𝑖𝑡 , and ?̈?𝑖𝑡 are time-demeaned data on 𝑦, 𝑥, and 𝑢 respectively. Equation 3.14 is 
the fixed effect estimator, or the within estimator, and the most important point is that the 
unobserved component, 𝑎𝑖, has disappeared from the model. 
3.6.2 Pooled ordinary least squares regression analysis 
I also employ pooled ordinary least squares estimation as a means of checking for the 
robustness of my panel data estimation in section 3.6.1 above. Again, the model estimated 
here is of a general form, as in equation 3.13 below: 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽𝑥𝑖𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡  ……………………………………………………………….……………….. (3.15) 
The key assumption here is that the error term 𝜖𝑖𝑡  is independently identically distributed 
over time 𝑡 and individual firms 𝑖, and unobserved effects are assumed not to be correlated 
with the explanatory variables. Since the error term is i.i.d,  the double index (i, t) is seen as 
not necessary, on the assumption that no information is lost by creating a new index, say j, 
and treat the data as though they were generated by equation 3.16 below: 
𝑦𝑗 = 𝛽𝑥𝑗 + 𝜖𝑗    …………………………………………………………………………………. (3.16) 
In equation 3.16, the error term is assumed to be i.i.d over 𝑖 and 𝑡 , therefore it should be i.i.d 
over 𝑗 . Since this is the case, this brings us back to the classical linear regression setting 
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with all the assumptions of an OLS estimator. The observations of 𝑥𝑖𝑡  are stacked in a matrix 
𝑋 and the observations of 𝑦𝑖𝑡  are stacked in a column vector 𝑌. Equation 3.16 is thus 
estimated. 
3.6.3 Testing the statistical significance of the abnormal returns 
I employ a t-test to make inferences about the statistical significance of the mean of 
estimated BHAR. In the second part of chapter 5, the information uncertainty proxies and the 
streaks of earnings surprises are used to sort the three-day buy-and-hold Fama-French 
three-factor adjusted returns. First, each information uncertainty variable and the mean of 
the past 11-month returns are employed to single-sort 𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅−1,1 to determine the variables 
mean effects on BHAR. Second, each information uncertainty variable is divided into two 
portfolios of high and low information uncertainty by their median value. This procedure is 
carried out separately for both the positive and negative streaks in quarterly earnings 
surprises. Then 𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅−1,1 is sorted by positive streaks of quarterly earnings surprises and 
subsequently sorted by each information uncertainty variable into high and low information 
uncertainty portfolios. This procedure is again repeated with stocks with negative streaks in 
quarterly earnings surprises. This is the interaction effect between each information 
uncertainty variable and the streaks of earnings surprise on 𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅−1,1. I employ t-statistics, 
estimated using the cross-sectional variation of the three-day buy-and-hold Fama-French 
three-factor adjusted returns, in order to test for the statistical significance of 
the 𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅−1,1 . Specifically, for the information uncertainty variable’s mean effect to test the 
null hypothesis that the mean of  𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅−1,1 is equal to zero for the portfolio of n stocks, I 
compute the t-statistics as follows: 
𝑡𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅 =
𝑀𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅
𝜎𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅 √𝑛⁄
  ……………………………………………………………………..….. (3.17) 
where 𝑀𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅 is the portfolio return’s arithmetic mean, 𝜎𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅 is the cross-sectional sample 
standard deviation of the three-day buy-and-hold Fama-French three-factor adjusted returns, 
𝑡𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅 is the computed t-statistics, and 𝑛 is the number of stocks in the portfolio.  
To test the interaction effect between the information uncertainty variable and streaks of 
quarterly earnings surprises on 𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅−1,1 , I test the significance of the difference portfolio 
(HML) between portfolios of high information uncertainty (HIU) and portfolios of low 
information uncertainty (LIU) using a two-sample t-test, as shown in equation 3.18 below: 
𝑡𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅𝐻𝑀𝐿 =
𝑀𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅𝐻𝐼𝑈−𝑀𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅𝐿𝐼𝑈
√2𝑆
2
𝑁
  ………………………………..………………………..…… (3.18) 
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The sample variance is computed as in equation 3.19 below: 
𝑆2 =
𝑆𝐿𝐼𝑈
2 +𝑆𝐻𝐼𝑈
2
2
=
∑ (𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅𝐿𝐼𝑈−𝑀𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅𝐿𝐼𝑈)
2+∑ (𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅𝐻𝐼𝑈−𝑀𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅𝐻𝐼𝑈)
2𝑁
𝑛=1
𝑁
𝑛=1
2(𝑁−1)
  ………………...……. (3.19) 
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Chapter 4 
Earnings momentum models, sequences of quarterly earnings change, and stock 
market response 
4.1 Introduction  
In chapter 3, I outline and describe my sample data and the various methods employed in 
the empirical analysis of the data. In this first empirical chapter, I test the response of stock 
prices to sequences (streaks) of changes in quarterly earnings-per-share (EPS) for my 
sample frame. To do this, I apply some of the propositions of two of the simplest 
representative agent earnings momentum models, Rabin (2002b) and Barberis, Shleifer and 
Vishny (1998) to predict stock market response to earnings announcement. The two models 
are parsimonious and tractable. A good theory should be able to explain much by little in 
terms of its assumptions and complexity (Friedman, 1953). A simple theory which requires 
many restrictive assumptions but predicts well can effectively encompass a more realistic 
but less predictively accurate alternative. In this chapter, through the various analyses of my 
sample data, I inquire whether there is more to earnings momentum than these very simple 
models explain. I also examine some of the contrasting predictions of the two models to 
ascertain which fits the historical data better. There is now substantial evidence in the 
literature showing that the stock market fails to process earnings information adequately. 
Such stock market behaviour is deemed anomalous in the face of new information about 
companies’ fundamentals coming into the market. To be deemed ‘anomalous’, the stock 
market’s response to earnings must deviate from that of a rational (reasonable) investor. A 
rational investor in the traditional finance literature is one who forms his expectation of 
earnings outcomes in accordance with Bayes’ rule. Hence any deviation by investors from a 
Bayesian inference about future earnings outcomes casts doubt on models that invoke 
rational inference about corporate fundamentals for equity valuation. 
This chapter also examines the completeness of the information content of the innovation in 
quarterly earnings and its use for equity valuation. Prior evidence in the literature shows that 
the difference between the most recent quarterly earnings and that of the same quarter last 
year constitutes the innovation in the most recent quarterly earnings (Ball and Brown (1968), 
Bernard and Thomas (1989, 1990)). This is based on the assumption that investors look at 
last year’s quarterly earnings as the best predictor of earnings in the same quarter of the 
current year. So, the quarterly EPS last year serves as the expected EPS for the same 
quarter this year. In standard finance, innovation in quarterly earnings always has a zero 
expectation, since earnings are supposed to follow a random process. However, evidence 
shows that the majority of the time, innovation in earnings is a non-zero figure, and this is the 
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‘earnings surprise’ to investors. The term ‘earnings surprise’ in standard market-based 
finance models represents a movement in earnings outcomes that does not accord with 
Bayesian projections. Most commonly, earnings surprise is measured as the difference 
between the actual quarterly EPS outcomes and investors’ expectations of them. Many 
studies show that the stock market responds in the direction of the most recent earnings 
surprise; if the surprise is above investors’ expectations, there is a positive short-run 
continuation in stock price (PEAD) in the direction of the sign of the earnings surprise and 
vice versa. There are a number of academic papers that have sought to explain why market 
returns deviate from the projections of rational expectation model. Some attribute this 
anomalous behaviour of the stock market to a number of cognitive biases that influence 
investors’ decision-making process. Leading the large number of psychological biases which 
have received a lot of attention in research are underreaction and overreaction anomalies. 
This chapter particularly studies the matching short-run anomaly of stock market 
underreaction based on investors’ failure to fully take into account recent information about 
earnings into their expectations of stock prices25. Investors’ underreaction to earnings news 
show that a company’s average stock returns in periods following good news (when 
earnings surprise is positive) are higher than the average returns in periods following bad 
news (when earnings surprises are negative). I study this behaviour by examining the 
response of three-monthly buy-and-hold abnormal returns to sequences of quarterly 
earnings announcements for the S&P500 constituent companies in the years 1991 to 2006. 
The first issue to be examined in this chapter is the distribution of sequences of quarterly 
earnings changes across the sample of S&P500 companies. This is important because the 
two models mentioned earlier have contrasting predictions as to what the distribution of this 
sequence of earnings should be. In examining this, it will be interesting to see which of the 
two models fits well with the distribution seen in the observed stock market data, at least for 
my S&P500 sample data frame. The central argument in this thesis presents a mechanism 
for stock market responses to specified sequences of earnings surprises. I begin by 
examining what this response is when there is positive trending in earnings, as against when 
reversal in earnings occurs. Although the investors are ‘surprised’ when the earnings deviate 
from the expected, one would like to examine how ‘surprised’ they are with companies that 
have recently reported streaks of earnings surprises of a particular sign. In other words, in 
examining the response of the market to sequences of earnings surprises, is there a point at 
which investors learn? Or are investors like ‘frogs in the pan’ and are less responsive to a 
series of small shocks than one large jolt?26 This relates to a more fundamental question 
                                                          
25
 See Chan et al (1996). 
26
 See Da et al (2014) for full details of the frog-in-the-pan hypothesis. 
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about how the market aggregates information (see Hayek (1937)). One of the predictions of 
Barberis et al’s (1998) model is that the representative investor uses a quasi-Bayesian 
model (an incorrect model, incorporating a sluggish response to news) in forecasting earning 
outcomes, and never realises that the model he is using is incorrect. On the other hand, 
Rabin (2002b) posits that if individuals are uncertain about the rate generating a particular 
process (e.g. an earnings-generating process), they overinfer from short sequences of its 
signals in a manner that suggests that the rate is more extreme than it actually is. 
4.2 Related literature 
Chan et al (1996, 1999) find that changes in earnings expectations have an incremental 
ability to predict monthly returns, over and above that of previous returns themselves. In 
drawing this conclusion, Chan et al (1996, 1999) accord with earlier evidence that investors 
struggle to understand both how earnings are constructed and what they imply for price. The 
same problem is identified by Kaplan and Roll (1972), who observe that although investors 
do require and work with accounting information, as contained in accounting statements, the 
sheer complexity and diversity of business transactions in accounting statements mean that 
investors’ understanding of them is limited. If this was true in 1972, we might think it to be far 
truer today, with the huge increase in the quantity and variety of accounting disclosures over 
published accounts of 200 pages or even more for large companies like my S&P500 sample 
companies.  
The many empirical studies of earnings momentum cluster into three broad categories 
based on the earnings surprise proxy used: 
 Bernard and Thomas (1989, 1990) conducted influential studies on post-
earnings announcement drift. Post-earnings announcement drift is the 
phenomenon which sees companies with good news about earnings 
outperforming those with bad news for some months following the earnings 
announcement. Good (bad) earnings news here is described as a situation 
where the actual earnings outcome is higher (lower) than the expected earnings. 
Subsequently a number of researchers have related the intensity of this 
phenomenon to transaction costs, arbitrage and liquidity risks (Bhushan (1994), 
Mendenhall (2004), Sadka and Sadka (2009)). 
 
 Chan et al (1996, 1999) confirm the ability of revisions in the consensus analysts’ 
forecasts of earnings to predict the degree of earnings momentum in the US. 
This evidence has been available at least since Givoly and Lakonishok (1979) 
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confirmed the predictive power of analysts’ consensus forecast revisions for 
stock market returns. 
 
 Easton et al (1992) document the degree to which earnings changes and price 
changes correlate in the long run. This result simply extends and makes more 
powerful the original result of Ball and Brown (1968) which shows that earnings 
changes and subsequent price changes correlate. This suggests that markets 
struggle to process earnings information and fail to incorporate such information 
instantaneously into price as the efficient market theory suggests. 
Since Chan et al’s (1996, 1999) early results, a number of studies have confirmed the 
presence of earnings momentum both in the US and elsewhere in the world and the need to 
explain why it persists. Griffin et al (2005), and Leippold and Lohre (2012) both document 
the presence of momentum in the international stock markets. Leippold and Lohre (2012) 
find that both price and earnings momentum are present in international equity markets and 
yet cannot establish any link between momentum and broader macroeconomic risks. They 
conclude that the only plausible explanation for the presence of momentum is that investors 
underreact to fundamental news about firms. Their work seems to confirm the work of Griffin 
et al (2005) who find momentum in global equity portfolios. Griffin et al (2005) find that price 
and earnings momentum strategies are profitable on a global basis. Other papers have 
previously reported the profitability of momentum strategies in Asian, European, and many 
emerging markets27.  
While each of these studies confirms the widespread presence of both earnings and price 
momentum, they differ on whether these are different manifestations of the same 
phenomenon or simply separate manifestations of asset mispricing. Could both earnings and 
price momentum occur as a result of the inability of the market to correctly interpret 
information about future cash-flows, or are they two independent phenomena? Chan et al 
(1996) find price momentum to be clustered around earnings announcements, suggesting 
price momentum is partly a response to earnings news. Chordia and Shivakumar (2006) find 
that in the US at least, price momentum is largely explained and subsumed by the 
systematic component of earnings momentum. Leippold and Lohre (2012) largely confirm 
this position for a sample of European markets.  
Using consensus analysts’ forecasts to study earnings momentum, Hilary and Hsu (2013) 
report results on the relation between the persuasiveness of an analyst’s forecasts and the 
consistency of their forecast errors. Specifically, they report that consistent forecast errors 
                                                          
27
 See Rouwenhorst (1998, 1999), and Chui, Titman, and Wei (2000). 
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dominate forecast accuracy as a determinant of the informativeness of an analyst’s forecast 
revisions. Furthermore, the authors report that to a greater extent, the consistency of 
analysts’ forecast errors affect price more than the size and magnitude of single forecast 
error. 
The papers reviewed above suggest that an understanding of earnings momentum will go a 
long way towards explaining the puzzling persistence of the momentum anomaly. Although a 
large body of empirical research on earnings momentum currently exists, we still lack 
compelling theoretical models to confirm whether earnings momentum and price momentum 
are the same phenomenon or two phenomena linked by a common causal process, and if 
so, what that process is. In this chapter I examine and present evidence from two such 
theoretical models from many alternatives on offer (of which Hong and Stein (1999) is one of 
the leading examples) to fulfil this role. This may help in providing complementary evidence 
to facilitate future theory-driven empirical investigation on earnings momentum. 
4.3 Behavioural models of earnings momentum and hypothesis development 
The representative agent framework envisages a prototypical ‘everyman’ investor facing 
different states of the world on different dates, say, in periods of boom and recession, good 
and bad, or momentum and reversion regimes. The investor conditions his response to 
earnings announcements according to the state of the world he currently believes to hold. In 
order to understand investors’ responses to sequences of quarterly earnings changes within 
the US S&P500 data frame, I examine the predictive power of two such representative agent 
models by Barberis, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998) and Rabin (2002b). At the end of the 
empirical tests, I draw inferences from the results to find out which of these two models is 
supported by the evidence drawn from the real-world data. 
4.3.1 Rabin’s (2002b) inference by believers in the law of small numbers model 
Rabin (2002b) considers the responses to information of an investor who is a standard 
Bayesian apart from believing that the urn, or population, from which he draws the observed 
sample outcomes (of, say, earnings), is sampled without replacement. This induces a form 
of the ‘gambler’s fallacy’ that it is time for one’s ‘luck to turn’ after observing a streak of 
successive (usually bad) outcomes. Rabin (2002b) terms such a deviant projection of 
outcomes a belief in the ‘law of small numbers’. This is of, course, simply an imitation of the 
true rule of inference called the law of large numbers. Rabin (2002b) uses the term ‘Freddy’ 
to illustrate those individuals who believe in the law of small numbers. I adopt this 
terminology from Rabin (2002b) in referring to a believer in the law of small numbers as 
‘Freddy’, who uses a sort of everyman quasi-Bayesian inference. In the following two 
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sections, the focus is on how a Bayesian and a Freddy differ in their projection of earnings 
outcomes given the recently observed sequence of quarterly earnings changes. 
4.3.1.1 A Bayesian inference about earnings outcomes in the Rabin model 
Consider a Bayesian investor faced with a recent sequence of quarterly earnings changes, 
for example, two consecutive increases in quarterly EPS or an increase followed by a fall. 
What weight does such an investor place on a further increase in quarterly earnings 
outcomes (𝑃𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑒)? The answer is, of course, given by the Bayesian posterior inferred from 
multiplying the likelihood of a rise in earnings outcomes this quarter (∆𝐸𝑡(+)) by its prior 
probability, given past quarterly earnings outcomes (∆𝐸𝑡−1). From the above, it follows that 
Bayes’ rule infers future sequences of quarterly earning rises, or falls, by mapping past 
quarterly earnings outcomes into the posterior probability attached to the future ones as 
follows: 
𝑃𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑒 =
(Pr[∆𝐸𝑡(+)|∆𝐸𝑡−1(+)]𝑋 𝑃𝑟[∆𝐸𝑡−1(+)])
[Pr(∆𝐸𝑡(+)|∆𝐸𝑡−1(+))+Pr(𝐸𝑡(+)|∆𝐸𝑡−1(−))+Pr(∆𝐸𝑡(+)|∆𝐸𝑡−1(0))]
  ……………………………….(4.1) 
The inferred posterior probability of a rise is simply the probability of a rise in earnings as a 
proportion of all possible outcomes, be they past rises (∆𝐸𝑡−1(+)), falls (∆𝐸𝑡−1(−)), or simply 
no change in earnings(∆𝐸𝑡−1(0)).  
To illuminate this process, I adopt a simple example from Rabin (2002b) to illustrate the 
process of a Bayesian updating of expectations. Consider an investor who believes that any 
of three quarterly earnings change outcomes (i.e. rise, fall or no change) are currently 
equally likely; 𝑃𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑒 = 𝑃𝑟𝑓𝑎𝑙𝑙 = 𝑃𝑟𝑛𝑜 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 =
1
3
 . The investor’s unconditional prior is a third for 
each state. However, that investor also believes that the probability of observing a rise in the 
current quarter is conditioned on past quarterly earnings changes. So the likelihood of 
observing an increase in earnings this quarter varies with the previous quarter’s reported 
quarterly earnings change. Assuming that a company whose quarterly earnings fell last 
quarter is believed by an investor to have a 25% probability of its earnings rising in the next 
quarter, a company whose earnings remained unchanged in the last quarter is believed to 
have a 50% chance of earnings rising this quarter, and finally, a company whose earnings 
rose last quarter is assigned a 75% chance of earnings rising again in the current quarter. 
Such a set of expectations might be associated with an investor acquainted with stock 
market investment. Applying the Bayesian revision rule discussed earlier to this case, one 
will obtain an inferred posterior probability of a sixth of observing a rise in quarterly earnings 
this quarter given a fall last quarter. This is shown in equation 4.2 below: 
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𝑃𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑒|𝑓𝑎𝑙𝑙 =
1
4⁄
1
4⁄ +
1
2⁄ +
3
4⁄
=
1
4⁄
1.5
= 1 6⁄  …………………………………………………….……. (4.2) 
Similar reasoning implies a posterior probability of a rise, given no change in earnings last 
quarter, of a third; 𝑃𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑒|𝑛𝑜 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 =
1
3
 𝑜𝑟 
1 2⁄
1.5
. Therefore, the investor’s unconditional prior and 
conditional posterior probabilities after observing a no change outcome last quarter remain 
unchanged. Finally, a Bayesian infers a posterior probability of a half or 
3
4⁄
1.5
, of observing 
consecutive quarterly earnings rises. 
4.3.1.2 Inference about earnings outcomes under the law of small numbers 
In the Rabin (2002) model, Freddy, the believer in the law of small numbers, is simply a 
Bayesian who believes he samples from an urn, or population, that is sampled without 
replacement in each consecutive period, only to be replenished between the second and 
third draw. This is simply a formal modelling device employed to mimic the ‘overinference’ of 
Freddy, who infers likely patterns where there are none. 
In the numerical example used in section 4.3.2 above to illustrate Bayesian revision, there 
are three states (quarterly earnings rises, falls and no change) and three balls bearing the 
names of those states drawn on two consecutive occasions. Hence, in my numerical 
example, the inferred posterior probability of observing a quarterly earnings rise next time, 
given a fall in the prior quarter, declines from; 
𝑃𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑒|𝑓𝑎𝑙𝑙 =
1
6
 𝑡𝑜 zero, i.e.(
1−1
4−1
1−1
4−1
+
2−1
4−1
+
3−1
4−1
)  𝑜𝑟 (
0
0
3
+
1
3
+
2
3
) =  
0
1
= 0, 
For a company whose earnings did not change last quarter it is: 
𝑃𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑒|𝑛𝑜 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 = (
2−1
4−1
1−1
4−1
+
2−1
4−1
+
4−1
6−1
)  𝑜𝑟 (
1
3
0
3
+
1
3
+
2
3
) =  
1
3
 , for Freddy (the same as for his Bayesian 
counterpart), and finally the inferred posterior probability of successive quarterly earnings 
rises, increases from; 
𝑃𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑒|𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑒 =
1
2
 𝑡𝑜 (
3−1
4−1
1−1
4−1
+
2−1
4−1
+
3−1
4−1
)  𝑜𝑟 (
2
3
0
3
+
1
3
+
2
3
) =  
2
3
. 
The overall impact, therefore, of a believer in the law of small numbers is to shift the 
distribution of inferred posterior probabilities of earnings rise rightwards. So, from a Bayesian 
posterior probability of a sixth for rises, following a fall in quarterly earnings, a third for a 
company recording no earnings change last quarter and,  finally, half for consecutive 
quarterly rises towards an analogous distribution of zero, a third and two-thirds for Freddy. 
Figure 4.1 graphically represents this rightward shift in posterior probabilities for a Freddy. 
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This rightward shift depicts Freddy’s overinference about future value from the earnings 
signal he receives.  
Freddy’s distribution of quarterly earnings change in expectations is skewed to the right of a 
Bayesian because Freddy puts more weight on the continuations of recent earnings trends 
(a probability of two-thirds rather than a half) and less weight on reversals of that trend (a 
probability of zero rather than a sixth). Thus Freddy overinfers earnings trends relative to his 
rational (Bayesian) counterpart. Charting this overinference will be the central task of the 
empirical work in this chapter.  
The discussion above shows that this model predicts the least investor earnings surprise for 
extreme momentum cases which Freddy has come to expect over time. In the empirical 
tests, my focus is on the overinference implication of the Rabin (2002b) model’s explanation 
of momentum. Does the Rabin model illuminate the phenomenon of how an investor’s 
earnings expectations shape price formation in more than just a theoretical sense? Is the 
impact of earnings momentum primarily observed once a sequence is initiated (i.e. a 
reversal averted) or primarily as earnings momentum intensifies? I ask what is the value-
added of the Rabin (2002b) model in its allowance for the conditioning of sample share 
returns on the duration of the most recent earnings sequence or, as other researchers have 
stated (see Loh and Warachka (2012)), does the streakiness of quarterly earnings 
announcements significantly affect how the stock market responds to them? 
4.3.2 Transitions between momentum and reversion regimes in the Barberis et al 
(1998) model 
In Rabin’s (2002b) model, the representative investor, Freddy, is an imperfect Bayesian in 
the projection of earnings; however, in Barberis et al’s (1998) model, the investor is “always 
wrong but never in doubt”. Therefore, one can safely say that the investor in Barberis et al’s 
(1998) framework is straightforwardly irrational compared to the quasi-rational investor 
portrayed in the Rabin (2002b) model. In Barberis et al’s model, investors believe they are 
observing an earnings process that switches between eras of trending and mean-reversion. 
This is despite the fact that in reality earnings always follows a random walk (or at least this 
is the assumption of the true model in Barberis et al). In the Barberis et al model, the true 
earnings-generating process is 𝐸𝑡 = 𝐸𝑡−1 + 𝑦𝑡 where 𝑦𝑡  is the earnings shock or innovation. 
In this model, although there is always zero expectation of earnings innovation, investors 
nevertheless believe that 𝑦𝑡 contains a trend in momentum states or a degree of reversal 
towards no change in mean-reversion states. Hence, while quarterly changes in earnings 
always follow a random walk and innovations in earnings are always in reality  zero in 
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expectation, investors incorrectly believe themselves to be in one of two states, either mean-
reverting or trending (so state, s = R or M). Thus, as one can see, the Barberis et al (1998) 
model makes more spectacular claims about the investor’s rationality than the Rabin (2002b) 
model requires. We might say that for Rabin, investors are irrational, but for Barberis et al, 
investors are delusional, since in BSV’s model investors never get to learn the true nature of 
the earnings-generating process (assumed to be a random walk) and only vary in their self-
delusion, sometimes exhibiting a belief in trending and at other times in earnings mean-
reversion regimes. 
From the model, it is clear that the only difference between momentum and reversion 
regimes is the degree of confidence attached to observing a continuation or reversion in past 
earnings innovations, 𝑦𝑡. In the reversion regime of Barberis et al’s model, the chance of 
earnings shocks of the same sign , 𝜋𝑡, is believed to be low (so 𝜋𝑡 = 𝜋𝐿 lying between zero 
and a half, so that 0 < 𝜋𝐿 < 0.5) with earnings news being likely to be swiftly reversed. In the 
momentum regime, the opposite expectation is held by the investor, so that 0.5 < 𝜋𝐻 < 1. 
The contrasting regimes take the form given in table 4.1. 
Investors in the Barberis et al (1998) model believe that they are either in the momentum or 
reversion regime in each quarter, despite the fact that quarterly earnings always follow a 
random walk. Consistent with this self-delusion, investors infer probabilities of leaving states 
they are in without recourse to any rational set of assumptions. Let 𝜆𝑅 be the probability of 
leaving the reversion regime, and hence that of entering the momentum regime anew, and 
𝜆𝑀 be the probability of leaving the momentum regime and entering the reversion regime in 
this quarter. Barberis et al focus on the case when both 𝜆𝑅 and 𝜆𝑀 are low and hence the 
quarterly earnings regime rarely changes, although this is not a structural requirement of the 
model. The transition matrix for switching between reversion and momentum regimes is 
given by table 4.2. 
The central dilemma for the representative investor in this sort of world is to be able to form 
a best guess of which earnings regime currently prevails. This guess is denoted by 𝑞𝑡 , the 
probability of being in the reversion regime. In reality, earnings always follow a random walk, 
making this a false or, at best, illusory choice. Regardless of the fact that this decision is 
simply a false choice, the investor must optimally infer the probability of being in the 
reversion regime and so see the pattern of announced earnings change direction for the next 
quarter. The investor’s best guess of being in the reversion regime is given by the 
application of Bayes’ rule as follows: 
𝑞𝑡 =
((1−𝜆𝑅)𝑋 𝑞𝑡−1+𝜆𝑀 𝑋 (1−𝑞𝑡−1)) 𝑋 (1−𝜋𝐿)
((1−𝜆𝑅) 𝑋 𝑞𝑡−1+𝜆𝑀 𝑋 (1−𝑞𝑡−1)) 𝑋 (1−𝜋𝐿)+(𝜆𝑅 𝑋 𝑞𝑡−1+(1−𝜆𝑀) 𝑋 (1−𝑞𝑡−1)) 𝑋 (1−𝜋𝐻)
 ………….…….. (4.3) 
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Equation 4.3 above represents a case where there is a sequence of opposing quarterly 
earnings changes, when 𝑞𝑡−1 <  𝑞𝑡 , because the observed sequence confirms the investor’s 
(false) belief that he is in a reversion regime.  
When quarterly earnings moved in the same direction in this quarter as last, the investor 
attaches a lower probability to his belief that he is in the reversion regime i.e. 𝑞𝑡−1 >  𝑞𝑡 (i.e., 
he increases the probability of being in the momentum regime). This is shown in equation 
4.4 below: 
𝑞𝑡 =
((1−𝜆𝑅) 𝑋 𝑞𝑡−1+𝜆𝑀 𝑋 (1−𝑞𝑡−1)) 𝑋 𝜋𝐿
((1−𝜆𝑅) 𝑋 𝑞𝑡−1+𝜆𝑀 𝑋 (1−𝑞𝑡−1)) 𝑋 𝜋𝐿+(𝜆𝑅 𝑋 𝑞𝑡−1+(1−𝜆𝑀) 𝑋 (1−𝑞𝑡−1)) 𝑋 𝜋𝐻
 ………………………... (4.4) 
Table 4.3 presents a numerical illustration of the revision process based on table 1 in the 
original Barberis et al (1998) paper. As the number of repeated sequences of improvements 
occurs (𝑦 >  0 ) the probability attached to being in the reversion state declines, and 𝑞𝑡 falls 
for an investor who accords with the constraints of the Barberis et al model.  
In a similar fashion, repeated alternations of the sign of quarterly earnings changes confirms 
the representative investor’s (false) belief that he is in the reversion regime, thus 𝑞𝑡 rises. As 
the number of repeated sequences of improvements occurs (i.e. when 𝑦 >  0 or 𝑦 <  0), the 
probability attached to being in the reversion state declines for such an investor. 
The particular example considered by Barberis et al is when the probability of getting out of 
the reversion regime (i.e. entering the momentum regime) is low compared to that of leaving 
the momentum regime (i.e. entering the reversion regime). For the particular numerical 
example considered in table 4.3, the probability of leaving the reversion regime is both 
unlikely (𝜆𝑅 = 10%) and three times as low as the probability of leaving the momentum 
regime (𝜆𝑀 = 30%). In this highly stylised economy, the state is allowed to fluctuate between 
the momentum and reversion regime at dates 1 to 10 and thereafter enters the momentum 
regime until the end of the trial at date 14. Between dates 11 and 14, 𝑞𝑡, the investor’s 
inferred posterior probability of being in the reversion regime falls by 5%, reflecting recent 
consecutive changes in earnings of the same sign. This assumption regarding the updating 
of 𝑞𝑡 is open to exploration, via comparative static exercises, based on inducing variations in 
the exit state probabilities 𝜆𝑅 and 𝜆𝑀 to alter the predicted behaviour in conformity with the 
observed data. This variation in the rate of transition can itself be optimally updated and 
constitutes a degree of freedom available to characterise observed market behaviour not 
available in the Rabin (2002b) model. Hence, the temporal stability of reversion probabilities 
becomes a way of differentiating the Barberis et al (1998) and Rabin (2002b) models of how 
earnings momentum persists and impacts upon equity returns. So, Rabin’s model focuses 
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upon the length and intensity of earnings change sequences, but says little about how the 
probability of reversion is determined. Barberis et al’s model explicitly addresses what 
determines the transition probability between trending and mean-reversion regimes within 
each regime, but has little to say about variations in the intensity of an investor’s response 
as the earnings sequence lengthens. 
One very clear property of Barberis et al’s (1998) model is the symmetry of earnings 
reversion expectations within the trending regime for both quarterly earnings rises and falls. 
The sign of sequences of EPS changes do not matter; rather, what matters in the Barberis et 
al model is the sequence length. The credibility of this assumption is one way of 
distinguishing between the empirical values of the two alternative representative agent 
models of how earnings momentum emerges in the stock market. 
4.3.3 Hypothesis development 
Behavioural finance theory is built on a number of important concepts which affect human 
behaviour and financial decision-making processes. The first amongst these concepts are 
the human cognitive biases and heuristics, and second is the limit to arbitrage. The 
hypotheses to be tested here are largely based on the first concept – the human decision-
making process as influenced by human cognitive biases. The two representative agent 
earnings momentum models of Barberis et al (1998) and Rabin (2002b) offer a number of 
testable hypotheses on how investors interpret earnings outcomes and how they form their 
expectations of companies’ earnings. The two models draw on the errors made by a 
representative ‘everyman’ in arriving at decisions when they are faced with uncertainty about 
events that have the potential to produce different outcomes.  
One particular aspect that is seemingly common amongst the two models above is that there 
is a systematic component of mispricing which is occasioned by certain factors that cannot 
be considered as risk factors. These models point to human elements which are both 
pervasive and persistent in nature as being responsible. In the absence of a ‘full information 
set’ for potential investments outcomes, investors are likely to draw on those things they 
know (albeit wrongly) about a firm’s profitability, or otherwise, in arriving at their investment 
decisions. Several empirical works in finance seem to corroborate this position. A firm’s 
earnings outcome is one of the most powerful fundamentals that provide information about 
the firm’s profitability to the public. It is therefore not surprising that investors, analysts, and 
other market participants monitor earnings and changes in earnings expectations with such 
scrutiny. The models of Barberis et al (1998) and Rabin (2002b) show that investors 
observing sequences (streaks) of corporate changes in quarterly earnings outcomes have a 
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tendency to use the wrong models to predict future earnings outcomes, which subsequently 
result in incorrect judgements about future stock price for such companies.  
The predictions of these two models motivate this empirical investigation of the real-world 
data. Following the above discussions and the predictions of Barberis et al (1998) and Rabin 
(2002b), I derive a number of testable hypotheses based on inferences drawn from 
sequences of changes in companies’ quarterly earnings realisations by investors. From 
Rabin’s (2002b) model (inference by believers in the law of small numbers), I hypothesise 
how investors infer (overinfer) the likelihood that short sequences of quarterly earnings 
changes resemble the long-run rate from which these signals are being drawn. When 
investors observe short streaks of changes in quarterly earnings outcomes of the same sign, 
how does this influence their investment decisions?  
BSV propose a model in which the representative investor has a mental illusion that a 
company’s earnings are generated by one of two models each quarter. Each of the two 
models captures the prevailing state of the world and generates earnings accordingly. The 
earnings trending state switches with the mean-reversion state, with the investor believing 
that the mean-reversion state is more likely to occur in the next time period. Therefore, the 
investor believes that he is more likely to see a negative shock in earnings next time period if 
the current earnings shock is positive, and vice versa. There is therefore a distinct 
symmetrical distribution of earnings shocks between the trending or mean-reverting state. In 
contrast, Rabin does not propose any such symmetry in the distribution of earnings shocks. 
From the foregoing I derive my hypothesis 1 thus: 
H1: There is no symmetry in the distribution of the consistent earnings rises and falls 
amongst the US S&P500 companies.  
This hypothesis follows the theoretical assumption in standard finance that the data-
generating process for quarterly earnings is a random process. This implies that innovation 
in quarterly earnings cannot follow a defined symmetry, as the BSV model seems to 
suggest. The BSV model suggests a symmetrical distribution where earnings innovation is 
clearly mapped into trending or mean-reversion regimes. Rabin proposes the behaviour of a 
representative investor who, although Bayesian (he applies correct prior probabilities in 
forecasting earnings in period one) falls short of using the correct model to make subsequent 
forecasts after observing streaks of earnings shocks. Rabin proposes that the behaviour of 
this investor will depend on the sign of the earnings innovation, the consistency of the 
earnings innovation, and the length of the streaks of earnings shocks. Furthermore, he 
proposes that the magnitude and sign of individual (single) earnings shocks attract a less 
dramatic response from the investor.  I derive the next four hypotheses from the above, thus: 
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H2: There is no relation between sequences of quarterly EPS falls or rises and the stock 
market returns.  
Hypothesis 2 follows the market efficiency theory that past information about earnings and 
price cannot predict price. This is because, according the theory, past information about 
firms would have been fully incorporated into the price. The theory further claims that any 
trading strategy based on past public information will not produce abnormal returns. 
Furthermore, a sequence of quarterly EPS changes is not a known risk factor and should not 
explain returns. Contrary to this, the Rabin model proposes that if an investor observes 
sequences of EPS changes, his decision-making process is likely to be impaired by the 
influence of the gambler’s fallacy. This influence will result in future overinference by the 
investor, ultimately resulting in stock returns trending in the same direction as the sequence 
of EPS changes. 
H3: There is no difference between the size of average returns generated by sequences of 
positive and negative EPS changes of equal length. 
Hypothesis 3 is based on market efficiency principle that the average returns following a 
period of good news and the average returns following bad news are equal. In other words, it 
is not possible to create a profitable trading strategy that is long (short) on stocks with 
positive (negative) sequences. However, in reality evidence from momentum studies show 
that investors underreact to earnings news: the average realised returns following good 
news (a positive earnings change confirming a positive sequence of EPS change in the most 
recent earnings announcement) is greater than realised average returns following bad news 
(a negative earnings change confirming a negative EPS change in the most recent earnings 
announcement). 
H4: Investors are not ‘surprised’ with the increasing length or frequency of the sequence of 
EPS changes and it has no impact on stock prices. 
The Rabin model proposes that the behaviour of the investor who is a believer in the law of 
small numbers is influenced by the number of consecutive EPS changes he observes. 
According to the model, in period one, the investor has the same priors as another investor 
who is fully Bayesian, but his predictions become more extreme than the Bayesian’s after 
observing two and more consecutive EPS changes of the same sign. This hypothesis tests 
whether there is a difference in the size of average returns generated between sequences of 
EPS changes of two and higher lengths. 
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H5: There is no difference between the response of investors to lengthening sequences of 
positive and negative EPS changes. 
Hypothesis 5 tests whether the behaviour of the investor is the same if he observes growing 
sequences of positive and negative EPS changes. The hypothesis tests and compares the 
behaviour of the investors towards companies that have consistent EPS falls versus those 
that have consistent EPS rises for considerable periods of time. We expect that investors will 
demand more premia from companies with consistent declines in their quarterly earnings, 
while companies that consistently post quarterly earnings rises enjoy discounts in their cost 
of capital. The Rabin model postulates a reversal in returns as the sequences of EPS 
changes lengthens. 
4.4 Main empirical results 
4.4.1 Descriptive statistics 
Table 4.4 provides the sample descriptive statistics for the variables used. Panel A of table 
4.4 shows a summary of the descriptive statistics of the main variables used in this chapter. 
The mean three-monthly buy-and-hold Fama-French three-factor adjusted return is 0.4% 
and the median is 0.5%, showing that the distribution is slightly skewed to the left. The three-
monthly buy-and-hold abnormal returns exhibit little skewness but strong and significant 
kurtosis. The mean quarterly EPS for the S&P500 constituent companies is $1.006 and the 
standard deviation is approximately 5.99. One point is evident here: although the S&P500 
constituent companies are, on average, large firms in terms of their market capitalisation, the 
size of its companies varies just as much as the size of their quarterly EPS. I exclude a few 
extremely large changes in quarterly EPS, removing EPS changes exceeding 200%, which 
seem indicative of error in the I/B/E/S database. In panel A of table 4.4, it is evident that 
although the average quarterly EPS changes for the S&P500 firms are fairly small and 
positive, there is very wide variation around that mean value.  
Panel B of table 4.4 shows the correlation matrix for the variables. The Pearson (Spearman) 
correlation between the three-monthly Fama-French three-factor adjusted returns and 
sequence of quarterly EPS changes (Consistency) is 0.057 (0.064), which confirms the 
relation between the two in univariate tests. The metric Consistency is the sequence length 
of quarterly EPS changes and is constructed by using the most recent annualised quarterly 
earnings change deflated by the prior year end stock price. There is clearly a strong positive 
Pearson (Spearman) correlation of 0.256 (0.633) between quarterly EPS changes and the 
length of the quarterly earnings sequence. Both the Pearson and Spearman correlation 
coefficients show an interesting association between monthly Fama-French three-factor 
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model adjusted returns (in the months between two adjacent quarterly EPS announcements) 
and the length of sequence of quarterly EPS changes. The Pearson (Spearman) correlation 
coefficients between Consistency and the monthly abnormal return (ABR) in the month t 
when earnings are announced is 0.044 (0.057). The association between them in month t+1 
is less intense, with a Pearson correlation of 0.012 and a Spearman of 0.024. Their 
association diminishes even further in month t+2 to Pearson = -0.008 and Spearman = 
0.007. However, there is a sudden rise in this association in the month of the next EPS 
announcement. The Pearson (Spearman) correlation coefficient between the monthly 
abnormal returns and Consistency in month t+3 is 0.035 (0.046). This confirms the 
consensus in the literature that earnings momentum effect in price is most intense around 
the time of the quarterly EPS announcement. The Pearson (Spearman) correlation 
coefficient between the sequence of EPS change lengths and monthly cumulative abnormal 
returns (CAR) is 0.040 (0.052). The CAR is used here as an alternative metric for the buy-
and-hold abnormal returns28. 
In panels C and D of table 4.4, I break up the distribution of quarterly EPS sequences as 
each year of the quarterly runs in earnings falls / rises cumulates in my sample data. I 
calculate the mean, median and skewness of the quarterly EPS changes (Panel C) and 
Fama-French three-factor model adjusted returns (Panel D). These two measures are 
matched to their various categories of EPS change sequence lengths, for example, 2 to 4, 5 
to 8, and finally 9 to 12 quarters of consecutive falls or rises in EPS. On examination of 
panels C and D, one characteristic is evident. While quarterly EPS changes are sharply 
skewed throughout the range of cumulated rises and falls in EPS, this does not reflect in 
investor returns to holding the stocks which report such strings of cumulative rises and falls 
in earnings. This suggests that the distributions of quarterly EPS is both skewed and 
expected to be so by investors. Hence, this may be suggesting that the announcement of 
lengthening sequences of quarterly EPS rises and falls, or simply more ‘streakiness’ by 
sample companies, rarely causes very dramatic movements in their cost of capital. 
4.4.2 The distribution of consistent quarterly earnings rises and falls 
In this section I conduct the formal test of hypothesis 1. This hypothesis tests the symmetry 
of the sequences of quarterly EPS rises and falls in my sample data. I begin this analysis by 
first focusing on figure 4.2, which provides a histogram of the percentage frequency 
distribution of sequences of quarterly EPS rises and falls in the sample. This same 
distribution is also presented in panel A of table 4.5 in its numerical form. The asymmetric 
and uneven distribution of sequences of quarterly EPS changes in the sample is striking. 
                                                          
28
 See Dissanaike (1994)) for details of various methods for measuring multi-period excess returns. 
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Interestingly, the sequences of EPS changes in 837 companies show a peculiar distribution 
pattern, with companies being more likely to report extreme positive quarterly increases. A 
Shapiro-Wilk test of normality (reported in panel B of table 4.5) rejects the hypothesis that 
the Consistency variable is normally distributed, with a t-statistic V = 120.88 (Prob>z = 0.00). 
More than 21% of the time, companies consistently post positive EPS change increases for 
a period of three years, as against a little over 1% that consistently post declining quarterly 
EPS changes for a period of twelve quarters. This affirms a long-held belief in market-based 
accounting research on meeting and beating the earnings targets and the requisite earnings 
management to do just that (see Bartov et al (2002)). It also reflects the fact that consistently 
poorly performing companies do not enter the S&P500, and if they do, they are not likely to 
be in it for long. About 13% of the companies report one quarter of EPS rises before 
reporting a decline in the following quarter. For companies that report differing lengths of 
positive EPS rises, there is a clear trend of a steady decline in the number of companies 
reporting consistent quarterly earnings rises, from 13% for one quarter to 2% for eleven 
quarters. There is also a sudden increase in the number of companies that report consistent 
quarterly EPS rises for twelve quarters. On the other hand, there is no such discernible 
pattern in the number of companies that report consistent falls in quarterly EPS. Although 
there are no companies that report just one quarter of decrease in quarterly EPS change, 
there is a decreasing number of companies that report a consistent number of declining EPS 
changes from two successive to five successive quarters. Beyond this point, there is no 
particular pattern for companies reporting successive declines in quarterly EPS changes 
from six to twelve consecutive quarters. The low number of companies that post declining 
quarterly EPS changes for twelve consecutive quarters is understandable. Firms reporting 
declining quarterly EPS for long periods of time run the risk of going from declining earnings 
to making losses and subsequent bankruptcy. 
In figure 4.3, the histogram shows the distribution frequencies of positive and negative 
quarterly EPS change reported by the companies over twelve quarters. More than 61% of 
the companies post small increase or decrease in EPS changes which cluster around the 
zero point. A little less than 1% of the companies report a quarterly EPS change decline of 
100% from the previous quarter, while a little above 1% report a quarterly EPS change 
increase of 100%. In all, it is clear that companies report positive quarterly EPS changes 
more often than they report negative changes. A good number of research works look at the 
symmetry of quarterly EPS change distribution. Some look at the link between this and the 
levels of quarterly EPS that firms report, while others try to interpret it in terms of EPS 
management to exceed thresholds. Although the distribution of the EPS changes of my 
sample companies seems to suggest confirmation of this research, it is hard to say that with 
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certainty. Beaver et al (2007) support Durtshi and Easton’s (2005) argument (see also 
Burgstahler and Dichev (1997)). The authors posit that the discontinuity in the distribution of 
price-deflated EPS changes is largely driven by the same factors that cause discontinuity in 
the distribution of price-deflated EPS levels. Beaver et al (2007) assert that the term 
‘discontinuity’ is shorthand for an unusually low frequency of small loss observations and an 
unusually high frequency of small profit observations, relative to the frequencies in the 
adjacent intervals of earnings distribution. It does not imply that the cumulative distribution 
function is discontinuous at zero. In line with Beaver et al (2007), my sample data show a 
high frequency of small positive quarterly EPS changes relative to small negative quarterly 
EPS changes, even when quarterly EPS changes are deflated by the prior year end stock 
price. Hence, it is important to show that the asymmetry in the distribution of quarterly EPS 
changes does not support the kind of symmetry between EPS rises and falls that the BSV 
model proposes. 
Figure 4.4 plots the mean quarterly EPS changes over twelve quarters of consistent 
quarterly EPS rises and falls. The cumulatively larger nature of repeated falls in quarterly 
EPS is very clear from the data, while the scale of repeated quarterly EPS rises stabilise to 
smallish values after a year. Consistent quarterly declines seem to accumulate fairly 
alarmingly, while consistent quarterly EPS growth appears to be a fairly stable, possibly 
even manageable, form of earnings smoothing in my sample data. 
4.4.3 Consistent earnings rises and falls and the stock market response  
The basic pattern in figure 4.4 showing that the cumulative quarterly EPS falls are becoming 
more dramatic in scale, while cumulative quarterly EPS rises stabilise to small values is 
confirmed by figure 4.5. This suggests that the pattern does not result from a few rogue 
outlier observations that would imply that there is no broader trend in the data. Given this 
stylised fact, one would conclude that it is most probably not wise to pool all consistent 
quarterly earnings rises and falls into the same two states as the BSV (1998) models does. 
This is because the requisite symmetry this sort of model implies is not present in my data 
sample (see table 4.4 for the distribution of sequences of quarterly EPS rises and falls). 
Furthermore, the cumulative impact of quarterly EPS falls is far more dramatic than the 
cumulative impact of quarterly EPS rises. Additionally, consistent quarterly EPS rises, which 
continue for twelve quarters, are common, constituting about almost a quarter of my sample 
data. This is unlikely to have a dramatic stock market impact because something that quarter 
of stocks do is hardly shocking news to investors. Figure 4.6 reconstructs figure 4.5 using 
the median of the Fama-French three-factor adjusted returns rather than the mean Fama-
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French three-factor adjusted returns to guard against my inferences being driven by a 
minority of rogue data points. 
In figure 4.5 I show how more extreme sequences of quarterly EPS changes are reflected in 
investor returns. In this figure, I plot the mean buy-and-hold returns (adjusted by the Fama-
French three-factor) in the three months following the reported quarterly EPS change for 
increasing durations of quarterly EPS rises and falls over a twelve-quarter period. This 
shows again that the average market response to successive EPS changes is highly uneven 
across different durations of consistent quarterly EPS rises and falls. For consistent quarterly 
EPS rises, the market response is always small and positive, with little increase in the 
intensity of this response as the run of positive EPS changes lengthens. This suggests some 
degree of learning about the scale and direction of the sequences of quarterly EPS changes 
that is more consistent with the Rabin (2002b) model than the Barberis et al (1998) model. 
The market response amongst investors to consistent quarterly EPS falls is far more 
uneven, with no real discernible trend being present here. This makes sense, because 
quarterly EPS falls, especially large cumulative ones, are by their very nature transitory. This 
is because companies with consistent large EPS falls will either correct the negative trend 
and return to better form or face liquidation once the EPS falls become large earnings 
losses. Companies with declining quarterly EPS over a long period must offer a high rate of 
return to compensate the investors for the risk of holding their stocks if they are to survive. 
From figure 4.5, such compensation (premium) is fairly clear for the most extreme consistent 
group of earnings fallers, but fairly ephemeral, if at all present, for companies reporting only 
eight or fewer quarters of earnings falls. Such shorter temporary dips in earnings 
performances are not apparently accompanied by the company having its cost of equity 
capital raised by the stock market.  
Figure 4.6 confirms the asymmetric market responses to quarterly EPS rises and falls using 
the median buy-and-hold Fama-French three-factor model adjusted returns performance 
metric over a three-month period following the quarterly earnings announcement. In this 
alternative test, the payment of premium returns in order to compensate for the risk of 
repeated losses clearly shows. And again, as in the case of the plot against average returns; 
companies reporting repeated earnings falls for a period of less than eight quarters display 
no discernible pattern in the cost of the equity capital they are required to pay. 
In panels C and D of table 4.4, I break up the distribution of sequences of EPS changes as 
each year of the quarterly run in earnings changes cumulate. Then the mean, median and 
skewness of the of quarterly EPS changes (shown in panel C) and Fama-French three-factor 
adjusted returns performance metric (shown in panel D) for 1 to 4, 5 to 8, and finally 9 to 12 
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quarters of consecutive falls and rises in EPS (each successive year of consecutive rises 
and falls shown in panel B) are calculated.  
From the distribution shown in this table, one characteristic of the data is very clear: while 
quarterly EPS changes are sharply skewed throughout the range of cumulated rises and 
falls in EPS, this is not reflected in investor returns to holding the stocks which report such 
streaks of cumulative rises and falls in earnings. This suggests that the distribution of EPS 
changes is both skewed and expected to be so by investors. Hence, the announcement of 
lengthening EPS rises and falls sequences by sample companies rarely causes very 
dramatic movements in their cost of capital. Therefore, it appears only substantial 
‘streakiness’ in earnings is priced in my S&P500 sample frame.  
4.4.4 Regression-based results 
Here in the regression-based analysis, I test hypotheses 2 to 5 enumerated in section 4.3.5 
above. 
4.4.4.1 Sequences of quarterly EPS changes and monthly stock abnormal returns 
Here I conduct regression analysis to test my hypothesis 2. This hypothesis tests the relation 
between sequences of quarterly EPS changes and market returns. The first set of regression 
results presented in table 4.6 clearly shows evidence of earnings momentum in the monthly 
Fama-French three-factor adjusted returns as explained by the sequence of EPS changes. 
In each of the three months in any particular quarter, earnings momentum achieves its 
highest intensity in the same month (month t) that earnings are announced. The earnings 
momentum effect continues in the month immediately following the month that earnings 
were announced but with less intensity. This trend continues in the second month, but 
earnings momentum becomes weaker than in the month earnings were announced, with the 
monthly abnormal return even turning negative by the third month. However, there is a 
reversal of trend and a dramatic positive increase in the earnings momentum effect in the 
following month. This month coincides with the month in which the next quarterly earnings 
news is reported. These findings are consistent with the underreaction anomaly documented 
in the literature. This anomaly, which was initially documented in the United States markets 
and later in other markets around the world, seems to suggest that investors fail to fully 
understand the information contained in current earnings outcomes with respect to its 
implications for future earnings realisations. The monotonic decline in the monthly adjusted 
returns, following the month in which the earnings announcement was made appears to 
show that as time passes and more information about earnings filters into the market, 
investors adjust their predictions about future earnings in line with the most recent 
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information. However, as seen here in table 4.6, there is a sharp rise in abnormal returns 
around the following month when the new quarterly EPS figure is announced compared to 
the month immediately before. One way to explain this jump is that investors still fail to fully 
understand the implications of earnings in the previous quarter for the current month’s price. 
This behaviour is also consistent with the slow diffusion of quarterly earnings information into 
price. This hypothesis suggests that information about earnings slowly filters into price, and 
this process continues until there is full price discovery. Several research studies report this 
pattern of behaviour in the literature, for example Liu et al (2003) report this behaviour for the 
UK markets.  
In table 4.6, the interaction term constructed from the sequences of quarterly EPS change 
and annualised quarterly EPS change predicts a monotonically positive increase in monthly 
Fama-French three-factor adjusted abnormal returns from the earnings announcement 
month up until the month before the next earnings announcement. This suggests that 
positive change in the annualised quarterly EPS reinforces the predictive power of the 
sequence of quarterly EPS change. This also suggests that positive change in EPS 
increases the overinference by the investor of the possibility of future prosperity for the 
company in question. This obviously pushes up the future prices of the company’s stock. 
4.4.4.2 The impact of sequences of quarterly EPS changes on three-month buy-and-
  hold abnormal returns 
In this section I continue to test hypothesis 2 by using three-month buy-and-hold abnormal 
returns in place of monthly abnormal returns. I undertake regression-based tests to establish 
whether the variable Consistency impacts upon the amount of earnings-generated 
momentum in price. Here, I employ buy-and-hold returns, adjusted by the Fama-French 
three-factor, covering a three-month period following the announcement of the most recent 
quarterly earnings change as my dependent variable. I present the results of this regression 
analysis in table 4.7. The table shows the results of a basic regression of quarterly EPS 
changes on their matched three-month buy-and-hold Fama-French three-factor adjusted 
returns. It is evident that the market responds to quarterly earnings rises and falls as a 
sequence of EPS changes lengthens. The Consistency variable explains 0.05% of the 
abnormal returns, which is statistically significant with t-value = 8.77 at a 99% confidence 
level. It is already shown in section 4.4.2 from the graphical analysis that while the market 
responses to lengthy sequences of quarterly EPS rises are pretty stable, the stock market 
response to lengthy declines in quarterly EPS is more erratic. Specifically, it appears that 
companies reporting a long stream of quarterly EPS falls are forced to pay a premium for 
risk to their remaining long-suffering investors. In the regression-based test, this is reflected 
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by the strongly significant positive coefficient on the Consistency variable, which measures 
the length of the sequence. This premium payment is especially marked in the longest 
earnings fall sequences, say after eight quarters of consistent earnings declines. The low R2 
of 5% to 6% in reported regressions in table 4.7 attests to the difficulty of exploiting the 
empirical regularities in earnings outcomes and their sequences to earn returns in excess of 
the Fama-French three-factor model benchmark. The proportional relation between the 
reported R2 of the regression and an F-test for its overall explanatory power suggest that 
these regularities, while present, are masked by substantial random variation as envisaged 
by the efficient market hypothesis29. So, while the regression results here seem to offer 
arbitrage opportunities, they are certainly not riskless, even after controlling for the risk 
factors modelled in the standard Fama-French three-factor model benchmark. In the 
multivariate regression of Consistency and DeltaEPS (most recent quarterly EPS change), 
the DeltaEPS variable loses its explanatory power on the buy-and-hold abnormal returns. 
DeltaEPS explains on 0.005% of the abnormal returns which is not statistically significant. 
One reason that seems plausible for this observation is that within the S&P500 constituent 
companies, it is very likely that any observed short-term earnings-generated momentum will 
very likely be arbitraged away in such a large and liquid market. 
4.4.4.3 The impact of differing quarterly EPS sequence lengths on stock returns 
This section presents tests to show the impact of various lengths of sequences of EPS 
change on Fama-French adjusted returns. Panel A of table 4.8 shows the regression results 
of differing market responses to lengthy quarterly EPS rises and falls of more than eight 
quarters. The rationale behind this is to examine the impact that the growing length of a 
sequence of EPS changes of a particular sign may have on price. This section also tests 
whether there is a significant difference in returns between companies reporting consistent 
EPS rises and those reporting consistent EPS falls. In addition, this section tests how 
‘surprised’ investors are if there is a growing ‘streakiness’ in the EPS change. The section in 
effect tests hypotheses 3, 4, and 5. 
In this regression, I allow the regression intercepts to shift depending on the nature of the 
quarterly EPS sequence. This allows me to condition on both the length and sign of earnings 
sequences. I include a dummy variable in the regression for the quarterly EPS sequence 
being a sequence of over eight quarters of either EPS change rises or falls, denoted as 
More2yearpos and More2yearneg respectively. A further dummy variable to capture 
quarterly earnings rises regardless of duration is denoted as variants of ‘Rise’ (1…, 4) in my 
regressions. The year of the quarterly EPS change is also included in the regression as a 
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control variable, to capture any temporal instability in the regression model. Although the 
market response to quarterly EPS changes is strongly affected by the year in which they 
occur, with price responses being more muted as the years go by, there seems to be little 
difference in the average market response to quarterly EPS rises and falls. Companies 
reporting consistent quarterly EPS rises for more than eight quarters earn significant 
negative three-month buy-and-hold Fama-French three-factor adjusted returns of -0.50% (t-
value = -2.43). On the other hand, companies that post consistent quarterly EPS falls for 
over eight quarters earn significant positive three-month buy-and-hold Fama-French three-
factor adjusted returns of 1.16% (t-value = 4.02).  
While the lengthening sequences of EPS rises and falls differ little in their average response 
from the market, a separation in response becomes clearly evident at the extremes of the 
earnings sequence distribution. Those companies with prolonged quarterly EPS falls pay a 
premium to investors who remain with them, presumably as compensation for the risk of the 
company failing, while companies reporting consistent quarterly earnings growth enjoy a 
small discount on their cost of capital. These premia and discounts seen in my results are 
not explained by the standard risk proxies embedded in the Fama-French three-factor 
model.  
Panel B of table 4.8 presents the results of a regression with another two dummy variables. 
One of the dummy variables, denoted as Less2yearpos, represents earnings rises of up to 
eight quarters. The regression shows that for a unit increase in length, there is an increase in 
three-month buy-and-hold Fama-French three-factor adjusted returns of 0.50% (t-value = 
2.68). On the other hand, for the second dummy variable, denoted Less2yearneg, 
representing earnings falls of up to eight quarters, there is a more dramatic loss of -1.20% (t-
value = -4.02) in three-month buy-and-hold Fama-French three-factor adjusted returns for a 
unit increase in the length of the Less2yearneg sequence.  
In panel C of table 4.8, I include two dummy variables in the model to capture the impact of 
different lengths of EPS rises and falls (of between one and four quarters in length) on the 
abnormal returns. This test further examines whether the duration of a sequence has any 
effect on the size and sign of abnormal returns. The dummy variable Less1yearpos denotes 
EPS rises of one to four quarters, while Less1yearneg is a dummy that represents EPS falls 
of one to four quarters. A panel regression of these two variables with the Consistency and 
DeltaEPS variables as control variables shows an interesting pattern. For consistent EPS 
rises of one quarter and up to four quarters; with each unit increase in the length of the 
sequence, there is a decrease of -0.56% (t-value = -3.04) in the realised three-month buy-
and-hold Fama-French three-factor adjusted returns. This is both economically and 
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statistically significant at a 5% confidence level. However, for consistent EPS falls of one to 
four quarters, a unit increase in the length of EPS sequence results in a small decrease of -
0.14% (t-value = -0.80) in the three-month buy-and-hold Fama-French three-factor adjusted 
returns. This coefficient is not significant at the 5% confidence level. 
The results from the two dummy variables, Less1yearneg and Less2yearneg, representing 
EPS falls of up to four and eight quarters respectively, show an interesting, consistent 
pattern of behaviour. Companies reporting consistent quarterly EPS falls for four quarters 
earn small negative three-month buy-and-hold Fama-French three-factor adjusted returns of 
-0.14%. However, for those companies that continue to post declining EPS for about eight 
quarters, their stocks earn even more negative three-month buy-and-hold Fama-French 
three-factor adjusted returns of -1.20%. The investors here may be holding on to such stocks 
with the hope that the companies will turn their earnings around and hence their stocks will 
earn better returns in the future, or the stocks may simply be very illiquid, with few buyers 
left. This is consistent with a phenomenon known in behavioural finance as the ‘disposition 
effect’, which occurs when investors are reluctant to sell shares that are falling in value 
relative to the ones whose values are rising. A correspondingly interesting pattern is shown 
by companies posting different durations of quarterly EPS rises. Those firms that post 
consistent EPS rises for four quarters earn a negative three-month buy-and-hold Fama-
French three-factor adjusted return of -0.56%. The abnormal returns become positive and 
increase to 0.50% if firms continue to post EPS rises for up to eight quarters. The investors’ 
response to the differing lengths of EPS rises suggests that investors do think that after a 
few positive earnings surprises, the quarterly EPS will soon revert on a “what goes up, 
comes down” basis. Thus, the negative abnormal returns after four quarters turn positive 
after eight quarters of consistent EPS rises. The investors’ response to both the lengthening 
EPS rises and falls is consistent with the earnings momentum literature.  
For both EPS falls and rises of four- and eight-quarter duration, there is clearly a differing 
response from investors, although from the histogram in figure 4.5, it is evident that there is 
a positive, albeit minimal, increment in monthly buy-and-hold abnormal returns for EPS rises 
of one, two, three, and four quarters. The average response of the monthly buy-and-hold 
abnormal returns to EPS rises for the four quarters is negative. For sequences of earnings 
rises of up to eight quarters, though, there is a positive and significant response to the 
lengthening sequence of EPS rises. The response of three-month buy-and-hold Fama-
French three-factor adjusted returns seems to reverse between EPS rises of four and eight 
quarters. This is completely different from the response of three-month buy-and-hold Fama-
French three-factor adjusted returns to an emerging sequence of EPS falls of four and eight 
quarters’ duration. For sequences of EPS falls of four quarters, the three-month buy-and-
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hold abnormal return is negative and not significant at the 5% confidence level. However, up 
to eight quarters of consistent EPS falls, the abnormal returns are strongly negative and 
significant. There seems to be disposition effect at play here, although it is hard to say for 
certain. 
From the three consistent EPS durations results above, it is evident that as the year dummy 
of EPS change lengthens, the three-month buy-and-hold abnormal returns become more 
muted and negative. With the dummy variable Rise (of various variants), the mean three-
month buy-and-hold abnormal return is negative (except in cases where the duration of 
sequence of EPS changes is four quarters or less) for all companies posting consistent EPS 
rises in my data sample, which might imply  market anticipation of an oncoming end to the 
sequence.  
From table 4.6, the interaction term’s (Consis*SΔEPS) impact on the abnormal returns 
increases in the month following earnings announcement but starts to decline in the third 
month. However, it has a negative impact on the consistency variable with three-month buy-
and-hold abnormal returns declining from 0.05% to 0.04% as shown in table 4.7. These 
results suggest that although the consistency variable is the main explanatory variable for 
earnings momentum, the quarterly earnings changes on its own has an attenuating effect on 
the investors’ response to lengthening sequences of quarterly EPS changes in a three-
month buy-and-hold investment strategy. This is consistent with evidence from other studies 
which shows that quarterly EPS change in the most recent earnings announcement explains 
earnings momentum in stock returns although it has a weaker explanatory power in the 
presence of the consistency variable. The interaction term above is the product of 
consistency variable and the quarterly EPS changes. 
4.5 Additional tests for robustness checks  
In the following sub-sections I present the results of four additional tests to confirm the 
robustness of the primary results presented in section 4.4. This is achieved by employing 
event clustering analysis, an alternative estimation method, and one alternative specification 
for the main estimation equation. 
4.5.1 Sub-period analyses  
In order to examine whether the results of the analysis in the previous sections are confined 
to a particular period in the sample data, I provide sub-period analyses in this section. The 
sample data is divided into two equal periods for analysis: from January 1991 to December 
1998 and from January 1999 to December 2006. In panels A, B, C, and D of table 4.9, I 
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present the results of this sub-period analysis. The performance of the different explanatory 
variables follows the same pattern as shown in the full period analyses in section 4.4 above. 
It is interesting to see that even in both sub-period analyses; companies posting declining 
quarterly EPS beyond eight quarters seem to pay a premium to investors who patiently 
continue to hold their shares. Although this remains the case in both sub-periods, comparing 
this in the two sub-periods, a higher premium was paid to investors holding the shares of 
companies that consistently post declining quarterly EPS for more than eight quarters in the 
period 1991 to 1998 (1.30% three-month buy-and-hold abnormal returns) as against (0.90% 
three-month buy-and-hold abnormal returns) in the period 1999 to 2006. This is shown in 
panels C and D of table 4.9 respectively. One way to explain the different premia earned in 
the sub-periods may be to look at the impact of the numerous economic and financial market 
shocks that characterised the early and mid-1990s. This could also be attributed to the rapid 
EPS growth in US companies in the 1990s (the average annual EPS growth in the US in the 
1990s was 15%). Companies posting quarterly EPS rises consistently for more than eight 
quarters seem to enjoy some discount, as are the case in the full period analysis. This can 
be seen as a reversal of trend, as previously these firms are paying increasing premia for 
consistent quarterly EPS rises posted up until the eighth quarter. Another way to explain this 
could be that investors have now realised the apparent earnings management which might 
be going on in those companies and decide to invest otherwise. There is also the possibility 
that the impact of regulation fair disclosure (Regulation FD 2000) in the United States might 
have helped to facilitate this30. Investors are no longer ‘surprised’ by the incremental rise in 
these companies’ quarterly EPS after many quarters and now begin to desert their stocks. It 
is obvious from this that the length (or the duration) of consistent EPS rises/falls is crucial in 
determining the earnings momentum effect on stock prices. There is, however, a small 
positive three-month buy-and-hold abnormal return (0.002%), albeit not statistically 
significant, earned by investors holding shares of companies that consistently post quarterly 
EPS rises for more than eight quarters in the sub-period of 1999 to 2006, as against much 
more negative abnormal returns of -0.95% in three-month buy-and-hold abnormal returns in 
the sub-period of 1991 to 1998. For companies posting consistent EPS rises, there is a 
positive, not significant (0.23%), relation between quarterly EPS rises and the three-month 
buy-and-hold abnormal returns in the sub-period 1999 to 2006. However, this relation is 
negative (-0.68%) and statistically significant in the sub-period 1991 to 1998. The stocks of 
companies posting positive change in quarterly EPS earn positive buy-and-hold abnormal 
returns on average. This is consistent with previous research; stocks usually show abnormal 
returns in the same direction as the quarterly earnings surprise. 
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The sub-period analysis for the impact of sequences of EPS on abnormal returns shows that 
the results of the full period analyses are not confined to a particular period. On the average, 
the sequence of quarterly EPS change is positive and statistically significant in the month in 
which the EPS is announced and not statistically significant in the next two months following 
the announcement. This is the case in both the sub-periods of 1991 to 1998 and 1999 to 
2006, as shown in panel C and D of table 4.9. This is exactly the same findings as for the full 
period analyses. 
4.5.2 Analysis of data by industry classification 
There are times when industry clustering may occur, and this means that regression results 
are likely to be driven by some industry sectors within the sample data of interest31. The 
problem posed by industry clustering cannot be ignored, as several researches have shown 
that this problem reduces the power of statistical tests in testing for the significance of 
abnormal returns (Dyckman et al (1984); Mackinlay (1997)). Dyckman et al (1984) observe 
that although researchers who study securities assume that securities are usually selected 
through random sampling, event studies do not usually involve random samples. The 
authors posit that accounting events are often clustered around particular industries, time 
periods, or both. Brown and Warner (1980) examine time clustering in monthly returns. They 
posit that clustering impacts and lowers the number of securities whose month ‘0’ behaviour 
is independent, and consequently, if there is positive correlation across securities’ mean 
historical returns in calendar times, clustering will increase the variance of performance 
measures and hence lower the power of the tests. Although my sample’s descriptive 
analysis does not indicate a significant degree of industry clustering, I still test to confirm that 
the initial findings are not driven by industry effect. 
To investigate industry clustering, I select ten sector groupings according to Standard and 
Poor’s global industry classification standard (henceforth the GICS code). Each of the ten 
sector groupings is present in my S&P500 constituent companies of my sample data. The 
ten sector groupings are: Energy (10), Materials (15), Industrials (20), Consumer 
discretionary (25), Consumer staples (30), Health Care (35), Financials (40), Information 
technology (45), Telecommunication services (50), and Utilities (55) – the sector codes are 
in parenthesis. The first step here is identifying and matching each of the companies in my 
sample data with its S&P500 GICS code, defined according to the two-digit GICS code 
provided by S&P. 
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The regression results of the industry sectors are summarised in table 4.10. The results are 
consistent with the initial findings of the analyses in section 4.4. In eight of the ten sectors 
analysed, on average, the sequence of quarterly EPS changes has a positive impact on the 
Fama-French adjusted returns, although this is quite muted in a few of these sectors. On 
examining the impact of different durations of sequences of EPS rises or falls in the different 
sectors, I observe the same trend shown earlier in the main analyses. For companies with 
sequences of quarterly EPS rises of more than eight quarters, the monthly buy-and-hold 
abnormal returns are negative in eight of the ten sector groupings, while for companies 
posting EPS falls of over eight quarters, the monthly buy-and-hold abnormal returns are 
positive in nine of the ten sector groupings. These results are consistent with the results 
obtained earlier from the main regression analyses which show that companies that post 
EPS falls for over eight quarters seem to pay a premium to their long-suffering investors who 
hold onto their stocks, disregarding the fact earnings have consistently declined for many 
quarters, whereas companies that post consistent EPS rises for more than eight quarters 
enjoy a corresponding discount in their cost of capital. For companies posting consistent 
EPS rises and falls for a shorter period of four quarters and eight quarters, the impact on 
their monthly abnormal returns follow the same trend seen in the main regression analyses. 
The results here show that the findings in the results of the main analyses are not driven by 
clustering around few industry sectors but are widespread throughout the entire sample 
data. 
4.5.3 Earnings momentum and information discreteness 
In this section, I introduce the information discreteness metric as modelled by Da et al (2014) 
to test the extent to which the impact of information discreteness exacerbating earnings 
momentum in my sample data. Da et al (2014) describe information discreteness as both the 
rate with which information about firms arrives in the market and the magnitude of each 
signal that is received by the market. The authors distinguish the impact of small amounts of 
information which continuously flow into the market from that of large pieces of information 
that come at discrete time periods. Although I do not test the frog in the pan hypothesis of 
Da et al (2014), I test the impact of earnings information discreteness (arrival of earnings 
news) on earnings momentum in returns. It is well known that conjectures about earnings 
are one source of value-relevant information, usually conveyed by analysts’ forecasts of 
earnings and speculation in brokers’ reports. The descriptive statistics presented in table 4.4 
confirm that the sample displays a skewed distribution of company returns, which implies 
that the results may be sensitive to how quickly the market receives and processes 
information about sample companies’ performance. A less skewed distribution of returns 
indicates that earnings information flows into price in a much timelier manner. Hence, I 
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introduced the information discreteness metric as a control variable into the original 
regression equation alongside length of EPS sequences to determine its impact on the 
earnings momentum observed in my data sample. The information discreteness metric is 
constructed following Da et al’s (2014) approach.  Information discreteness 𝐼𝐷𝑧 is defined 
as: 
𝐼𝐷𝑧 = 𝑠𝑔𝑛(𝑃𝑅𝐸𝑇).
[%𝑛𝑒𝑔−%𝑝𝑜𝑠]
[%𝑛𝑒𝑔+%𝑝𝑜𝑠]
 …………………………………………………………..…..… (4.5) 
where %neg and %pos are the percentage of days during the portfolio formation period with 
negative and positive returns respectively, PRET is a company’s cumulative return over the 
past twelve months excluding the most recent month, sgn(PRET) is the sign of PRET and is 
equal to +1 when PRET is positive and equal to -1 when PRET is negative (Da et al (2014)). 
The information discreteness measure does not depend on the size or magnitude of a 
stock’s returns but rather on the sign of the return (this is despite the fact that it is derived 
from PRET, which depends on the size of cumulative returns). This property differentiates 
this metric from return volatility, skewness and kurtosis. Furthermore, the information 
discreteness proxy defines the time series property of the PRET as seen in the daily returns 
from which the cumulative formation period returns are calculated32. 
I include a dummy variable, IDz, to my original model to test for the impact of information 
discreteness or granularity upon the earnings momentum seen in my sample data. The 
dummy IDz takes a value of one when information discreteness is above its median value, or 
granular, and zero otherwise (when smooth). The distribution of informational discreteness 
as captured by the IDz metric is skewed left in the sample by a few companies with very 
smooth continuous price movements, causing the mean to lie at 0.07 while the median is 
0.053. This dummy is constructed on an individual company basis, hence it allows for the 
control of shifts in company intercepts (but not annual) with the degree of recorded 
information discreteness.  
The results of this regression are presented in table 4.11. The dummy is significant, 
suggesting that information discreteness is indeed a factor that helps in fomenting earnings 
momentum as well as price momentum in stock returns. As I indicated above, I did not test 
the Da et al (2014) frog in the pan hypothesis; however informational discreteness is clearly 
one factor determining the intensity of earnings momentum, even after controlling for the 
consistency of earnings sequences. However, it is important to point out that the inclusion of 
such a control for informational discreteness in the tests does not appear to weaken the role 
of a consistent streak of quarterly EPS rises and falls in determining the extent of the 
                                                          
32
 See Da et al (2014) for details of how PRET is measured. 
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earnings-driven momentum observed in the data. So earnings streakiness and informational 
discreteness appear to have separate and additive effects in driving the momentum in stock 
price.  
4.5.4 Profitability of earnings momentum strategies with different duration of EPS rise 
 or fall sequence employing Bayesian estimation method 
The ordinary least squares regressions (panel regressions) focus on the average impact of 
EPS changes and their sequence lengths given symmetry with the assumption that investors 
sample from a fixed known normal distribution of EPS changes and earnings sequence 
lengths. But as the representative agent models outlined in section 4.3 emphasise, investors 
do not know the true distribution of EPS changes or the duration of each consistent earnings 
change sequence. Investors must learn these distributions by trial and error. The Bayesian 
estimates of the key model coefficients capture this process of price discovery. For a normal 
distribution, the ordinary least squares estimation has all the attractions of a maximum 
likelihood, providing parameter values that make the sample data most likely to be observed. 
However, this type of estimator leaves open many theories which attach a probability of one 
(the greatest possible likelihood) to factors which could not conceivably play any causal role 
in driving the phenomenon in question. In this sense, maximum likelihood estimators explain 
too much variation in the data compared to their Bayesian counterparts33. 
The regression results presented in tables 4.7 and 4.8 are based on minimising squared 
deviations from the mean. Table 4.12 provides Bayesian estimates of the main regression 
results. The results in table 4.12 show a weighted average of the investor’s prior distribution 
of the parameters and their sample means. The weight of the sample means increase as the 
estimation sample grows. Initially, the sample weight placed on the various independent 
variables (e.g. ∆eps, consistency, and consistency x ∆eps) is set to zero. This is consistent 
with the investor’s scepticism about the ability of fundamentals to explain abnormal returns. 
The results presented in table 4.12 show regression coefficients estimated at the 5%, 50% 
and 95% points of distribution of three-monthly buy-and-hold Fama-French three-factor 
model adjusted returns. The explanatory powers of the consistency variable and the 
interaction term increased monotonically as the distribution of BHAR increased from 5% 
through to 95%. This shows that investors make upward adjustment in the valuation model 
when they observe growing sequences of quarterly EPS changes. This result reveals the 
scale of variation in estimated regression coefficients and also confirms that the results of 
the regression are robust to shifts in the estimated mean.  
                                                          
33
 See Howson and Urbach 2006, p. 215 – 216. 
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4.6 Summary and conclusion 
In this chapter, I present evidence on the suitability for empirical application of the two 
representative agent style models of the stock market impact of momentum in reported 
earnings. The early evidence that is shown in the results leads one to favour the Rabin 
(2002b) model based on the ‘law of small numbers’ as against the Barberis et al (1998) 
model of investor sentiment. Two very important reasons lead to this conclusion. First, the 
results do not seem to support the BSV model’s assumption that investors never infer the 
true nature of the quarterly earnings process they face. Contrary to this BSV model 
assumption, the investors seem to show that some kind of learning is going on through the 
growing sequence of EPS at every earnings announcement. The second reason is the 
simplicity of the distinction between the trending and mean-reverting regimes in the BSV 
model without regard to the length of each sequence that prevails. The results of the 
empirical analyses carried out in this chapter suggest that it is both the duration of the 
quarterly EPS change sequence and its sign which primarily determine their impact on 
prices, rather than consistent earnings rises as such.  Prolonged sequences of quarterly 
EPS falls seem particularly marked in exerting a risk premium from US S&P500 constituent 
companies in my chosen sample period. Only the Rabin (2002b) model allows for effective 
modelling of the impact of extensive falls in quarterly earnings, since it does not impose the 
symmetry in response to quarterly EPS rises and falls which the Barberis et al (1998) model 
requires. 
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Table 4.1 
Momentum and Reversion regimes in the Barberis et al (1998) model 
 
The tables below show the reversion and momentum models of Barberis et al 
(1998). 𝜋𝐿 is the low probability (0 ≤  𝜋𝐿 ≤ 0.5) attached to any given shock being 
repeated in terms of its sign in the next time period within the reversion regime in 
panel A and 𝜋𝐻 is the high probability (0.5 ≤  𝜋𝐻  ≤ 1.0) attached to a shock of any given 
sign being repeated within the momentum regime. The key aspect of this model lies in the 
fact that 𝜋𝐿 is small and 𝜋𝐻  is large. This means that under the mean-reverting 
regime, a positive shock is likely to be followed be a negative shock, while under the 
momentum regime; a positive shock is likely to be followed by another positive 
shock. 
 
 
 
                 Panel A 
 
 
  Reversion Regime    
  
    
  
   
 
 
 
                         Panel B 
 
 
  
Momentum Regime     
  
 
    
  
 
  
𝜋𝐿 
1 − 𝜋𝐿 
1 − 𝜋𝐿 
𝜋𝐿 
𝑦𝑡 = y 
𝑦𝑡 = −y 
𝑦𝑡+1 = 𝑦 𝑦𝑡+1 = −𝑦 
𝜋𝐻 
𝜋𝐻 1 − 𝜋𝐻 
1 − 𝜋𝐻 
𝑦𝑡= y 
𝑦𝑡=  − y 
𝑦𝑡+1= y 𝑦𝑡+1 = −y 
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Table 4.2 
 
The transition matrix from the reversion to the momentum regimes and back 
 
Table 4.2 shows the transition models in the Barberis et al (1998) model, transiting from 
reversion to momentum and back to reversion. 𝜆R  is the probability of leaving the reversion 
regime and 𝜆M  is the probability of leaving the momentum regime. The parameters 𝜆R and 
𝜆M are responsible for determining the transition probabilities from the reversion regime to 
the momentum regime respectively. The model focuses on small 𝜆R and 𝜆M , which implies 
that transitions between reversion and momentum regimes occur rarely. 
 
 
 
Prevailing 
regime 
In Reversion Regime next 
quarter 
In Momentum Regime next 
quarter 
 
Reversion 
                  
                
 
Momentum 
           
 
                      
 
 
  
1 − 𝜆𝑅 
1 − 𝜆M 
 𝜆R 
𝜆M 
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                                                       Table 4.3 
 
                 Earnings expectations in the Barberis et al (1998) model 
 
Table 4.3 below is based on an illustrative simulation of the model presented in 
Barberis et al (1998) table 1 in which 𝜋𝐿 =  
1
3
, 𝜋𝐻 =  
3
4
  and  𝜆R = 0.1, 𝜆M = 0.3. q(t) 
represents the probability that the mean-reverting model is generating quarterly earnings yt. 
 
 
 
Date (t) q(t) yt Length of run 
0 0.50 y 0 
1 0.80  -y 0 
2 0.86 y 0 
3 0.88  -y 0 
4 0.88 y 0 
5 0.84 y 1 
6 0.87  -y 0 
7 0.83  -y 1 
8 0.87 y 0 
9 0.88  -y 0 
10 0.88 y 0 
11 0.84 y 1 
12 0.81 y 2 
13 0.80 y 3 
14 0.77 y 4 
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Table 4.4: Summary of descriptive statistics for sample data 
 
Panel A shows the descriptive statistics of the sample and Panel B the correlation matrix of all the variables used in analysis in this chapter. The 
statistics include the number of observations of each of the variables, average value, median, standard deviation, minimum and maximum value, 
skewness and kurtosis respectively. The variables presented are the stock’s three-month buy-and-hold Fama-French three-factor model adjusted 
returns (BHAR), three-month Fama-French three-factor model adjusted cumulative returns (CAR), quarterly earnings-per-share levels (EPS), 
annualised quarterly earnings-per-share change (ΔEPS), annualised quarterly earnings-per-share change normalised by prior stock price (SΔEPS), 
ABRt is 1-month Fama-French three-factor model adjusted returns at the end of month t (current earnings announcement month), ABRt+1 1-month 
Fama-French three-factor model adjusted returns at the end of month t+1, ABRt+2 1-month Fama-French three-factor model adjusted returns at the end 
of month t+2, and Consistency is the length of sequences of annualised earnings-per-share changes scaled by prior stock price in the most current 
quarter. This sample is composed of all the companies that are in the S&P500 index from 1991 to 2006 (including those companies that were deleted 
during this sample period). There are a total of 525 companies yielding 23,017 company quarters of earnings-per-share changes in the final sample. 
Some 837 S&P500 constituent companies have quarterly changes data in my sample and my final sample companies derive from including only 
companies for which share-price performance including benchmark adjustments can be calculated. 
 
                      Panel A: Descriptive statistics 
       
Variable No. of Obs. Mean Median 
Std. 
Dev. Min. Max. Skew. Kurtosis 
BHAR 23017 0.004 0.005 0.055 -0.512 0.511 -0.062 9.206 
CAR 23017 0.032 0.029 0.223 -1.589 4.575 0.894 17.717 
EPS 23017 1.006 0.88 5.99 -411.2 22.58 -58.456 3954.7 
ΔEPS 23017 0.124 0.113 9.611 -372 534 0.187 20.45 
SΔEPS 23017 0.006 0.004 0.186 -1 1 0.186 20.45 
ABRt 23017 0.004 0.002 0.107 -0.727 1.326 0.728 11.18 
ABRt+1 23017 0.015 0.008 0.123 -0.860 5.487 4.705 179.87 
ABRt+2 23017 0.009 0.007 0.107 -0.685 2.649 1.693 33.026 
ABRt+3 23017 0.004 0.002 0.107 -0.727 1.326 0.723 11.37 
Consistency 23017 3.274 3 6.560 -12 12 -0.157 -2.021 
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  Panel B: Correlation matrix (Spearman Correlations are shown above the diagonal with Pearson below) 
 
  BHAR CAR EPS ΔEPS SΔEPS ABRit ABRit+1 ABRit+2 ABRit+3 Consistency 
BHAR 1 0.992 -0.004 0.083 0.099 0.446 0.494 0.425 0.468 0.064 
CAR 0.979 1 -0.029 0.078 0.094 0.434 0.500 0.426 0.468 0.052 
EPS 0.068 0.050 1 0.222 0.118 0.029 -0.030 -0.012 0.017 -0.004 
ΔEPS 0.005 0.003 0.001 1 0.948 0.057 0.037 0.029 0.049 0.622 
SΔEPS 0.044 0.044 0.008 0.059 1 0.061 0.051 0.039 0.054 0.633 
ABRit 0.478 0.457 0.042 0.007 0.034 1 -0.047 -0.027 0.434 0.057 
ABRit+1 0.496 0.545 -0.001 0.011 0.020 -0.072 1 0.012 0.020 0.024 
ABRit+2 0.470 0.480 0.039 -0.014 0.006 -0.022 0.027 1 -0.012 0.007 
ABRit+3 0.521 0.519 0.025 0.001 0.029 0.053 0.033 -0.008 1 0.046 
Consistency 0.057 0.040 0.052 0.014 0.256 0.044 0.012 -0.008 0.035 1 
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Table 4.4 continued 
Panel C: Skewness of quarterly earnings-per-share changes by length and sign of earnings sequence 
 
Panel C breaks up the distribution of EPS change sequences as each year of the quarterly run in EPS changes cumulates. I calculate the mean, median, kurtosis, 
standard deviation, and skewness of grouped sequence lengths of 1 to 4, 5 to 8, and 9 to 12 quarters of either consecutive EPS falls or rises (i.e. each successive 
year of consecutive falls and rises). 
 
Sequence Length Number of Obs. Mean Median Skewness Kurtosis Std. Dev. 
9 to 12 Consecutive falls 792 -7.780 -1.011 -27.933 783.959 2.06E+15 
5 to 8 Consecutive falls 2369 -9.030 -0.567 -35.116 1250.447 3.13E+14 
1 to 4 Consecutive falls 3566 -2.800 -0.384 -59.69 3564 1.67E+14 
1 to 4 Consecutive rises 6716 -1.030 0.24 -81.932 6714 8.42E+14 
5 to 8 Consecutive rises 3059 0.453 0.279 11.226 216.044 0.749 
9 to 12 consecutive rises 6515 0.263 0.175 36.057 1519.854 0.82 
        
Panel D: Skewness of three-month Buy-and-Hold Fama-French three-factor adjusted returns by length and sign of earnings sequence 
 
Panel D breaks up the distribution of EPS change sequences as a year of the quarterly run in EPS changes cumulates. I calculate the mean, median, standard 
deviation, kurtosis, and skewness of three-month buy-and-hold Fama-French three-factor model adjusted returns matched with their respective grouped EPS 
sequence lengths for 1 to 4, 5 to 8, and 9 to 12 quarters of consecutive EPS falls or rises (i.e. each successive year if consecutive falls and rises). 
 
Sequence Length 
Number of   
Obs.   Mean Median Skewness Kurtosis Std. Dev. 
9 to 12 consecutive falls 792 0.004 0.006 0.239 6.438 0.058 
5 to 8 Consecutive falls 2369 -0.001 0.001 0.035 5.821 0.06 
1 to 4 Consecutive falls 3566 -0.001 0.0004 0.077 9.177 0.061 
1 to 4 Consecutive rises 6716 0.002 0.003 -0.194 9.622 0.058 
5 to 8 Consecutive rises 3059 0.008 0.008 0.15 12.056 0.051 
9 to 12 consecutive rises 6515 0.007 0.007 -0.024 8.229 0.046 
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Table 4.5 
 
Panel A: Distribution of sequences of quarterly EPS rises and falls across the sample 
 
This table presents the distribution of sequences of quarterly earnings-per-share changes across the sample companies. The distribution shows that quarterly 
earnings rises are far more common than quarterly earnings falls. 
 
Consistency Proportion Std. Err. [95% Conf. Interval] 
-12 1.067% 0.0006753 0.0093464 - 0.0119936 
-11 0.527% 0.0004759 0.0043374 - 0.006203 
-10 0.756% 0.0005693 0.0064438 - 0.0086756 
-9 1.097% 0.0006847 0.0096303 - 0.0123144 
-8 1.395% 0.000771 0.012442   -  0.0154642 
-7 0.397% 0.0004135 0.0031637 - 0.0047848 
-6 4.661% 0.0013856 0.0438953 - 0.0493269 
-5 3.845% 0.0012637 0.0359696 - 0.0409236 
-4 4.303% 0.0013337 0.0404115 - 0.0456398 
-3 5.309% 0.0014737 0.0502023 - 0.0559794 
-2 5.918% 0.0015509 0.0561419 - 0.0622217 
1 13.335% 0.0022344 0.1289739 - 0.1377331 
2 5.957% 0.0015557 0.0565214 - 0.0626199 
3 5.223% 0.0014623 0.0493606 - 0.0550931 
4 4.700% 0.001391 0.0442733 - 0.0497264 
5 4.083% 0.0013006 0.0382732 - 0.0433718 
6 3.525% 0.0012121 0.0328742 - 0.0376257 
7 3.028% 0.0011263 0.0280744 - 0.0324897 
8 2.626% 0.0010511 0.0242044 - 0.0283249 
9 2.385% 0.0010028 0.02188   -   0.025811 
10 2.315% 0.0009885 0.0212168 - 0.0250919 
11 2.065% 0.0009347 0.0188168 - 0.0224809 
12 21.483% 0.0026994 0.2095347 - 0.2201167 
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Panel B: Shapiro-Wilk W test for normality 
 
          
  
Variable Obs W V  z Prob>z 
  
  
Consistency 23017 0.988 120.88 13.099 0.00 
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Table 4.6: Panel regression of sequence of quarterly EPS changes and monthly abnormal returns 
 
The table below shows the intercept and the estimates of the panel regression model for monthly Fama-French three-factor model adjusted returns. 
The regression model is 𝐀𝐁𝐑𝐢𝐭 =  𝜶 +  𝜷𝟏𝑪𝑶𝑵𝑺𝑰𝑺 + 𝜷𝟐𝑺𝚫𝚬𝑷𝑺 +  𝜷𝟑𝑪𝑶𝑵𝑺𝑰𝑺 ∗ 𝑺𝚫𝚬𝑷𝑺 +  𝝐𝒕.  where 𝐀𝐁𝐑𝐢𝐭  is the 1-month Fama-French three-factor 
model adjusted returns at time t,  𝑪𝑶𝑵𝑺𝑰𝑺  (Consistency) is the length of quarterly earnings change sequence, 1, 2,,,,,,,,12 denoting EPS change 
sequences lasting 1 quarter, 2 consecutive quarters, 3 consecutive quarters, 12 consecutive quarters etc.; 𝑺𝚫𝚬𝑷𝑺  is the change in annualised 
quarterly EPS (DeltaEPS) normalised by prior price, 𝑪𝑶𝑵𝑺𝑰𝑺 ∗ 𝑺𝚫𝚬𝑷𝑺 is an interaction term measuring the interaction between Consistency and 
DeltaEPS, and 𝝐𝒕 random error. The sample includes all the S&P500 constituent stocks from January 1991 to December 2006. The t-statistics are 
reported in parenthesis and ***, **, * indicates statistical significance at a 1%, 5%, and 10% confidence level. The reported t values are subject to 
robust heteroskedasticity correction following White (1980). 
   Month Intercept Consistency DeltaEPS Consis*𝑺𝚫EPS N 
𝐀𝐁𝐑𝐢𝐭 
     
 
0.200%**(2.12) 0.073%***(6.36) 
  
23013 
 
0.223%**(2.37) 0.064%***(5.71) 1.260%**(2.15) 
 
23013 
 
-0.001%(-0.20) 0.074%***(6.64) 1.690%***(2.92) 0.056%***(5.65) 23013 
      𝐀𝐁𝐑𝐢𝐭+𝟏 
     
 
1.410%***(12.75) 0.019%(1.55) 
  
23013 
 
1.440%***(12.45) 0.009%(0.68) 1.303%(1.37) 
 
23013 
 
1.060%***(9.71) 0.030%**(2.19) 1.990%**(2.03) 0.930%***(6.03) 23013 
      𝐀𝐁𝐑𝐢𝐭+𝟐 
     
 
0.100%**(11.06) -0.014%(-1.22) 
  
23013 
 
1.005%**(11.32) -0.00017(-1.66) 0.547%(0.84) 
 
23013 
 
0.712%**(7.50) -0.00002(-0.27) 1.080% (1.75) 0.720%***(4.95) 23013 
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Table 4.7: Regression of three-month buy-and-hold Fama-French three-factor model adjusted returns and Consistency of quarterly EPS 
changes 
 
This table shows the OLS regression of three-month buy-and-hold Fama-French three-factor model adjusted returns on Consistency (the sequences of 
annualised quarterly earnings-per-share changes). The regression model is 𝐁𝐇𝐀𝐑𝐢𝐭 =  𝜶 +  𝜷𝟏𝑪𝑶𝑵𝑺𝑰𝑺 +  𝜷𝟐𝑺𝚫𝚬𝑷𝑺 + 𝜷𝟑𝑪𝑶𝑵𝑺𝑰𝑺 ∗ 𝑺𝚫𝚬𝑷𝑺 +  𝝐𝒕.  where 
𝐁𝐇𝐀𝐑𝐢𝐭  is the three-month buy-and-hold Fama-French three-factor model adjusted returns at time t,  𝑪𝑶𝑵𝑺𝑰𝑺  (Consistency) is the length of the 
quarterly earnings change sequence, 1, 2,,,,,,,,12 denoting earnings change sequences lasting 1 quarter, 2 consecutive quarters, 3 consecutive 
quarters, 12 consecutive quarters etc.; 𝑺𝚫𝚬𝑷𝑺  is the change in annualised quarterly EPS (DeltaEPS) normalised by prior price, 𝑪𝑶𝑵𝑺𝑰𝑺 ∗ 𝑺𝚫𝚬𝑷𝑺 is an 
interaction term measuring the interaction between Consistency and DeltaEPS, and 𝝐𝒕 random error. The sample includes all the S&P500 constituent 
stocks from January 1991 to December 2006. The t-statistics are reported in parenthesis and ***, **, * indicates statistical significance at a 1%, 5%, and 
10% confidence level. The reported t values are subject to robust heteroskedasticity correction following White (1980). 
 
 
 
  Intercept  𝐃𝐞𝐥𝐭𝐚𝐄𝐏𝐒 Consistency  Consis*𝑺∆𝐄𝐏𝐒 N R2 
𝐁𝐇𝐀𝐑𝐢𝐭 
      
 
0.30%***(10.00) 0.005% (1.14) 
  
23013 0.06 
 
0.20%***(4.78) 0.005%(0.68) 0.05%***(8.77) 
 
23013 0.06 
  0.20%***(5.03) 0.004%(0.28) 0.04%***(8.54) -0.001% (-1.51) 23013 0.06 
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Table 4.8: Panel regression of buy-and-hold abnormal returns and different durations of sequences of quarterly EPS changes 
 
Panels A, B, and C of this table shows the intercept and estimates of the panel regression of three-month buy-and-hold Fama-French three-factor adjusted returns 
on Consistency (sequence of quarterly EPS change). Panel D presents the OLS regression estimates of the same regression. The regression model is: 𝐁𝐇𝐀𝐑𝐢𝐭 =
 𝜶 +  𝜷𝟏𝑪𝑶𝑵𝑺𝑰𝑺 + 𝜷𝟐𝑺𝚫𝚬𝑷𝑺 +  𝜷𝟑𝑫𝑼𝑴𝑴𝒀𝟏 + 𝜷𝟒𝑫𝑼𝑴𝑴𝒀𝟐 + 𝜷𝟓𝑫𝑼𝑴𝑴𝒀𝟑 + 𝜷𝟔𝒀𝑬𝑨𝑹 +  𝝐𝒕.  where 𝐁𝐇𝐀𝐑𝐢𝐭  is the 3-month buy-and-hold Fama-French three-factor 
model adjusted returns at time t,  𝑪𝑶𝑵𝑺𝑰𝑺  (Consistency) is the length of the quarterly earnings change sequence, 1, 2,,,,,,,,12 denoting earnings change sequences 
lasting 1 quarter, 2 consecutive quarters, 3 consecutive quarters, 12 consecutive quarters etc.; 𝑺𝚫𝚬𝑷𝑺  is the change in annualised quarterly EPS (DeltaEPS)  
normalised by prior price; 𝑫𝑼𝑴𝑴𝒀𝟏 represents either Rise1, Rise2, Rise3, or Rise4 (Rise1 captures the sequence of quarterly EPS rises and falls of more than 
eight quarters; Rise2 captures the sequence of quarterly EPS rises and falls eight quarters or less; Rise3 captures the sequences of quarterly EPS rises and falls of 
four quarters or less; Rise4  captures the sequence of quarterly EPS rises and falls of two and three quarters),  𝑫𝑼𝑴𝑴𝒀𝟐 represents either More2yearneg, 
Less2yearneg or Less1yearneg: (More2yearneg = is a dummy variable that equals 1 for consistent quarterly earnings fall sequences beyond eight quarters and 
zero otherwise;  Less2yearneg = is a dummy variable that equals 1 for consistent quarterly earnings fall sequences of eight quarters or less and zero otherwise; 
Less1yearneg = is a dummy variable that equals 1 for consistent quarterly earnings fall sequences of four quarters or less and zero otherwise), 
𝑫𝑼𝑴𝑴𝒀𝟑 represents either More2yearpos, Less2yearpos or Less1yearpos:  (More2yearpos = is a dummy variable that equals 1 for consistent quarterly 
earnings rise sequences beyond eight quarters and zero otherwise or  Less2yearpos = is a dummy variable that equals 1 for consistent quarterly earnings rise 
sequences of eight quarters or less and zero otherwise or Less1yearpos = is a dummy variable that equals 1 for consistent quarterly earnings rise sequences of 
four quarters or less and zero otherwise), 𝒀𝑬𝑨𝑹  is the year in my sample period from 1991 to 2006 in which the quarterly earnings sequence is recorded, and 𝝐𝒕 is 
random error. The sample includes all the S&P500 constituent stocks from January 1991 to December 2006. The t-statistics are reported in parenthesis and ***, **, * 
indicates statistical significance at a 1%, 5%, and 10% confidence level. For the OLS regression in panel D, the reported t values are subject to robust 
heteroskedasticity correction following White (1980). 
 
  Panel A: Consistent sequence of quarterly EPS changes for more than two years     
𝐁𝐇𝐀𝐑𝐢𝐭 
          Intercept Year Consistency DeltaEPS Rise1 More2yearneg More2yearpos N 
 
132%** (7.58) -0.066%*** (-7.74) 0.092%*** (4.19) 0.900% ***(2.68) -0.254% (-1.34) 1.161%*** (4.02) -0.50%** (-2.43) 23017 
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           Panel B: Consistent sequence of quarterly EPS changes for less or equal to eight quarters   
𝐁𝐇𝐀𝐑𝐢𝐭 
          Intercept Year Consistency DeltaEPS Rise2 Less2yearneg Less2yearpos N 
 
133.1%***(7.64) -0.066%***(-7.57) 0.092***(4.19) 0.900%***(2.68) -1.910%***(3.47) -1.200%***(-4.02) 0.500%***(2.68) 23017 
         
   
 
 
 
 
    
           Panel C: Consistent sequence of quarterly EPS changes for less or equal to four quarters   
𝐁𝐇𝐀𝐑𝐢𝐭 
          Intercept Year Consistency DeltaEPS Rise3 Less1yearneg Less1yearpos N 
 
132.7%***(7.62) -0.066%***(-7.61) -0.011% (-0.56) 0.937%***(2.76) 0.748%***(2.14) -0.14% (-0.80) -0.56%***(-3.04) 23017 
         
         
                  
  Panel D: Consistent sequence of quarterly EPS changes for two and three quarters (OLS regression estimates)   
𝐁𝐇𝐀𝐑𝐢𝐭 
          Intercept   Year Consistency DeltaEPS Rise4 More2yearneg More2yearpos N         R2 
 
135%*** 
     (9.64) 
  -0.07%*** 
   (-9.62) 
0.09% 
(4.52) 
0.04% 
(0.73) 
0.748%*** 
(2.14) 
1.00%  
(4.19) 
-0.50%***                       
(-3.00) 23017  0.05 
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Table 4.9: Sub-period Analysis 
 
This table reports the panel estimates of the price impact of consistent quarterly earnings patterns. Panel A shows the results for the first period from 
January 1991 to December 1998 and Panel B shows the results for the second period from January 1999 to December 2006. The regression model 
is: 𝐁𝐇𝐀𝐑𝐢𝐭 =  𝜶 +  𝜷𝑪𝑶𝑵𝑺𝑰𝑺 +  𝜷𝟏𝑺𝚫𝚬𝑷𝑺 +  𝜷𝟐𝑫𝑼𝑴𝑴𝒀𝟏 + 𝜷𝟑𝑫𝑼𝑴𝑴𝒀𝟐 + 𝜷𝟒𝑫𝑼𝑴𝑴𝒀𝟑 + 𝜷𝟓𝒀𝑬𝑨𝑹 + 𝝐𝒕. where 𝐁𝐇𝐀𝐑𝐢𝐭  is the 3-month buy-and-
hold Fama-French three-factor model adjusted returns at time t,  𝑪𝑶𝑵𝑺𝑰𝑺  (Consistency) is the length of the quarterly earnings change sequence, 1, 
2,,,,,,,,12 denoting earnings change sequences lasting 1 quarter, 2 consecutive quarters, 3 consecutive quarters, 12 consecutive quarters etc.; 
𝑺𝚫𝚬𝑷𝑺  (DeltaEPS) is the absolute change in annualised quarterly earnings-per-share normalised by prior price; 𝑫𝑼𝑴𝑴𝒀𝟏 represents Rise which 
captures the consistent sequences of quarterly EPS rises and falls of more than eight quarters; 𝑫𝑼𝑴𝑴𝒀𝟐 represents More2yearneg which equals 1 
for a consistent sequence of quarterly EPS falls of more than eight quarters and zero otherwise; 𝑫𝑼𝑴𝑴𝒀𝟑 represents More2yearpos which equals 
1 for a consistent sequence of quarterly EPS rises of more than eight quarters and zero otherwise; 𝒀𝑬𝑨𝑹  is the year in my sample period from 1991 
to 2006 in which the quarterly earnings sequence is recorded, and 𝝐𝒕 is random error. The sample includes all the S&P500 constituent stocks from 
January 1991 to December 2006. The t-statistics are reported in parenthesis and ***, **, * indicates statistical significance at a 1%, 5%, and 10% 
confidence level. 
 
  Panel A: Panel regression of buy-and-hold abnormal returns with different durations of sequences of quarterly EPS changes (1991 - 1998) 
    
               Intercept Year Consistency DeltaEPS Rise More2yearneg More2yearpos N 
    𝐁𝐇𝐀𝐑𝐢𝐭 
            
 
-75.510% (-1.37) 0.038% (1.39) 0.120%***(4.08) 0.877%**(2.10) -0.679%** (-2.57) 1.267%***(3.04) -0.945%***(-3.47) 11149 
    
 
         
             
      Panel B: Panel regression of buy-and-hold abnormal returns with different durations of sequences of quarterly EPS changes (1999 - 2006) 
    
               Intercept Year Consistency DeltaEPS Rise More2yearneg More2yearpos N 
    𝐁𝐇𝐀𝐑𝐢𝐭 
            
 
-194.560%***(3.45) 0.097%***(3.44) 0.035% (1.17) 0.704% (1.32) 0.234% (0.89) 0.882%**(2.30) 0.002% (0.01) 11868 
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Table 4.9 continued 
This table reports the panel estimates of price impact of consistent quarterly earnings patterns on monthly abnormal returns. Panel C shows the results for the first 
period from January 1991 to December 1998 and Panel D shows the results for the second period from January 1999 to December 2006. The table below shows the 
intercept and the estimates of the panel regression model for 1-month Fama-French three-factor model adjusted returns. The regression model is 𝐀𝐁𝐑𝐢𝐭 =  𝜶 +
 𝜷𝑪𝑶𝑵𝑺𝑰𝑺 + 𝜷𝟏𝑺𝚫𝚬𝑷𝑺 +  𝜷𝟐𝑪𝑶𝑵𝑺𝑰𝑺 ∗ 𝑺𝚫𝚬𝑷𝑺 + 𝝐𝒕.  where 𝐀𝐁𝐑𝐢𝐭  is the 1-month Fama-French three-factor model adjusted returns at time t,  𝑪𝑶𝑵𝑺𝑰𝑺  (Consistency) 
is the length of the quarterly earnings change sequence of 1, 2,,,,,,,,11 to 12 denoting earnings change sequences lasting 1 quarter, 2 consecutive quarters, 3 
consecutive quarters, 12 consecutive quarters etc.; 𝑺𝚫𝚬𝑷𝑺   is the change in annualised quarterly EPS (DeltaEPS) normalised by prior price, 𝑪𝑶𝑵𝑺𝑰𝑺 ∗ 𝑺𝚫𝚬𝑷𝑺 is an 
interaction term measuring the interaction between Consistency and DeltaEPS, and 𝝐𝒕 is random error. The sample includes all the S&P500 constituent stocks from 
January 1991 to December 2006. The t-statistics are reported in parenthesis and ***, **, * indicates statistical significance at a 1%, 5%, and 10% confidence level. 
 
 
Panel C: Panel regression of sequence of quarterly EPS and 1-month Fama-French three-factor adjusted returns (1991 – 1998) 
 
Month Intercept Consistency DeltaEPS Consis*𝑺∆𝐄𝐏𝐒 N 
𝐀𝐁𝐑𝐢𝐭 
     
 
0.930%***(7.33) 0.032%** (2.24) 
  
11147 
 
0.940%***(7.49) 0.027% (1.88) 0.780% (1.11) 
 
11147 
 
0.706%***(5.86) 0.036%** (2.59) 0.962% (1.44) 0.465%***(3.90) 11147 
      𝐀𝐁𝐑𝐢𝐭+𝟏 
     
 
1.890%***(12.13) 0.003% (0.19) 
  
11148 
 
1.920%***(11.53) -0.012% (-0.67) 1.870% (1.36) 
 
11148 
 
1.360%***(9.59) 0.013% (0.75) 2.290% (1.66) 1.080%***(4.91) 11148 
𝐀𝐁𝐑𝐢𝐭+𝟐 
     
      
 
0.683%***(5.37) 0.025% (1.63) 
  
11148 
 
0.696%***(5.63) 0.019% (1.42) 0.689% (0.73) 
 
11148 
 
0.362%***(2.88) 0.033%** (2.48) 0.898% (1.04) 0.680%***(3.11) 11148 
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Panel D: Panel regression of sequence of quarterly EPS and 1-month Fama-French three-factor adjusted returns (1999 - 2006) 
 
Month Intercept Consistency DeltaEPS Consis*𝑺∆𝐄𝐏𝐒 N 
𝐀𝐁𝐑𝐢𝐭 
     
 
-0.387%***(-3.15) 0.092%***(5.56) 
  
11866 
 
-0.350%***(-2.77) 0.079%***(4.68) 1.975% (1.88) 
 
11866 
 
-0.556%***(-4.39) 0.094%***(5.51) 2.867%** (2.49) 0.647%***(3.36) 11866 
𝐀𝐁𝐑𝐢𝐭+𝟏 
     
      
 
1.054%***(7.68) 0.016% (0.93) 
  
11864 
 
1.056%***(7.61) 0.016% (0.87) 0.134% (0.13) 
 
11864 
 
0.863%***(5.94) 0.030% (1.62) 0.965% (0.87) 0.609%** (2.51) 11864 
𝐀𝐁𝐑𝐢𝐭+𝟐 
     
      
 
1.224%***(10.18) -0.045%***(-2.69) 
  
11864 
 
1.230%***(10.21) -0.047%***(-2.86) 0.331% (0.42) 
 
11864 
 
0.959%***(7.54) -0.027% (-1.61) 1.507% (1.78) 0.857%***(4.73) 11864 
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Table 4.10: Analysis of data by industry classification  
 
This table reports the panel estimates of price impact of consistent quarterly earnings patterns. Panel A shows the results for the first period from 
January 1991 to December 1998 and Panel B shows the results for the second period from January 1999 to December 2006. The regression model 
is:  𝐁𝐇𝐀𝐑𝐢𝐭 =  𝜶 + 𝜷𝟏𝑪𝑶𝑵𝑺𝑰𝑺 +  𝜷𝟐𝑺𝚫𝚬𝑷𝑺 +  𝜷𝟑𝑫𝑼𝑴𝑴𝒀𝟏 + 𝜷𝟒𝑫𝑼𝑴𝑴𝒀𝟐 + 𝜷𝟓𝑫𝑼𝑴𝑴𝒀𝟑 + 𝜷𝟔𝒀𝑬𝑨𝑹 +  𝝐𝒕.  where 𝐁𝐇𝐀𝐑𝐢𝐭  is the 3-month buy-and-
hold Fama-French three-factor model adjusted returns at time t,  𝑪𝑶𝑵𝑺𝑰𝑺  (Consistency) is the length of the quarterly earnings change sequence, 1, 
2,,,,,,,,12 denoting earnings change sequences lasting 1 quarter, 2 consecutive quarters, 3 consecutive quarters, 12 consecutive quarters etc.; 
𝑺𝚫𝚬𝑷𝑺  (DeltaEPS) is the absolute change in annualised quarterly earnings-per-share normalised by prior price;  𝑫𝑼𝑴𝑴𝒀𝟏 represents either Rise1, 
Rise2, or Rise3 (Rise1 captures the sequence of quarterly EPS rises and falls of more than eight quarters; Rise2 captures the sequence of quarterly 
EPS rises and falls of eight quarters or less; Rise3 captures the sequences of quarterly EPS rises and falls of four quarters or less; 
𝑫𝑼𝑴𝑴𝒀𝟐 represents either More2yearneg, Less2yearneg or Less1yearneg:  (More2yearneg = a dummy variable that equals 1 for consistent 
sequences of quarterly EPS falls of more than eight quarters and zero otherwise or  Less2yearneg = a dummy variable that equals 1 for consistent 
sequences of quarterly EPS falls of eight quarters or less and zero otherwise or Less1yearneg = a dummy variable that equals 1 for consistent 
sequences of quarterly EPS falls of four quarters or less and zero otherwise), 𝑫𝑼𝑴𝑴𝒀𝟑 represents either More2yearpos, Less2yearpos or 
Less1yearpos: (More2yearpos = a dummy variable that equals 1 for consistent sequences of quarterly EPS rises of more than eight quarters and 
zero otherwise or  Less2yearpos = is a dummy variable that equals 1 for consistent sequences of quarterly EPS rises of eight quarters or less and 
zero otherwise or Less1yearpos = is a dummy variable that equals 1 for consistent sequences of quarterly EPS rises of four quarters or less and 
zero otherwise), 𝒀𝑬𝑨𝑹  is the year in my sample period from 1991 to 2006 in which the sequence of quarterly EPS changes is recorded, and 𝝐𝒕 is 
random error. The sample includes all the S&P500 constituent stocks from January 1991 to December 2006. The t-statistics are reported in 
parenthesis and ***, **, * indicates statistical significance at a 1%, 5%, and 10% confidence level. 
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  Panel A: Consistent sequence of quarterly EPS rises and falls for more than eight quarters     
𝐁𝐇𝐀𝐑𝐢𝐭 
           Intercept Year Consistency DeltaEPS Consis*𝑺∆𝐄𝐏𝐒 Rise1 More2yearneg More2yearpos N 
Sector 
         
          
Utilities -12.406% (-0.25) 0.006% (0.36) -0.072% (-1.37) 0.100% (0.06) -0.173% (-0.30) 0.832% (1.89) 0.562% (0.69) 1.187% (1.71) 1257 
Telecomm. 
services 533.030%***(3.06) -0.266%***(-3.06) 0.114% (0.74) -0.865% (-1.58) 1.106%***(6.03) -1.469% (-1.35) 1.675% (0.63) 0.296% (0.23) 309 
Information 
tech. 236.407%***(2.84) -0.118%***(-2.84) 0.097% (0.91) 1.856%***(3.19) 0.521%***(3.86) 0.308% (0.36) 0.069% (0.05) -0.583% (-0.59) 2220 
Financials 120%***3.98) -0.060%***(-3.97) 0.024% (0.63) 0.739% (1.07) 0.579%** (2.25) 0.305% (0.92) 0.570% (0.84) -0.118% (-0.32) 2736 
Health Care -78.150% (-1.07) 0.039% (1.08) 0.131% (1.75) -0.690% (-0.57) 0.651%** (2.26) -0.292% (-0.48) 0.549% (0.26) -1.290%** (-2.06) 1617 
Consumer 
Staples 93.950%***(2.93) -0.047%***(-2.93) 0.097% (1.88) 0.300% (0.52) 1.252%***(6.60) -0.029% (-0.05) 0.712% (0.58) -0.610% (-1.44) 1658 
Consumer 
Discretionary 93.280% (1.78) -0.046% (-1.79) 0.075% (1.00) 0.004% (0.00) 1.130%***(4.81) 0.259% (0.36) 0.522% (0.51) -0.595% (-0.95) 2759 
Industrials 87.210%** (2.59) -0.043%** (-2.58) 0.093% (1.82) 0.570% (0.76) 0.557% (1.82) -0.529% (-1.12) 1.174% (1.93) -0.529% (-1.12) 1777 
Materials 96.540% (1.71) -0.048% (-1.71) 0.065% (0.98) 4.030%** (2.40) 0.421% (1.73) -0.030% (-0.05) 0.371% (0.56) -0.375% (-0.54) 1100 
Energy -209.430%***(-3.15) 0.105%***(3.15) -0.008% (-0.10) 0.409% (0.48) 0.600%***(3.11) 0.194% (0.29) -0.659% (-0.88) -0.923% (-0.88) 1149 
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Table 4.10 continued 
 
           Panel B: Consistent sequence of quarterly EPS rises and falls  for less or equal to eight quarters     
𝐁𝐇𝐀𝐑𝐢𝐭 
           Intercept Year Consistency DeltaEPS Consis*𝑺∆𝐄𝐏𝐒 Rise2 Less2yearneg Less2yearpos N 
Sector 
         
          
Utilities -11.840% (-0.36) 0.006% (0.36) -0.072% (-1.37) 0.100% (0.06) -0.173% (-0.30) 1.457% (0.96) -0.562% (-0.69) -1.187% (-1.71) 1257 
Telecomm. 
services 534.710%***(3.04) -0.266%***(-3.06) 0.114% (0.74) -0.865% (-1.58) 0.060%***(6.03) -2.849% (-0.73) -1.675% (-0.63) -0.296% (-0.23) 309 
Information 
tech. 236.470%***(2.82) -0.118%***(-2.84) 0.097% (0.91) 1.850%***(3.19) 0.521%***(3.86) -0.345% (-0.13) -0.069% (-0.05) 0.583% (0.59) 2220 
Financials 120.630%***(3.99) -0.060%***(-3.97) 0.024% (0.63) 0.739% (1.07) 0.579%** (2.25) -0.384% (-0.36) -0.570% (-0.84) 0.118% (0.32) 2736 
Health Care -77.560% (-1.17) 0.039% (1.20) 0.131% (1.71) -0.690% (-0.84) 0.651%***(3.56) -2.133% (-1.08) -0.550% (-0.48) 1.290% (1.86) 1617 
Consumer 
Staples 94.660%***(2.94) -0.047%***(-2.93) 0.097% (1.88) 0.300% (0.52) 1.250%***(6.60) -1.352% (-0.89) -0.712% (-0.58) 0.610% (1.44) 1658 
Consumer 
Discretionary 93.800% (1.79) -0.046% (-1.79) 0.075% (1.00) 0.004% (0.00) 1.132%***(4.81) -0.859% (-0.48) -0.522% (-0.51) 0.595% (0.95) 2759 
Industrials 88.38%** (2.62) -0.043%** (-2.58) 0.093% (1.82) 0.570% (0.76) 0.557%***(2.76) -2.049% (-1.86) -1.174% (-1.93) -1.704%**(-2.07) 1777 
Materials 96.916% (1.72) -0.048% (-1.71) 0.065% (0.98) 4.028%** (2.40) 0.421% (1.73) -0.777% (-0.48) -0.371% (-0.56) 0.375% (0.54) 1100 
Energy -210%***(-3.15) 0.105%***(3.15) -0.008% (-0.10) 0.408% (0.48) 0.660%***(3.11) -0.069% (-0.04) 0.659% (0.88) 0.923% (0.88) 1149 
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Table 4.10 continued 
 
  Panel C: Consistent sequence of quarterly EPS rises and falls  for less or equal to four quarters     
𝐁𝐇𝐀𝐑𝐢𝐭 
           Intercept Year Consistency DeltaEPS Consis*𝑺∆𝐄𝐏𝐒 Rise3 Less1yearneg Less1yearpos N 
Sector 
         
          
Utilities -15.368% (-0.46) 0.008% (0.48) 0.048% (0.53) 0.228% (0.13) -0.212% (-0.36) -0.729% (-0.51) -1.085% (-1.81) 0.057% (0.09) 1257 
Telecomm. Services 524.720%***(3.12) -0.262%***(-3.12) -0.009% (-0.10) -0.561% (-1.22) 1.154%***(6.28) 0.374% (0.25) -0.488% (-0.65) -1.900% (-1.38) 309 
Information tech. 226.090%** (2.65) -0.113%** (-2.65) 0.078% (0.81) 1.825%***(3.23) 0.55%***(3.97) 0.346% (0.21) 0.422% (0.57) 0.479% (0.52) 2220 
Financials 122.780%***(4.10) -0.061%***(-4.10) -0.012% (-0.34) 0.823% (1.12) 0.563%** (2.34) 0.467% (0.81) -0.439% (-1.23) -0.304% (-0.96) 2736 
Health Care -75.905% (-1.10) 0.037% (1.09) -0.075% (-1.03) -0.504% (-0.42) 0.615%** (2.07) 1.959% (1.47) 0.310% (0.58) -0.894% (-1.11) 1617 
Consumer Staples 89.370%***(2.79) -0.045%***(-2.82) 0.002% (0.05) 0.305% (0.56) 1.299%***(6.67) 1.338% (1.59) 0.752% (1.26) -0.290% (-0.54) 1658 
Consumer 
Discretionary 87.204% (1.67) -0.044% (-1.69) -0.041% (-0.65) -0.032% (-0.03) 1.179%***(5.10) 2.081% (1.93) 1.018%** (2.00) -0.491% (-0.80) 2759 
Industrials 88.747%** (2.59) -0.044%** (-2.58) 0.030% (1.11) 0.723% (0.98) 0.591%***(2.77) -0.127% (-0.38) -0.135% (-0.39) -0.480% (-1.82) 1777 
Materials 109.547%** (2.03) -0.055%** (-2.04) 0.012% (0.20) 3.923%** (2.35) 0.464% (1.81) 0.688% (0.57) 0.711% (1.03) 0.041% (0.07) 1100 
Energy -208.110%***(-2.82) 0.104%***(2.82) -0.189% (-1.66) 0.732% (0.78) 0.517%** (2.61) 2.533% (1.27) -0.124% (-0.15) -1.562% (-1.60) 1149 
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Table 4.11: Main regression model including dummy for ‘information discreteness’ (i.e. the company’s 𝑰𝑫𝒛 value being above or below the 
sample 𝑰𝑫𝒛 median value) 
 
This table shows the OLS regression of three-month buy-and-hold Fama-French three-factor model adjusted returns on Consistency (the sequences 
of annualised quarterly earnings-per-share changes). The regression model is 𝐁𝐇𝐀𝐑𝐢𝐭 =  𝜶 + 𝜷𝟏𝑪𝑶𝑵𝑺𝑰𝑺 +  𝜷𝟐𝑺𝚫𝚬𝑷𝑺 + 𝜷𝟑𝑪𝑶𝑵𝑺𝑰𝑺 ∗ 𝑺𝚫𝚬𝑷𝑺 +
𝜷𝟒𝑰𝑫𝒛 + 𝝐𝒕.  where 𝐁𝐇𝐀𝐑𝐢𝐭  is the 3-month buy-and-hold Fama-French three-factor model adjusted returns at time t,  𝑪𝑶𝑵𝑺𝑰𝑺  (Consistency) is the 
length of the quarterly earnings change sequence of 1, 2,,,,,,,, 11, and 12 denoting earnings change sequences lasting 1 quarter, 2 consecutive 
quarters, 3 consecutive quarters, 11 consecutive quarters, 12 consecutive quarters etc.; 𝑺𝚫𝚬𝑷𝑺  is the change in annualised quarterly EPS 
(DeltaEPS) normalised by prior price, 𝑪𝑶𝑵𝑺𝑰𝑺 ∗ 𝑺𝚫𝚬𝑷𝑺 is  an interaction term measuring the interaction between Consistency and DeltaEPS, 𝑰𝑫𝒛  is 
a dummy variable which takes the value of one when information discreteness as measured by equation 4.5 is above its median value and takes zero 
otherwise, and 𝝐𝒕 is random error. The 𝑰𝑫𝒛  dummy captures the speed with which value relevant information enters price. The sample includes all the 
S&P500 constituent stocks from January 1991 to December 2006. The t-statistics are reported in parenthesis and ***, **, * indicates statistical 
significance at a 1%, 5%, and 10%confidence level. The reported t values are subject to robust heteroskedasticity correction following White (1980). 
 
 
 
  Intercept DeltaEPS Consistency Consis*𝑺∆𝐄𝐏𝐒  IDz N R
2 
𝐁𝐇𝐀𝐑𝐢𝐭 -0.828%***(-2.81) 3.940%***(3.25) 0.090%***(2.86) 1.380%***(5.61) 1.046%***(2.66) 23017 0.13 
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Table 4.12: Bayesian estimates of the main regression model 
 
The table presents the Bayesian estimates of the main regression in table 4.7. The 
regression model is 𝐁𝐇𝐀𝐑𝐢𝐭 =  𝜶 +  𝜷𝟏𝑪𝑶𝑵𝑺𝑰𝑺 + 𝜷𝟐𝑺𝚫𝚬𝑷𝑺 +  𝜷𝟑𝑪𝑶𝑵𝑺𝑰𝑺 ∗ 𝑺𝚫𝚬𝑷𝑺 +  𝝐𝒕.  
where 𝐁𝐇𝐀𝐑𝐢𝐭  is the 3-month buy-and-hold Fama-French three-factor model adjusted 
returns at time t,  𝑪𝑶𝑵𝑺𝑰𝑺  (Consistency) is the length of the quarterly earnings change 
sequence, 1, 2,,,,,,,,12 denoting earnings change sequences lasting 1 quarter, 2 consecutive 
quarters, 3 consecutive quarters, 12 consecutive quarters etc.; 𝑺𝚫𝚬𝑷𝑺  is the change in 
annualised quarterly EPS (DeltaEPS) normalised by prior price, 𝑪𝑶𝑵𝑺𝑰𝑺 ∗ 𝑺𝚫𝚬𝑷𝑺 is an 
interaction term measuring the interaction between Consistency and DeltaEPS, and 
𝝐𝒕 random error. The sample includes all the S&P500 constituent stocks from January 1991 
to December 2006. The Bayesian estimates show a weighted average of the investor’s prior 
distribution of the parameters and their sample means. The weights of the sample mean 
increase as the estimation sample grows. Initially, the weight placed on the various variables 
(Consistency, DeltaEPS, and Consis*𝑺∆𝐄𝐏𝐒) is set to zero, and this action is consistent with 
due scepticism about the ability of fundamentals to explain abnormal returns. The estimates 
of regression coefficients are taken at the 5%, 50%, and 95% points of distribution of the 
three-month buy-and-hold Fama-French three-factor model adjusted returns. 
 
 
Confidence Interval Intercept DeltaEPS Consistency Consis*𝑺∆𝐄𝐏𝐒 
5% -0.153% 1.137% 0.054% 0.442% 
50% -0.010% 1.786% 0.073% 0.569% 
95% 0.133% 2.426% 0.092% 0.699% 
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Figure 4.1: The distribution of a Bayesian and a quasi-Bayesian (Freddy) posterior 
prior of earnings 
Figure 4.1 below shows the distribution of expectations of a quasi-Bayesian investor 
(Freddy) as opposed to that of a Bayesian investor. For a Bayesian with a posterior 
probability of 1/6 for earnings rises immediately following a fall in quarterly earnings, 1/3 for a 
company recording no earnings change last quarter, and finally, ½ for consecutive quarterly 
rises, there is an analogous distribution of zero, 1/3, and 2/3 for the quasi-Bayesian (Freddy) 
investor. Therefore the overall impact of a belief in the law of small numbers is to shift the 
distribution of inferred posterior probabilities of earnings rightwards. This figure graphically 
represents this rightward shift in posterior probabilities. 
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Figure 4.2: The distribution of sequences of quarterly EPS rises and falls traced over 
12 quarters of data 
Figure 4.2 provides the histogram of the percentage frequency distribution of sequences of 
quarterly EPS change in my sample. The figure shows that the asymmetric and uneven 
distribution of quarterly earnings-per-share changes in my sample date is striking. About 
22% of the sample data derives from companies reporting quarterly earnings increases for at 
least three years or twelve quarters or more. 
 
 
  
0
5
1
0
1
5
2
0
P
e
rc
e
n
t
-10 -5 0 5 10
consistency
135 
 
Figure 4.3: The distribution of annualised quarterly EPS changes normalised by prior 
year end stock price 
Figure 4.3 shows the histogram of the percentage frequency distribution of raw annualised 
quarterly earnings changes normalised by prior price in the most recent quarter in my 
sample data. The distribution between quarterly earnings falls and rises is asymmetric and 
uneven. Quarterly earnings rises are much more common than quarterly earnings falls. The 
majority of my S&P500 companies seem to post incremental positive earnings quarter on 
quarter; about 62% of the quarterly earnings changes are very small in value and close to 
the zero point. This may be suggestive of some form of earnings management engaged in 
by managers to meet and beat targets, and this is well documented in the literature. 
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Figure 4.4: Mean EPS change by length of quarterly EPS rises and falls traced over 12 
quarters of data 
Figure 4.4 plots the means of annualised quarterly EPS changes over twelve quarters of 
consistent earnings rises and falls. The cumulatively larger nature of the repeated falls in 
quarterly EPS is very clear in the data while the scale of repeated quarterly earnings rises 
stabilises to smallish values for four quarters. Consistent quarterly declines in earnings seem 
to cumulate in fairly stable, possibly even manageable forms of corporate reporting in my 
sample data. 
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Figure 4.5: Mean three-month buy-and-hold Fama-French three-factor adjusted 
returns by Consistency 
Figure 4.5 shows the relation between the three-month buy-and-hold Fama-French three-
factor model adjusted returns and the quarterly earnings change sequences of increasing 
length, across losses/gains over three years’ duration. 
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Figure 4.6: Median three-month buy-and-hold Fama-French three-factor adjusted 
returns by Consistency 
Figure 4.6 simply reconstructs figure 4.5 using the median of the three-month buy-and-hold 
Fama-French three-factor model adjusted returns rather than the mean of the three-month 
buy-and-hold Fama-French three-factor model adjusted returns. The basic pattern of figure 
4.4 showing cumulative quarterly earnings falls becoming more dramatic in scale while 
cumulative quarterly earnings growth stabilise to small values is confirmed by figures 4.5 and 
4.6. This suggests that the pattern does not result from a few rogue, outlier observations 
which imply no broader trend in the data. 
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Chapter 5 
Post-earnings announcement drift, streaks of earnings surprises, information 
uncertainty, and the gambler’s fallacy 
5.1 Introduction 
In chapter 4, I introduced two theoretical models of earnings momentum (Barberis et al 
(1998), and Rabin (2002b)). I use the propositions of the models to show how sequences 
(streaks) of quarterly EPS rises and falls impact on stock returns34. In chapter 4, the 
quarterly EPS change metric used was measured in a way that captures the market impact 
of sequences of quarterly EPS through to the next year’s quarterly earnings announcement. 
The objective was to determine this impact and the subsequent earnings momentum in price 
within a medium-term window (three months). In this chapter, the fundamental hypotheses of 
the impact of sequences (streaks) of EPS changes on price in chapter 4, based mainly on 
Rabin (2002b), are extended further. Here, the focus is on testing the impact of streaks of 
earnings surprises (EPS rises and falls) on the S&P500 constituent companies’ stock returns 
in a shorter window around the quarterly EPS announcement date. In order to ensure that 
the price response to sequences of EPS changes is not limited to the earnings momentum 
metric in chapter 4, a variant metric of earnings momentum is introduced in this chapter. This 
metric captures the change in the representative investor’s expectation at earnings 
announcement in a different way. Here I calculate the change in a representative investor’s 
expectation (earnings surprise) of quarterly earnings by taking the difference between the 
actual quarterly earnings and monthly analyst forecast of quarterly earnings in the most 
current quarter normalised by the prior year end price. This metric allows the investor’s 
market expectations of earnings to reflect developments since the previous quarterly 
earnings announcement. I also test for how the interaction effect between streaks of 
earnings surprises and different information uncertainty proxies impacts on the stock market 
returns. The information uncertainty proxies and tests follow procedures in Zhang (2006a).  
There is a need to understand earnings momentum better, given the strong evidence that 
stock markets underreact to recent earnings news. Subsequently, investors are prone to 
overinfer from dramatic price movements resulting from underreaction to earnings news, and 
this leads them to make incorrect forecasts. Again, in this chapter, I employ the propositions 
of Rabin’s (2002b) model, as its predictions fit best with my data sample, as seen in the 
results of chapter 4. In addition, in this chapter, I examine further to see if the results of the 
model’s predictions in chapter 4 remain consistent when the earnings surprise metrics and 
the impact period tested are changed.  
                                                          
34
 Note: ‘streaks’ in this chapter and ‘sequences’ in chapter 4 are used interchangeably. 
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The important alteration made in this chapter is that the change in investors’ expectations 
(earnings surprise) for quarterly EPS outcomes is calculated using analysts’ consensus 
forecasts of EPS and the actual EPS, as reported by the I/B/E/S database. This metric of 
change in investors’ expectation is different from the metric used in chapter 4, which is 
based on the time series of reported actual quarterly earnings-per-share. This position on 
earnings momentum metrics has support in the finance literature. One such study is Livnat 
and Mendenhall (2006), who report that using two different earnings surprise metrics, one 
from analysts’ forecast of earnings and actual quarterly EPS from the I/B/E/S database and 
another from a time series model, they observe that patterns of returns around future 
earnings announcements are different when generated by the alternative metrics of 
investors’ earnings expectations. The authors conclude that the reason for this could be the 
fact that the two earnings surprise metrics are capturing different kinds of information about 
future quarterly EPS. So it will be interesting to see whether the two different metrics of 
earnings momentum and their streaks are able to capture earnings momentum in price 
according to Rabin’s (2002b) propositions. In this chapter, I introduce information uncertainty 
proxies as control variables. In addition, I use information uncertainty proxies and streaks of 
earnings surprises to create interaction variables. The choice of control variables is made 
against the backdrop of the fact that high or low information uncertainty about a firm’s 
quarterly EPS could impact upon returns around quarterly EPS announcement dates. I 
hypothesise that firms with high information uncertainty will exhibit larger earnings 
momentum on their returns around quarterly EPS announcement dates. This is because for 
this sub-sample of corporations, the earnings announcement resolves more uncertainty at 
that point in time than it does for low information uncertainty firms. 
Furthermore, in this chapter, the main hypothesis remains the overinference bias which 
shows how investors observing sequences (streaks) of EPS rises and falls may interpret a 
firm’s value incorrectly. How this behaviour consequently impacts on stock prices also 
remains fundamental in this chapter. In addition, I examine other hypotheses which include 
the impact of streaks of earnings surprises on stock price in the presence of different levels 
of uncertainty about the fundamental value of firms. For firms that consistently report 
quarterly EPS rises over long periods of time, one would expect the market to get used to 
their ‘earnings news’ and not be surprised when new confirming EPS outcomes are 
announced. In order words, the market’s reaction to the earnings announcements of such 
firms (if anything) is expected to be weak and muted. To examine this behaviour,  this 
chapter examines the impact that the information content of quarterly EPS has on price in 
the short window of three days – a time when the most recent earnings news hits the 
market. It is important to see how the market responds to the sudden change in investors’ 
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expectations once the most recent EPS is announced. The chapter also seeks to show 
whether the post-earnings announcement drift is a result of investors’ overinference from the 
information content of EPS with the arrival of earnings news. Additionally, the chapter seeks 
to understand whether subsequent market corrections following period of earnings 
momentum imply that investors have learnt the true nature of earnings news with the 
passage of time. Finally, it examines the valuation implications of information uncertainty 
around earnings announcements. It is well known that information uncertainty reduces the 
degree of anticipation of announced earnings and at the same time intensifies the response 
to earnings at the announcement date when uncertainty is partially or fully resolved. 
I include information uncertainty proxies as control variables because S&P500 constituent 
firms are large capitalised as well as very liquid firms, with all of the main analysts following 
them, so I expect any earnings momentum effect caused by sequences (streaks) of earnings 
rises and falls to be wiped away (or at least reduced substantially) by information 
uncertainties surrounding their fundamentals over time. This is more so because, as has 
been argued in the literature at various times, the test window employed here is very short. 
Analysts tend to follow those firms that investors wish to invest in more than the less popular 
firms. In other words, analysts tend to cover those firms that are consistently doing well or at 
least reporting good earnings outcomes; they do not usually cover firms that consistently 
produce poor results. Consequently, this means that investors and all market participants 
have more information on the firms that analysts follow, therefore there is less uncertainty 
about those firms’ fundamentals, and their stock price behaviour is less dramatic around 
quarterly earnings announcements and ameliorates any underreaction. So it is expected that 
firms with large analyst followings will be low information uncertainty firms. 
In a nutshell, the main objectives of this chapter are threefold. First, I calculate buy-and-hold 
Fama-French three-factor adjusted post-earnings announcement returns in a shorter widow 
of three days. This is in contrast to three months window applied in the chapter 4. The 
intention here is to examine the earnings momentum effect in a window that is as short as 
possible in order to eliminate contamination from sources other than the earnings 
announcement. Second, the earnings surprise metric used here is calculated using the 
consensus analysts’ forecast of quarterly EPS and actual quarterly EPS from the I/B/E/S 
database. Some authors argue that the consensus analysts’ forecast is a far better and more 
reliable measure of investors’ expectation of quarterly EPS than the time series of actual 
EPS35. This is because analysts adjust their forecast more often, usually on a monthly basis, 
thus continually incorporating new information into their forecasts. Furthermore, richer 
                                                          
35
 See Givoly and Lakonishok (1980, 1984), Livnat and Mendenhall (2006). 
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information sets from sources other than simple past EPS outcomes enter the forecast of 
next quarter’s earnings. Analysts incorporate such factors as technological and regulatory 
shifts in a company’s environment into their monthly forecasts. Third, six information 
uncertainty proxies are introduced as control variables for earnings momentum that is not 
associated with the most recent earnings shock. Through these three paths, I hope to show 
the robustness of my central argument in chapter 4 to various competing stories that might 
challenge its integrity.   
5.2 Related literature and hypothesis development 
Here I narrow down my literature review to those papers that are directly related to the 
hypotheses tested in this chapter. The section is obviously an extension of the broader 
literature review in chapter 2. The hypotheses tested in this chapter are derived following this 
literature review. 
5.2.1 Experimental evidence of responses to lengthening streaks of EPS rises and 
 falls 
Each of the competing models of investors’ underreaction/overreaction I reviewed in chapter 
2 offers compelling stories on how information about earnings changes might be assimilated 
into price. However, the models provide us with no idea as to whether investors really think 
like that in practice. Bloomfield and Hales (2002) provide evidence from laboratory 
experiments to show that when asked to predict the outcome of a random draw, most 
peoples’ forecasts are grounded in their observation of past reversions and continuations in 
the series. If they can see that the series have been subject to many reversals, they 
generally underreact to the most recent change, but if they observe an unbroken set of 
recent rises, or falls, they usually overreact to the most recent change. This is consistent 
with investors regarding repeated signals about the value as separating companies into ‘star’ 
and ‘dog’ categories. It is surprising that experimental subjects still behave in this manner 
even when they are told in advance that the series they observe is generated from a random 
process, that is, even when it is clear that inference based on past innovations in the series 
is irrational. 
Asparouhova, Hertzel, and Lemmon (2009) present a simple explanation of why the subjects 
in the Bloomfield and Hales (2002) experiments use past realisations of the process they 
observe to predict future outcomes. The authors argue that this is because the realisations 
that the subjects are presented with seem so unlikely to have been generated by a random 
process. Thus, even when they are told that they are predicting a random process, they do 
not believe they actually are. In correcting for this failure, they re-ran the Bloomfield and 
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Hales (2002) experiments, presenting subjects with eight past realisations of a random 
series that actually looks pretty random and asking them to predict the next outcome. When 
this is done, a pattern of biases far more consistent with Rabin’s (2002b) framework 
emerges. While initially subjects regard immediate past changes as a trend likely to reverse 
swiftly, however, if that trend continues, they came to regard it as indicative of the underlying 
value of the asset. So investors cycle between initial enchantment by the gambler’s fallacy 
(which for longer streaks presages the belief that changes they had regarded as transitory 
are, in fact, part of a broader trend of increasing/decreasing performance) and anticipation of 
reversal.  
5.2.2 Streaks of quarterly earnings surprises and investor returns 
A number of papers chronicle investor response to lengthening streaks of quarterly earnings 
rises and falls without attempting to invoke or confirm any broader theorisation of this 
empirical regularity. Thus, these papers try to infer a stock market response to earnings 
‘streakiness’ (a propensity to streaks in quarterly earning changes) regardless of its origin or 
rationale. Barth, Elliot and Finn (1999) document that corporations reporting streaks of 
quarterly earnings surprises of five years or more exhibit higher stock returns, and these 
returns are not explained by either greater expected earnings growth or by standard risk 
proxies. The authors show that companies reporting long streaks of quarterly earnings rises 
enjoy significantly higher earnings multiples in their price, while those that report a falling 
trend suffer significantly worse multiples of earnings for their price. This finding further 
weakens the market efficiency argument that public information is instantaneously 
assimilated into price. 
Frieder (2008) presents evidence concerning the type of trader that might be fuelling the 
emergence of momentum/underreaction regimes in prices. The author reports that at 
earnings announcement, as a streak of quarterly EPS rises lengthens, increasingly, a cohort 
of small trades typically associated with individual (possibly naïve) investors emerges in the 
market. The quarterly-earnings-change-chasing behaviour of investors executing small 
trades is costly for them, because the strategy yields significantly negative return. The 
persistence of momentum here may thus require that, as the saying goes “there is a noise 
trader born every minute” as successive generations of small traders get burned by larger 
and more sophisticated, larger trade, ‘smart-money’ traders. Frieder examines net order 
imbalances; this is the number of shares purchased compared to those sold by those trading 
small amounts of stocks and any response that may come from earnings surprises. If a 
series of quarterly earnings surprises is uncorrelated, as one would expect in an efficient 
market, they (streaks of earnings surprises) cannot influence order imbalances. However, 
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consistent with the predictions of the BSV model, Frieder finds that small traders make 
strongly significant net purchases just after streaks of positive earnings surprises 
commence, as compared to when a previous quarterly change is negative. Hence, investors 
tend to overextrapolate streaks of earnings performance when they observe consecutive 
EPS rises. In a more recent paper, Shanthikumar (2012) provides evidence showing similar 
trading patterns by small and large traders around earnings announcements. This study 
finds the relative intensity of small traders’ trading grows as the length of streaks of positive 
EPS change grow. It appears that investors who trade small volumes, are individual, and 
thus possibly naïve, investors who exhibit a strong preference for buying into stocks with 
lengthening streaks of good earnings performance. This form of ‘me too’ investment by 
smaller trade size investors seems a strong candidate to explain the observed earning 
momentum present in mature markets.  
5.2.3 Streaks of quarterly earnings surprises and the gambler’s fallacy 
There is a huge body of literature within market-based accounting research which discusses 
the scale and offers explanations for the existence of PEAD in stock returns. However a far 
smaller literature focuses on the market impact of streaks in quarterly EPS changes. Only a 
small number of researchers have specifically investigated the investor behaviour that the 
Rabin (2002b) model proposes. One of such papers is the Loh and Warachka (2012). The 
paper focuses on the stock market effect of lengthening streaks of earnings changes. 
Loh and Warachka (2012) examine the propositions of Rabin’s (2002b) model, which 
suggests that the gambler’s fallacy causes investors to underreact to streaks of earnings 
surprises. The authors find that streaks of earnings surprises explain about 54% of PEAD 
returns. The authors also find that earnings surprise reversals have no explanatory power in 
explaining PEAD. They find that a trading strategy which buys stocks with positive streaks of 
earnings surprises and sells stocks with negative streaks of earnings surprises yields a 
statistically significant four-factor adjusted return. In order to uncover such a profile in the 
stock market response to earnings surprises around earnings announcements, Loh and 
Warachka (2012) undertake two types of trading rule tests. In their first set of tests, portfolios 
are formed simply on the basis of the ‘streakiness’ of the company’s run of quarterly 
earnings announcements. Investors buy portfolios of companies that report confirming 
positive earnings surprises at the most recent earnings announcement, while they sell 
portfolios of stocks that reversed their lengthening streaks of positive earnings surprises in 
the most recent quarter earnings announcement. The authors report that this single-sort 
trading strategy yields a consistent average profit, even after reasonable controls for 
possible risk differences are made. It would appear that investors do indeed exhibit the 
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gambler’s fallacy / law of small numbers effect that Rabin’s (2002b) model envisages. The 
investors’ susceptibility to the gambler’s fallacy allows them to regard current earnings 
surprises as merely transitory, this behaviour being consistent with the gambler’s belief that 
‘my luck must change’. This belief triggers earnings momentum in prices that underpins the 
profitability of the strategy, which is based on segmenting stocks into portfolios based on 
their ‘streakiness’ in earnings. A second double-sort-based strategy implemented by first 
sorting by the scale of the earnings changes and later on the length of the streaks of 
quarterly earnings surprises does reveal investors’ exhibition of the gambler’s fallacy, 
triggering earnings-based momentum in price. Subsequently, the authors embed the 
predictive power of streaks of earnings surprises into a possible new valuation metric which 
they term the ‘streak factor’. The ‘streak factor’ is then deployed to explain the impact of 
successive earnings announcement results by examining the difference between returns 
earned by a portfolio of stocks enjoying a further quarterly earnings rise and a portfolio of 
stocks enduring a further quarterly earnings reversal. The streak factor explains more than 
half of the variation in the observed PEAD. The authors conclude that it is streaks of 
quarterly earnings surprises that explain PEAD and not simply the magnitude of quarterly 
earnings surprises or the reversal in earnings surprises. 
5.2.4 Earnings uncertainty and company valuation  
Earnings news is a numerical indication of the ‘fundamental’ company value, as opposed to 
the price. However, it also forms part of a broader ‘valuation story’ which companies, and 
especially their chief financial officers, tell the market (Holland 2004). Authors such as Zhang 
(2006a, 2006b) and Jiang et al (2005) devise empirical proxies to capture the degree of 
information uncertainty around stock value. The objective of both studies is to bring together 
evidence of the valuation implications of uncertainty concerning earnings outcomes. Such 
uncertainty reduces the degree of anticipation of announced earnings and hence 
exacerbates any response to earnings at the announcement date, when earnings 
uncertainty is partially or fully resolved. For more uncertain earnings announcements, 
investors need to work harder to assimilate the valuation implications of what is announced. 
Thus earnings-based anomalies thrive in these uncertainty-rich companies. Hence, it is 
possible to expect the most intense reactions as being to those earnings announcements 
that resolve the most uncertainty. This makes it important to control for earnings uncertainty 
in studying both the presence and persistence of earnings momentum around earnings 
announcements. 
The six information uncertainty proxies suggested by Zhang (2006a) are company size as 
measured by the market capitalisation, company age, coverage by analysts and the 
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dispersion of analysts’ forecast of earnings, the weekly excess stock return volatility of a 
company’s stock, and the volatility of the company’s cash-flows. High information uncertainty 
around earnings announcements gives a greater chance for biases in expectations to take 
hold and a sharper and stronger reaction to the resolution of the uncertainty such biases 
create. Each of these variables has featured in prior research concerning the market’s 
response to earnings information. Hence the value of this study lies in the integration of 
much of what is already known into a coherent and comprehensive framework for 
conditioning any anomalous market response upon variables known to capture earnings 
uncertainty. 
Asset price volatility has two aspects, and hence one may run the risk of conflating these two 
sources36 of risk, since variance of a firm’s signal about value, such as quarterly earnings, is 
characterised by the decomposition: 
𝑣𝑎𝑟 (𝑠) = 𝑣𝑎𝑟 (𝜈) + 𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑒) … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … . … … … … . (5.1) 
where 𝑣𝑎𝑟 (𝑠) denotes the variance of the signal about asset value and measures the overall 
amount of information uncertainty, 𝑣𝑎𝑟 (𝜈) is the firm’s underlying fundamental volatility and 
𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑒) captures the noise term reflecting the quality of information and the adequacy of 
earnings as a valuation signal in a market where many other factors hold sway (for example 
news about product innovation, technology and regulatory changes). 
Zhang (2006b) motivates his analysis of information uncertainty and its effect on the intensity 
of various behavioural anomalies with reference to theoretical models within the ‘noise 
trader’ tradition which have served as the workhorse model of behavioural finance37. In this 
chapter, I integrate the same concept of earnings uncertainty into the predictions of a model 
of the representative agent class, specifically the one by Rabin (2002b). By doing this, I hope 
to be able to generalise the applicability of this valuable area of empirical research. 
5.2.5 Hypothesis development 
Prior literature documents the impact of earnings announcements on stock market returns. A 
number of scholars have carefully tried to unravel the mystery behind the anomalies or 
regularities seen in stock returns just before and after company earnings announcements 
(see Chordia and Shivakumar (2006), Ball (1992)). What make research into some of those 
regularities so interesting are the persistent nature of the regularities and the profitability of 
some of the trading strategies based on them. 
                                                          
36
 See footnote 2 in Zhang (2006a) 
37
 See examples in; De Long, Shleifer, Summers and Waldmann (1990b), Daniel, Hirshleifer, and 
Subrahmanyam (1998). 
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PEAD is the phenomenon which shows that stocks with positive earnings surprises continue 
to show positive drifts in returns following a good news earnings announcement, while 
stocks with negative earnings surprises continue to a show negative drift in returns in the 
periods following their earnings announcement date. Some authors argue that this is a result 
of investors’ underreaction to earnings announcements. In other words, at the arrival of 
quarterly earnings news, investors and other market participants fail to fully incorporate the 
information contained in the current earnings news into stock prices. Put another way, 
investors fail to fully grasp the valuation implication of the information contained in the 
current earnings news for future earnings forecasts. Hence, the error from their forecasting 
models is what triggers the observed mispricing in stocks. The larger the size of this forecast 
error, the larger the subsequent PEAD that follows. Based on the underreaction line of 
argument, Rabin (2002b) and Rabin and Vayanos (2010) theorise that the gambler’s fallacy 
causes investors to underreact to trends. Investors underreact to trends because they 
expect trends to reverse rather than continue in the next time period. Investors expect the 
reversal of trend in order that the local distribution of earnings ‘balances out’ the opposing 
signal that has already been observed. This mistaken belief arises from the fact that the 
investors expect the observed sample of earnings signals to exhibit symmetry between 
positive and negative earnings surprise signals. In short, they succumb to the law of small 
numbers that the sample will exhibit all the characteristics of the population from which it is 
drawn. The failure of the earnings trend to reverse at the arrival of the most current earnings 
news causes the investor to underreact to the continuing trend. This investor underreaction 
to trends reinforces a continuation of trend in price rather than a reversal. Other theoretical 
models, such as the BSV model, posit that another form of cognitive bias known as the 
representativeness heuristic strengthens an investor’s belief that an earnings trend will 
continue. This belief manifests by showing that investors extrapolate far into the future, 
which causes an overreaction to recently observed price trends. The BSV model posits 
symmetry between the two opposing regimes of a trend and mean-reversion. This implies 
that the investor, without any form of empirical evidence, incorrectly believes that the 
distribution of earnings surprises will show a distinct division between these two regimes. 
This introduces further error into the investor’s forecasting model.  
In studying PEAD, researchers employ different metrics as a measure of the earnings 
surprises or the information content of earnings news. The change in investors’ earnings 
expectations at the arrival of quarterly earnings news, otherwise known as ‘earnings 
surprise’, provides the best measure of the earnings signal required for the study of PEAD 
(Ball and Bartov (1995), Foster et al (1984)). This is because, as the Rabin (2002b) and BSV 
(1998) models suggest, the sign of the previous earnings surprise will influence how 
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investors interpret the information contained in current earnings news. Some researchers 
employ earnings surprise as specified by analysts’ forecasts, while others use realised prior 
quarterly earnings series to calculate the measure. There are a number of reasons why the 
former metric is preferred over the latter in the literature. One reason is that the earnings 
surprises calculated by the analysts’ forecasts are less correlated than the realised earnings 
outcomes because analysts adjust their forecasts to incorporate earnings predictability. In 
addition to the reason above, I choose to employ the earnings surprise as defined by the 
analysts’ forecast in this chapter because as this earnings surprise measure has been widely 
reported elsewhere in literature, analysts tend to follow those firms that are large, well-
known, have established a reputation over the years, and have a track record of their stock 
performing well in the market. These characteristics are true of my S&P500 constituent 
companies sample frame, which is made up of stocks of large and very liquid companies 
and which almost certainly seed most money managers’ funds. For investors chasing these 
stocks, analysts’ forecast of earnings becomes the closest measure of investors’ expectation 
of the quarterly earnings performance of these companies.  
Although many studies examine the extent of the impact of earnings surprises as earnings 
signals on market returns, to my knowledge, only Loh and Warachka (2012) examine the 
empirical impact of streaks of earnings surprises on market returns. The authors do this by 
following the propositions of Rabin (2002b) of how the gambler’s fallacy may influence 
investors if they observe streaks of earnings surprises. In one of their earlier works, Griffin 
and Tversky (1992) observe that individuals assign more weight to information in consistent 
multi-year patterns of either earnings rises or falls than to the information in mere isolated 
quarterly earnings news. This observation indeed gives more credence to the notion that 
streaks of earnings surprises might be a credible candidate to explain stock returns. The 
theoretical models of Rabin (2002b) and BSV are rather silent on the level of impact that 
individual quarterly earnings surprises have on return continuation. Both models, however, 
dwell heavily on the impact that the streaks of either positive or negative earnings surprises 
have on short-run return continuation.  
In this chapter, the first two hypotheses examine the relation between streaks of earnings 
surprises, temporal reversals in earnings streaks and PEAD. The efficient market hypothesis 
states that public news about firms is instantaneously assimilated into the price. If relevant 
value information is assimilated into price instantaneously, then there will be no post-
earnings announcement drift. Here I test whether there is significant association between 
streaks of earnings surprises and PEAD in one hand and temporary reversals in streaks of 
earnings surprises and PEAD on the other. Rabin (2002b) proposes a significant association 
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between streaks of earnings surprises and the PEAD. Following the above lines of 
argument, I derive the first and second hypotheses of this chapter as follows: 
H1: The streaks of earnings surprise and reversals do not have a significant impact on 
PEAD. 
H2: The streaks of positive (negative) earnings surprises do not have a positive (negative) 
association with PEAD. 
In this chapter, I once more explore the propositions of Rabin (2002b) on how the gambler’s 
fallacy impacts upon stock market returns by influencing a representative investor who 
employs the incorrect model in forecasting future earnings. This belief causes the investor to 
believe in a false premise of a likely reversal of a trend in the short term. Because he is 
quasi-Bayesian, he is unable to recognise his mistaken belief, which says that the model 
generating the process of earnings is static and that once a particular signal is drawn in the 
current period, the chance of drawing the same signal in the next period is reduced. The 
representative investor does not recognise that the earnings-generating process is a 
completely random process (at least in theory). The gambler’s fallacy triggers underreaction 
in investors, which leads to the momentum (post-earnings announcement drift) exhibited by 
stock returns in the short run. However, since the gambler’s fallacy can influence the 
investor, inducing him to make errors in predictions after observing short streaks of positive 
or negative earnings signals, it is crucial to see how this behaviour changes as the streaks 
grow even longer, hence the third hypothesis. It is important to know whether the 
representative investor in the Rabin and BSV models exhibits any form of learning as the 
streaks of earnings surprises lengthen, thus: 
H3: Short streaks of positive earnings surprises do not earn more positive abnormal returns 
than short streaks of negative earnings surprises. Long streaks of negative earnings 
surprises do not earn more significant abnormal returns than long streaks of positive 
earnings surprises. 
Hypothesis 3 follows from the Rabin proposition that after the initial runs of positively 
correlated earnings surprises leading up to positive drift in returns, a correction phase 
follows which reverses the initial drift in positive or negative abnormal returns. 
Furthermore, I examine the impact of information uncertainty on PEAD under the influence 
of the gambler’s fallacy as the investor observes the lengthening streaks of positive or 
negative earnings surprises. At the quarterly earnings announcement, high information 
uncertainty will increase the level of underreaction from investors, while low information 
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uncertainty will do the reverse. This means that unconditional information uncertainty will 
have a negative correlation with returns – high uncertainty stocks yield lower future returns 
than low information uncertainty stocks (Zhang 2006a). In contrast to this, high (low) 
information uncertainty in the presence of a confirming streak of earnings surprises will see a 
larger (smaller) drift in returns than unconditional information uncertainty. Information 
uncertainty could be said to encompass any information which increases the level of 
ambiguity around the true value of any security. The investor searching through the financial 
statements of a firm has a mass of information to process and assimilate. This requires the 
investor to be able to interpret accurately what the financial figures actually represent in 
terms of firm value. Often, most of this information is hardly assigned any numerical value 
and the investor is saddled with the onerous task of making out what value should be 
assigned to the information in the companies’ financial statements. Zhang (2006a, 2006b) 
documents that high information uncertainty exacerbates stock market underreaction and 
overreaction in the face of significant earnings news. I seek to examine the impact of 
information uncertainty on PEAD in the presence of lengthening streaks and temporary 
reversals of earnings surprises. I therefore put forward that: 
H4: Information uncertainty does not have a positive association with returns.   
H5: Conditional upon significant good or bad news, high (low) information uncertainty does 
not have a positive (negative) association with PEAD. 
The nature of the interaction effect between information uncertainty and streaks of earnings 
surprises on PEAD will depend on a number of conditions. First, the nature of the 
information uncertainty variable involved is crucial. Increases in the information uncertainty 
variables such as age, analysts following, and firm size are expected to have an attenuating 
effect on PEAD. High levels of these information uncertainty proxies (age, firm size, and 
analysts following) unconditionally predict lower PEAD, since the ambiguity surrounding a 
company’s value tends to diminish as these proxies of information uncertainty grow. On the 
other hand, rises in other idiosyncratic (specific) firm-level uncertainties such as the 
dispersion of analysts’ forecasts, company cash-flow, and excess return volatilities 
exacerbate PEAD in the direction of the confirming earnings surprise. Information 
uncertainty reduces the degree of anticipation of announced earnings, inducing a larger 
earnings surprise at the earnings announcement date when that earnings uncertainty is 
resolved, thus:   
H6: Conditional upon streaks of earnings surprises, high information uncertainty does not 
exacerbate PEAD in the same direction as the confirming surprises. Therefore, high 
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information uncertainty conditional upon long streaks of positive (negative) earnings 
surprises does not produce a strong positive (negative) drift in returns. 
H7: PEAD trading strategies do not earn higher abnormal returns when streaks of positive 
earnings surprises are conditioned upon high information uncertainty stocks than on low-
information uncertainty stocks.  
5.3 Main empirical results 
5.3.1 Sample descriptive statistics  
Panels A to D of table 5.1 describe the variables of interest used in this chapter. Panel A 
provides the distribution of streaks of earnings surprises and temporary reversals across the 
sample period (1991 to 2006). A sequence of earnings surprises is defined as a streak if 
there are at least two consecutive earnings surprises of the same sign. On the other hand, a 
temporary reversal happens when a sequence of positive or negative streaks is terminated 
by the arrival of an earnings surprise of the opposite sign. The number of streaks across the 
entire sample ranges between 43% and 59% per year. This distribution clearly shows that 
streaks of earnings surprises are terminated more often in the sample of S&P500 companies 
when the earnings surprise metric is constructed using the difference between analysts’ 
consensus of forecast of earnings for the next quarter and actual earnings figures. This is in 
sharp contrast to the distribution of sequences of EPS changes in chapter 4. Again, in 
contrast to what we see here, there are certainly more temporary reversals when compared 
to chapter 4, where changes in earnings expectations are constructed using the historical 
data of quarterly earnings realisations. Panel B reports the difference in firm’s characteristics 
such as size, book-to-market, past returns, age, analyst coverage, stock volatility, and cash-
flow volatility company/quarters characterised by streaks and those exhibiting temporary 
reversals of earnings surprises. The differences between the streak and reversal portfolios 
are statistically significant. This indicates that the impact of streaks on PEAD by far 
outweighs that of temporary reversals. These firm characteristics are used as information 
uncertainty proxies in later sections and measure the impact of information uncertainty on 
returns when conditioned on streaks of earnings surprises. 
Panel C of table 5.1 shows more detailed descriptive statistics for the variables of interest. 
The Consistency variable consists of all of the negative and positive streaks of earnings 
surprises and temporary reversals. This table shows the longest positive and negative 
streaks to be of twelve quarters in length. BHAR is the three-day buy-and-hold Fama-French 
three-factor adjusted post-earnings announcement returns with a mean of 0.02% and a 
median of 0.01% which an indication of a slight negative skewness in the distribution. The 
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US S&P500 index covers larger firms at the very top end of the US listed firms; however, 
there is a wide variation in the size of the individual constituent companies. The market 
capitalisation of the companies in my sample ranges from 2.40 million to 499 billion dollars. 
The age of the companies in the index ranges between one and twenty years. There is a 
balance of old and young companies in the index and this must be a result of the fact that 
qualifying new companies are added simultaneously to the index while old ones, falling 
below the acceptable performance threshold of the index, are deleted. Thus there is a 
gradual, if partial, churn in the constituents of the S&P500 index over time. The mean stock 
return volatility (SVOL) is 5% with a median of 3.7% per week.  
Panel D shows the correlation coefficients matrix for the variables. The Pearson correlation 
is shown above the diagonal while the Spearman is shown below. BHAR and 
CONSISTENCY have a substantial positive correlation (Pearson = 0.13 and Spearman = 
0.12). This indicates a positive relation between PEAD and streaks of earnings surprises. 
The correlation coefficients between company size, analyst coverage, and company age are 
all positive, and this may be an indication that they capture the same type of information. 
Weekly stock return volatility (SVOL) and analyst forecast dispersion (AFORD) have a 
positive correlation (Pearson = 0.002 and Spearman = 0.16) and a weak positive correlation 
with cash-flow volatility (CVOL) (Pearson = 0.01 and Spearman = 0.01). 
5.3.2 The distribution of streaks of earnings surprises and temporary reversals 
Table 5.2 and figure 5.1 show the frequency distribution of streaks of negative and positive 
earnings surprises among the S&P500 constituent companies sample.  The table shows a 
distribution consisting of 51% positive and negative streaks and 49% temporary positive and 
negative reversals. From table 5.2, within the streaks of earnings surprises, 67.85% are 
positive streaks whereas a considerable lower number (32.15%) are negative streaks. This 
distribution follows a similar pattern to that seen in chapter 4. My S&P500 sample companies 
obviously report continuations in quarterly EPS rises far more than they report continuations 
in quarterly EPS falls (continuations in positive earnings surprises are more than double the 
number of continuations in negative earnings surprises). Table 5.2 shows that reporting of 
long streaks of earnings surprises is less dramatic when earnings surprises are calculated 
using analysts’ forecasts than when historical quarterly earnings are used. Only 2.72% of my 
sample companies report positive earnings surprise streaks extending to twelve quarters. 
Even fewer companies report declines in quarterly EPS for twelve consecutive quarters 
(0.4% of the total sample companies). This is not surprising, as companies that report 
declining quarterly EPS for three years or more are likely to be deleted from the index and 
may face bankruptcy. The trend here shows that companies which persistently report rising 
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or falling streaks in quarterly EPS are less dramatic and such streaks are shorter than seen 
in chapter 4. Still, a considerable number of companies report positive streaks of earnings 
surprises of between two and six quarters in length. This is more than negative streaks of 
the same lengths reported over the same period. Interestingly, this table and figure 5.1 show 
that 49% of the time, companies report temporary negative and positive reversals. Again, 
this indicates that with analyst forecasts, information about the true meaning of earnings is 
incorporated into the price more quickly and accurately, hence there are more streak 
reversals when compared with the historical earnings metric, which shows more 
continuations than reversals. There are 52.1% negative reversals (when a growing streak of 
negative earnings surprises is terminated by the most recent positive earnings surprise) and 
47.9% positive reversals (when a growing trend of positive earnings surprise ends). It is 
evident from the above that the sample companies are more likely to reverse a negative 
trend than a positive trend. Various authors argue that there are a number of reasons why 
firms seem to report more earnings rises than falls. Some researchers believe that this high 
likelihood for firms to report quarterly EPS rises may be a result of earnings management by 
managers to meet or beat current analysts’ earnings expectations38. Others believe that 
analysts receive incentives from managers and therefore their forecasts of earnings are 
more likely to be kept ‘intentionally’ low so as to create a positive earnings surprise at the 
earnings announcement date. Here earnings expectations are managed down to induce a 
share price bounce on the day on which earnings beat analysts’ deflated expectations. The 
resulting streaks of positive earnings surprises generate earnings momentum in stock 
returns for such companies39. In other words, as documented in the literature, markets 
reward companies with earnings outcomes which continually beat the analysts’ forecasts of 
earnings more than other companies with the same level of earnings forecast error but which 
failed to meet expectations40. Loh and Warachka (2012) reports that earnings surprises 
streaks of more than ten quarters are not frequent in their sample’s distribution of streaks. 
This is consistent with the findings in the distribution of my sample earnings surprises 
streaks. 
Although there is a clear similarity between the distributions of streaks of earnings surprises 
in this chapter and the distribution of sequences of EPS changes in chapter 4, there are 
some clear distinctions between them. In chapter 4, there are far more positive continuations 
in EPS changes than there are reversals while in this chapter, there are more positive 
continuations in earnings surprises than negative continuations. Besides that, there are far 
                                                          
38
 See Bartov, Givoly and Hayn (2002), Kross, Ro and Suk (2011). 
39
 See Chan, Karceski and Lakonishok (2007), Cen, Hilary and Wei (2013). 
40
 See Bartov, Givoly and Hayn (2002). 
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more temporary reversals in earnings surprises when analysts’ forecasts of earnings are 
used in constructing the earnings surprise metric.  
5.3.3 PEAD, streaks of earnings surprises and temporary reversals 
Figure 5.2 shows a plot of the mean of three-day PEAD returns against the Consistency 
variable. The figure shows that Consistency in the sign of earnings surprises explains three-
day buy-and-hold abnormal returns around the quarterly earnings announcement date. I test 
hypotheses 1 and 2 in this section to examine the relation between streaks of earnings 
surprises, temporary reversals, and the PEAD drift in the three days around earnings 
announcement date. The tests are shown in 13 different regression models in table 5.3. The 
results in table 5.3 show that in all the models tests, streaks of earnings surprises in my 
S&P500 sample explain the three-day buy-and–hold Fama-French three-factor adjusted 
returns around the earnings announcement date. The table results show that even in 
multivariate regression with other covariates, the streaks of earnings surprises maintain their 
explanatory power for PEAD. By increasing the length of the streaks of earnings surprises by 
one unit, PEAD returns increased by 0.21%, and this is statistically significant at the 1% 
confidence level. This result is consistent with the finding of Loh and Warachka (2012). 
There is no significant relationship between the magnitude of earnings surprises and the 
PEAD drift across the models tests here. This finding is consistent with both the BSV (1998) 
and Rabin (2002b) models which state that it is the sequences of earnings surprises rather 
than their magnitudes that investors look at to extract information about earnings at earnings 
announcement. In table 5.3, model 3 shows Consistency in earnings surprises (which is a 
proxy containing the sequences of all the streaks and temporary reversals in earnings 
surprises in the most recent quarter) and the magnitude of earnings surprises (ESURP) as 
covariates; Consistency explains 0.018% (t-value = 2.09) of the three-day buy-and-hold 
abnormal returns, while ESURP explains just 0.011% (t-value = 0.54) of the abnormal 
returns, which is insignificant. Again, this result shows that various lengths of earnings 
streaks and temporary reversals are far better explanatory variables than mere magnitude of 
quarterly earnings surprises. However, in model 4 of the same table, Consistency in 
earnings surprises loses its explanatory power in a multivariate regression with the streaks 
of earnings surprises. Again, this suggests that in explaining PEAD returns, the length and 
the sign of earnings surprises streaks are more important than temporary reversals. 
Investors react differently to streaks of positive earnings surprises and streaks of negative 
earnings surprises. Investors also perceive short streaks as ‘surprises’, hence their strong 
price reactions, while responses to longer streaks are more muted. From table 5.3, it is 
evident that the streaks in earnings surprises show a positive relation with PEAD in all of the 
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models tests. This finding is consistent with the finding of Loh and Warachka (2012), who 
report that trading strategies based on streaks of earnings surprises are profitable.  
In models 8 and 9 I also test for the impacts of positive and negative streaks on PEAD 
respectively. From the results, S&P500 companies with a minimum of positive earnings 
surprises in two consecutive quarters earn an abnormal return of 0.25% (t-value = 3.34), 
which is statistically significant at a 1% confidence level. On the other hand, companies with 
negative streaks in earnings surprises earn a negative three-day abnormal return of -0.10%.  
Although this performance by companies with negative streaks of earnings surprises is 
statistically significant at a 10% level, they are much more muted when compared with those 
of companies with positive streaks in earnings surprises. This finding is also related to the 
findings of Loh and Warachka (2012), who observe that trading strategies that buy stocks 
with positive streaks in earnings surprises and sell stocks with negative surprises in earnings 
surprises are profitable. When a positive (negative) streak in earnings surprises is 
terminated by the arrival of a negative (positive) earnings surprise in the most recent quarter, 
a positive (negative) reversal occurs. S&P500 companies that break their positive earnings 
surprises streaks by reporting a negative earnings surprise earn negative three-day buy-and-
hold Fama-French three-factor adjusted post-earnings announcement returns of -0.18%, 
which is highly significant at a 1% confidence level. This finding is consistent with that 
reported in Bartov, Elliott, and Finn (1999). On the other hand, companies with negative 
reversals in earnings surprises also earn negative abnormal returns which are statistically 
significant but more muted than returns from positive reversals. This finding contradicts the 
findings of Loh and Warachka (2012) that reversals in earnings surprises do not significantly 
explain stock returns.  The reason for this difference in findings between my work and that of 
Loh and Warachka (2012) may lie in the type of sample used. My S&P500 sample 
comprises companies that have high market capitalisation and are highly liquid. They have 
large numbers of analysts and investors following them. It is therefore not surprising to see 
that the market’s reactions are almost instantaneous when streaks of earnings surprises are 
terminated. Companies in which positive streaks are terminated at the most recent earnings 
announcement date seem to receive a negative reaction from the market. On the other 
hand, companies that turn a leaf with a positive earnings surprise in the most recent 
earnings announcement date do not attract such a dramatic reaction from the market. The 
markets seems to underreact more when a negative streak in earnings surprises is 
terminated than when a positive streak in earnings surprises is terminated. This behaviour is 
likely to be related to one of the key assumptions of the BSV (1998) model, which is that 
investors believe that negative trends in earnings are less likely to reverse. Investors under 
the gambler’s fallacy also wrongly believe that a particular trend will continue, therefore any 
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reversal that occurs in the future (trend) is adjudged to be transitory. In models 3 and 6, I find 
no significant relation between the interaction parameters of Consistency in earnings 
surprise and the recorded magnitude of the earnings surprise, and the PEAD. There is also 
no significant relation between the interaction parameters (of streaks of earnings surprises 
and magnitude of earnings surprises) and PEAD in models 7, 12, and 13. 
5.3.4 The impact of various lengths of streaks of earnings surprise on PEAD 
In section 5.3.3 above, the various test analyses show that streaks of earnings surprises 
explain the three-day Fama-French three-factor adjusted returns. In this section, I test 
hypothesis 3 to understand how investors and the market respond to lengthening streaks of 
earnings surprises. Also, as discussed in section 5.2.2, various papers in the literature 
document41 that companies that report increasing earnings (quarter on quarter) enjoy market 
goodwill, while companies with continuous declining quarterly earnings seem to be punished 
by the market with a decline in their share price. It is therefore pertinent to investigate this 
investor behaviour towards different streak lengths around the quarterly earnings 
announcement. This will give a better insight into the informativeness of earnings surprise 
streaks around the earnings announcement date.  
I begin this section by analysing the various impacts of lengthening of positive and negative 
streaks of earnings surprises on PEAD. I test three models each in panel A and B of table 
5.4 to examine the impacts of streak lengths of positive and negative earnings surprises 
respectively on PEAD. Panels A and B of table 5.4 show the results of the effect of 
lengthening positive and negative streaks of earnings surprises. The results here support the 
propositions of Rabin’s (2002b) and Rabin and Vayanos’ (2010) models. In panel A, shorter 
sequences of positive streaks of earnings surprises of between two and four quarters seem 
to trigger positive PEAD in my S&P500 companies sample (0.023% with t-value = 7.72). 
However, when positive streak lengths grow to between five and eight consecutive earnings 
surprises, the intensity of the underreaction becomes weaker. Although the level of three-
day Fama-French adjusted returns generated is still positive and significant (0.011% with t-
value = 3.65), it is less significant than that generated by short streaks of between two and 
four quarters. As the streak lengthens even further to between nine and twelve quarters, the 
impact of the streaks upon abnormal returns becomes muted and is not statistically 
significant. In panel B, I test the impact of lengthening negative streaks of earnings surprises 
on PEAD. The results follow the same pattern seen with the different lengths of positive 
streaks, albeit with the opposite impact on the three-day abnormal returns. Short streaks of 
negative earnings surprises of lengths of between two and four quarters generate a 
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 See Myers, Myers, and Skinner (2007). 
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significant negative abnormal return (-0.001% with t-value = -2.24). Further lengthening of 
negative streaks of between five and eight quarters generate PEAD returns that are still 
negative and more statistically significant (-0.003% with t-value = -3.89). Finally, companies 
reporting falling earnings outcomes consistently for nine to twelve quarters generate positive 
and statistically significant abnormal returns (0.009% with t-value = 6.76). One point is clear 
from the results in panel A and B of table 5.4: the market and investors seem to reward 
companies that report positive earnings surprises and punish those that report negative 
earnings surprises. The results also seem to suggest that there is some learning going on as 
investors observe lengthening streaks of positive and negative earnings surprises. 
Companies reporting long streaks of positive earnings surprises may run the risk of losing 
some of their integrity in the likely event that investors are no longer ‘surprised’ when there is 
yet another positive earnings surprise when the quarterly earnings are announced. For the 
companies that fall into this category, investors do not struggle to work out the true value of 
their earnings and its subsequent impact on prices in the days and weeks following the 
earnings announcement date. This may be the reason why abnormal returns to streaks of 
positive earnings surprises of nine quarters and longer generate muted and statistically not 
significant returns. On the other hand, companies reporting declining earnings consistently 
for nine quarters and longer seem to pay a premium to investors holding on to their stocks. 
These results confirm my third hypothesis. This makes sense, as the liquidation risk faced by 
this sub-sample of firms must be seen as considerable by their remaining equity investors. 
The results are consistent with the gambler’s fallacy effect of Rabin’s (2002b) model and hot-
hand fallacy of Rabin and Vayanos’ (2010) model. Short streaks generate significant PEAD, 
while a reversal in returns is triggered by longer streaks of earnings surprises. Loh and 
Warachka (2012) report a different behaviour in the response of stock returns to lengthening 
streaks of earnings surprises. The authors report that the response of stock returns to 
increasing lengths of streaks of earnings surprises intensifies as the streaks grow longer. 
The authors posit that the effect of the gambler’s fallacy on investors seems to persist, as 
investors are confident that the streaks they observe will continue. The authors also report 
that the response of PEAD to the streak length does not support the claims of Rabin and 
Vayanos (2010), who propose that this behaviour is a result of the hot-hand fallacy opposing 
the gambler’s fallacy. 
Panels C and D of table 5.4 show parallel results (tests for robustness) from the pooled OLS 
regressions and these support my initial results in panels A and B of table 5.4 respectively. 
The results reported in both panels A and B are obtained from a panel data regression 
analysis. 
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5.3.5 PEAD and information uncertainty 
In this section, I test hypothesis 4 and examine the relation between PEAD and information 
uncertainty. The different levels of proxies for information uncertainty surrounding the 
fundamentals of stocks around earnings announcement dates are sorted into five quintile 
portfolios with two extremes of high and low information uncertainties. The portfolio of high 
(low) information uncertainty stocks includes those stocks that have large (small) ambiguity 
surrounding their true values at earnings announcement dates. Usually, high (low) 
information uncertainty stocks are those with small (large) analyst following, small (large) 
firm size, i.e. based on market capitalisation, young (old) companies, large (small) dispersion 
in analysts’ forecasts, high (low) stock return volatility, and high (low) cash-flow volatility. 
Table 5.5 shows the results of a one-way sort based on a three-day abnormal return by 
information uncertainty proxies. I sort the stocks into five portfolios with stocks of low (high) 
information uncertainty at the top (bottom) of the table. The results show that portfolios of 
high information uncertainty stocks have lower average abnormal returns than portfolios of 
low information uncertainty stocks. The average zero-investment portfolio (high quintile – low 
quintile) return of -0.013% (t-value of -0.88) is negative and not statistically significant. My 
result here is consistent with the finding of Zhang (2006a) who also points out that Jiang et al 
(2005) report statistically significant negative results for similar tests. Zhang (2006a) 
attributes the disparity between his finding and that of Jiang et al (2005) to the difference in 
the holding period of portfolios in the two studies. Zhang posits that a portfolio with a longer 
holding period most likely will yield a negative and significant result as the initial market 
response unwinds in the long term. From table 5.5, all of the trading strategies that are long 
in stocks of high information uncertainty and short in stocks of low information uncertainty 
produce negative and not statistically significant abnormal returns. The reason for this might 
be that the arrival of earnings news brings about a partial resolution of the uncertainties 
surrounding a company’s fundamental value; hence there is no dramatic price response 
from high uncertainty stocks. Therefore unconditional low uncertainty stocks have higher 
returns than unconditional high uncertainty stocks. As Odean (1998) observes, investors 
usually overestimate prices when information about them is inconclusive. Zhang (2006a) 
also further argues that the evidence showing that low information uncertainty stocks have 
higher future returns than high information uncertainty stocks does not support the argument 
that information uncertainty is a cross-sectional risk factor that needs to be compensated for 
with higher returns. Diether et al (2002) and Boehme et al (2006) both argue that information 
uncertainty may lead to divergence of opinion among investors, which could lead to further 
mispricing. Consistent with my results here, Diether et al (2002) report that using dispersion 
in analysts’ forecasts and stock return volatility as proxies, high uncertainty stocks earn 
159 
 
future lower returns than low uncertainty stocks. The authors use analysts’ earnings forecast 
dispersion as a proxy for differences in opinion amongst investors about a stock.  
In order to further establish that there is post earnings announcement drift in my sample; I 
employ another metric. I use the metric (MRET) which is a cumulative past eleven months 
stock returns. I use this metric because it captures the drift in price (returns) generated by 
the earnings news. The results are shown in column 8 of Panel A in table 5.5. I sort stocks 
into five portfolios based on the previous 11-month cumulative returns showing extreme past 
loser and winner portfolios in the low and high deciles respectively. The past winner portfolio 
outperforms the past loser portfolio by a margin of 0.126% (t-value of 6.66) in the three-day 
buy-and-hold Fama-French 3-factor model adjusted returns. This further strengthens my 
argument of existence of PEAD in returns. 
5.3.5.1 PEAD, information uncertainty, and streaks of earnings surprises 
The evidence in the finance literature shows that information uncertainty conditional on the 
nature of news has a positive correlation with post-news drift. Zhang (2006a) reports that 
post-news price drift increases with information uncertainty for good news events. Using 
news-based proxies (such as analyst forecast revisions and past stock returns), the author 
shows that under the influence of information uncertainty, good news stocks earn higher 
returns than bad news stocks. The author also show that a trading strategy that buys (sells) 
good (bad) news/high information uncertainty stocks is more profitable than an alternative 
strategy that buys (sells) good (bad) news/low information uncertainty stocks. I test 
hypothesis 5 in this section. 
Following Zhang’s (2006a, 2006b) procedures, I choose the same information uncertainty 
proxies, such as a firm’s market capitalisation (MV), age (number of years since a company 
was added to the S&P500 stock index), analyst coverage (ACOV) (number of analysts 
following a firm), analyst forecast dispersion (AFORD), company’s cash-flow volatility 
(CVOL), and the company’s weekly excess stock volatility (SVOL). However, in a slight 
departure from Zhang’s (2006a, 2006b) procedure, I test for the impact of information 
uncertainty on the returns of companies with positive and negative streaks of earnings 
surprises over twelve quarters around the most recent earnings announcement date. Here, 
good news companies are those with confirming positive streaks in earnings surprises in the 
most recent quarterly earnings announcement, whereas the reverse is true for bad news 
companies. I test for the extent of the influence of high and low information uncertainties by 
allowing for interaction between each of them and the positive and negative earnings 
surprises streaks. I also test for the profitability of trading strategies that are based on high 
and low information uncertainties conditional upon positive or negative streaks of earnings 
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surprises as separate discrete characteristics. I start by sorting my sample stocks into those 
with positive and negative earnings surprise streaks. Subsequently, I sort each of the two 
groups of stocks into those of high and low information uncertainty. The median of each of 
the information uncertainty proxies is used as a cut-off point between low and high 
information uncertainty. Information uncertainty values above (below) the median value are 
treated as high (low). Table 5.6 shows the result of the test analyses.  
The results in table 5.6 show that information uncertainty when conditional upon the nature 
of news is positively correlated with returns around earnings announcement dates. This 
follows an exactly similar pattern to those we see in other studies in the finance literature. 
The ‘news’ in my case here is the confirmation of either a continuation of a positive or 
negative streak of earnings surprises, or otherwise, at the earnings announcement date. 
However, the relation as shown in the results of table 5.6 slightly differs from Zhang’s 
(2006a) results. This disparity between my results and Zhang’s particularly occurs when the 
information uncertainty proxies interact with positive streaks of earnings surprises. The 
double sort of the PEAD returns by information uncertainty proxies and positive streaks of 
earnings surprises show a marked increase in three-day abnormal returns. Sorting by 
companies’ market capitalisation (market value) and positive streaks of earnings surprises 
show that lowly capitalised companies (high information uncertainty companies) generate 
three-day abnormal returns of 0.038% (t-value = 3.45) while low information uncertainty 
companies (large capitalised companies) generate not statistically significant abnormal 
returns of 0.0008%. Similarly, sorting by company age and positive streaks of earnings 
surprises shows that high information uncertainty stocks generate three-day abnormal 
returns of 0.040% (t-value = 3.65) while low information uncertainty companies generate not 
statistically significant three-day abnormal returns of 0.005%. Sorting by analyst coverage of 
companies and cash-flow volatility with positive streaks of earnings surprises, high 
uncertainty stocks generate statistically significant three-day abnormal returns of 0.027% (t-
value = 2.37) and 0.031% (t-value = 2.43) respectively. However, sorting both weekly excess 
stock return volatility and analysts’ forecast dispersion by positive streaks of earnings 
surprises, high uncertainty stocks generate positive, but not statistically significant, three-day 
abnormal returns of 0.012% and 0.021% respectively.  
Sorting the information uncertainty proxies with streaks of negative earnings surprises shows 
no discernible pattern. Amongst the six information uncertainty proxies employed, only 
market capitalisation, cash-flow volatility, and analyst coverage (proxying for high information 
uncertainty) generate positive and statistically significant three-day abnormal returns with 
streaks of negative earnings surprises. The reason why streaks of negative earnings 
surprises under the influence of high information uncertainty earn positive abnormal returns 
161 
 
could be that investors who hold onto the stocks of these companies with declining earnings 
for many quarters can exert a premium for the liquidation risk they must increasingly bear. 
An interesting finding here is that none of the trading strategies involving buying (selling) 
high (low) information uncertainty stocks with negative streaks of earnings surprises is 
profitable, suggesting that once we control for common risk factors, informational arbitrage 
(based on these six information uncertainty proxies) is ineffective within the S&P500 during 
my sample period.  
Employing trading strategies that buy (sell) high (low) uncertainty stocks with streaks of 
positive earnings surprises generates positive and statistically significant three-day abnormal 
returns only when age and market capitalisation are used as information uncertainty proxies. 
Other trading strategies involving buying (selling) high uncertainty stocks with positive 
(negative) earnings streaks earn not statistically significant positive abnormal returns. 
However, those involving buying (selling) low uncertainty stocks with streaks of positive 
(negative) earnings surprises earn negative abnormal returns with all of the six information 
uncertainty proxies, but this is only statistically significant when market capitalisation and 
age are used as proxies for information uncertainty. 
The above results could be interpreted in a number of ways. First, it seems that to the 
investors in the S&P500 companies, the two most important factors determining the degree 
of information uncertainty reflected in a sample company’s stock returns are the number of 
years the company has ‘survived’ in the index and the company’s size. Before being 
admitted into the index, companies have to pass rigorous benchmark performance 
indicators42 and have to stay above the index’s acceptable performance thresholds in order 
to remain within it. It seems that investors view favourably those companies that stay within 
the index for a considerable length of time. This is a form of the well-known ‘familiarity 
breeds investment’ principle or what the psychologists Gerd Gigerenzer and Daniel 
Goldstein denote as the ‘recognition heuristic’ in their 2002 paper. Additionally, it is well 
established in the research literature that investors have a favourable outlook on companies 
with large market capitalisation. So for the S&P500 companies, market capitalisation, length 
of the time the company has stayed in the index, extent of the volatility of a company’s cash-
flow, and number of analysts following a firm seems to be the major source of high 
information uncertainties towards their stock market performance around quarterly earnings 
announcement dates. Little or no information is available on companies of low market 
capitalisation, young firms in the index, and those with low analyst coverage, and this leads 
to high uncertainty with regard to their fundamental values. However, this sub-set of 
                                                          
42
 See Chan, Kot, and Tang (2013). 
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companies also receives a higher level of resolution of their uncertainties at earnings 
announcement dates than low uncertainty stocks. Investors respond to this resolution of 
uncertainty with much intensity, and this exacerbates earnings-generated momentum in 
price.  
5.3.5.2 PEAD, information uncertainty, and lengthening streaks of earnings surprises 
In section 5.3.5.1 above, I sort PEAD returns by both information uncertainty and by streaks 
of either positive or negative earnings surprises. However, here I test hypotheses 6 and 7 in 
an attempt to better understand how different lengths of streaks interact with the information 
uncertainty proxies around earnings announcement dates. Here, I sort information 
uncertainty proxies by different lengths of streaks of positive or negative earnings surprises. 
The analysis below is expected to validate the results of the analysis in section 5.3.5.1. 
I begin by testing the impact of information uncertainty and streaks of earnings surprises 
(positive or negative) running consecutively for two to four quarters, two to eight quarters, 
and nine or more quarters on three-day PEAD returns. The results are shown in panels A, B, 
and C of table 5.7 respectively. Sorting high uncertainty stocks with positive streaks of two to 
four quarters, generates positive PEAD returns that are only statistically significant when 
market capitalisation and age serve as information uncertainty proxies. All other four proxies 
generate statistically not significant PEAD returns. However, sorting with high information 
uncertainty and negative streaks of earnings surprises of between two and four quarters 
generates returns that are not statistically significant, except when analyst coverage is used 
as the information uncertainty proxy. A trading strategy that buys (sells) high (low) 
information uncertainty stocks of between two to four streaks of earnings surprises 
generates mostly negative returns that are not statistically significant except when market 
capitalisation is employed as the uncertainty proxy. When high information uncertainty 
stocks are sorted by positive streaks of between two and eight quarters, larger statistically 
significant positive PEAD returns are generated than what was seen in section 5.3.5.1. 
Sorting by market capitalisation and positive streaks of earnings surprises of between two 
and eight quarters, high uncertainty stocks generate statistically significant positive three-day 
abnormal returns of 0.046% (t-value = 3.71). Similarly, sorting by age, analyst coverage and 
cash-flow volatility, high uncertainty stocks generate statistically significant positive abnormal 
returns of 0.047% (t-value = 3.94), 0.029% (t-value = 2.31), and 0.035% (t-value = 2.37) 
respectively. The magnitude of the abnormal returns seen here is more than that generated 
when information uncertainty is not conditioned on the length of the streaks of earnings 
surprises. Sorting high uncertainty stocks with negative streaks of earnings surprises of 
between two and eight quarters in length follows an almost identical pattern (both in terms of 
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the sign and size of the abnormal returns) to the results obtained in section 5.3.5.1. Sorting 
by market capitalisation, analyst coverage, cash-flow volatility and streaks of negative 
earnings surprises of between two and eight quarters, high uncertainty stocks generate 
statistically significant positive abnormal returns of 0.036% (t-value of 2.0), 0.041% (t-value = 
2.56), and 0.041% (t-value = 2.25) respectively. 
It is clear from the results that the impact of the gambler’s fallacy grows with the lengthening 
of the streaks of earnings surprises. As the streaks in earnings surprises continue to 
lengthen in a particular direction, in the presence of information uncertainty, the gambler’s 
fallacy causes PEAD returns to intensify. This is evident from the increase in PEAD returns 
when streaks of two to eight quarters are used as against streaks of two to four quarters. 
The gambler’s fallacy causes the representative investor to underreact to lengthening 
streaks of earnings surprises at successive announcement dates. 
A completely different picture is painted when high uncertainty stocks are sorted by positive 
streaks of earnings surprises of nine or more quarters in length. Sorting by all the information 
uncertainty proxies generates positive, but not statistically significant, three-day abnormal 
returns except when using age as an uncertainty proxy, which generates negative and not 
statistically significant abnormal returns. Sorting with negative streaks of nine or more 
quarters earns similar results to those of positive streaks of the same lengths. This finding 
about the relation between long streaks of earnings surprises and abnormal returns in the 
presence of high uncertainty shows that the impact of the gambler’s fallacy, as predicted by 
Rabin (2002b), is quite muted when investors have diffuse priors, as would indeed 
characterise a highly uncertain stock market valuation. 
It does seem that uncertainties about S&P500 companies persist more when there are 
increasing positive streaks of quarterly earnings surprises for up to eight quarters. However, 
beyond eight quarters to nine and more, the interaction effect between information 
uncertainty and streaks of earnings loses its explanatory ability. One possible explanation is 
that continuing streaks of both positive and negative earnings surprises bring about little 
surprise to investors and most likely uncertainties surrounding the value of such companies 
will have been fully or significantly resolved after similar earnings news has been received 
consecutively for more than eight quarters. The arrival of a continuous stream of affirmatory 
quarterly earnings news would normally dissipate some of the uncertainties surrounding a 
stock’s value; however, a growing trend in streaks (up to eight quarters of consistency in the 
sign of the earnings surprise) at earnings announcement negates this effect by instead 
introducing more uncertainty into the true value of the stocks. The impact of information 
uncertainty on PEAD drift is more defined when its interaction with different lengths of 
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earnings surprises is taken into account. So information uncertainty and ‘streakiness’ have 
incremental, not substitutive, value in explaining PEAD. 
5.4 Robustness checks 
In this section, I employ alternative model specifications and competing hypotheses to show 
the robustness of the results in the main empirical results section above. In order to achieve 
this purpose, I employ analysts’ forecast revision, which is often used as a measure of the 
change in investors’ expectations of quarterly earnings (or earnings surprise) in the 
literature. I carry out this robustness check in two different ways: first by establishing that the 
sign and size of analysts’ forecast revision can proxy as an earnings surprise measure and 
second, by establishing that the behaviour of investors in the presence of analysts’ forecast 
revisions and information uncertainty around earnings announcement dates produce similar 
results to those obtained when other proxies of earnings surprise are used. 
5.4.1 PEAD and analysts’ forecast revision 
In the finance literature, analysts’ forecast revisions are one of the proxies used to measure 
earnings surprise. In chapter 3, I introduced the analyst forecast revision and showed how it 
is constructed and used as a measure of earnings surprise. Here I use it as an alternative 
measure of earnings surprise for my S&P500 constituent companies and use it to explain 
earnings-generated momentum in price. 
In table 5.8, I present the results of a one-way sort of PEAD returns by the current analyst 
forecast revision, again to confirm the existence of PEAD in my sample companies’ returns 
and the presence of cognitive bias amongst investors. The confirmation of the existence of 
PEAD in my sample stocks is important for two major reasons. First, it refutes the argument 
that PEAD can only exist in stocks of small and illiquid companies and therefore could be 
attributed to compensation for risk. Second, using streaks of earnings surprises as the 
earnings momentum metric, it reinforces the propositions of Rabin (2002b) and BSV (1998) 
that an investor’s behaviour is influenced when he observes streaks of earnings surprises 
over a period of time. As the two models posit, this behaviour reinforces earnings-generated 
momentum in price. 
I classify analysts’ forecast revisions into three different groups: good news, bad news, and 
no news. If the revision is a rise in expected earnings, I recognise it as positive and classify it 
as good news, whereas if the revision is a fall in expected earnings, I recognise it as 
negative and classify it as bad news. If the difference between the most recent analysts’ 
forecast revision and the immediate past revision is zero, I classify it as no news. My sample 
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data constitutes of 21.24%, 53.05%, and 25.71% of negative, zero, and positive analysts’ 
forecast revisions respectively. Again, the nature of the distribution of analysts’ forecast 
revisions reveals a similar pattern to that seen with the forecast error in the main empirical 
sections, which suggests that analysts more readily give revisions that are low enough to 
give positive surprises. This is because, as this distribution shows, positive revisions in 
analysts’ forecasts of earnings are more frequent than negative revisions. This observation 
is consistent with the extant literature. The bad news companies have three-day abnormal 
returns of 0.001% (t-value = 0.16), zero news companies have 0.01% (t-value = 1.07), and 
good news companies have 0.03% (t-value = 4.45). A trading strategy that goes long on 
good news companies and short on bad news companies generates a spread of 0.029%, 
which is statistically significant (t-value = 3.90). The result confirms that bad news 
companies earn lower future returns, while good news companies earn higher future returns. 
Again, this is consistent with past reported findings in the analyst forecast revision literature. 
This result is also consistent with the interpretation that investors underreact to new earnings 
information, since future movements in stock prices are in the same direction as the most 
recent earnings surprise. 
5.4.2 PEAD, information uncertainty, and analysts’ forecast revisions 
In table 5.9, I test the relation between information uncertainty and the nature of news, using 
analysts’ forecast revision as a proxy for investors’ response to news about corporate 
earnings. In each case, I sort stocks by my information uncertainty proxies into two 
categories of high and low uncertainties using the median as a separation point. The stocks 
are first sorted into three different categories based on their most recent analyst forecast 
revision. Each of the stocks is sorted into one of the three portfolio categories; bad news, no-
news, and good news. Only results for the bad news and good news portfolios are reported 
here. 
The result in table 5.9 follows the same pattern as that in table 5.6. Here again, the proxies 
of information uncertainty used in section 5.3.5.1 are employed. In each case, higher 
information uncertainty generates larger three-day abnormal returns for good news portfolios 
than for bad news portfolios. In a double sort by positive analysts’ revisions and information 
uncertainty proxies, high information uncertainty portfolios generate larger abnormal returns 
than low information uncertainty portfolios. This behaviour is shown, for example, with the 
MCAP proxy, where the good news portfolio of high information uncertainty stocks generates 
a three-day abnormal returns of 0.058% (t-value = 2.66), while the low information 
uncertainty portfolio generates returns of 0.009%, which is not statistically significant. On the 
other hand, the bad news portfolio of high information uncertainty stocks generates 
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abnormal returns of 0.018%, while the portfolio of low information uncertainty generates 
abnormal returns of -0.013%. In the good news group and using market capitalisation as the 
information uncertainty proxy, a trading strategy that invests long in high uncertainty stocks 
and sells short in low uncertainty portfolio generates an abnormal return of 0.061% (t = 
2.17). In the bad news group, this strategy generates an abnormal return of 0.032% (t-value 
= 1.98). For the good news strategy, only the MCAP, CVOL, SVOL, AFORD, and ACOV 
information uncertainty proxies generate positive and statistically significant abnormal 
returns. For the bad news strategy, only the CVOL proxy generates statistically significant 
abnormal returns. 
A common observation here is that a company’s market capitalisation appears to be an 
important proxy for information uncertainty for good news companies. With market 
capitalisation as an information uncertainty proxy, high uncertainty companies represent the 
group of the smallest companies with the S&P500 index. From the results, investors respond 
more strongly to this sub-sample of companies when they have good news, hence the high 
abnormal returns. One can therefore conclude that investors underreact more to smaller 
companies with good earnings news in the S&P500 index, despite the fact that these smaller 
members may be amongst the largest companies traded in the market. This also confirms 
results reported by Zhang (2006a) in which the author documents that because of this kind 
of underreaction, small firms generate lower returns following bad news than following good 
news. Another observation is that investors appear to underreact to good news companies 
with high cash-flow volatility. The portfolio of high cash-flow volatility stocks generates a 
three-day abnormal return of 0.058% (t-value = 3.25). A good news trading strategy based 
on taking a long (short) position on high (low) cash-flow volatility stocks generates a 
statistically significant three-day abnormal return of 0.062% (t-value = 2.23). For all of the 
portfolios, the good news companies with high information uncertainty generate larger 
abnormal returns than bad news companies and show more PEAD.  
5.5 Summary and conclusion 
In this chapter, the case for the informativeness of the streaks of earnings surprises first 
examined in chapter 4 is further strengthened. This is done by investigating the explanatory 
power of streaks of earnings surprises in a short window of three days. This window falls 
within that period when the effect of the nature of earnings news is most intense in the stock 
market, especially for large companies like my S&P500 companies. The results show that 
even in this short window, investors in S&P500 companies appear to be influenced by the 
confirmation (or otherwise) of the lengthening of negative and positive streaks of earnings 
surprises at the most recent quarterly earnings announcement. This further supports my 
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hypothesis that investors underreact to streaks of changes in their expectations about stock 
returns. The impact of streaks on returns is further strengthened in the presence of high 
information uncertainties. This interaction effect between streaks of earnings surprises and 
high information uncertainty is most intense when information uncertainty proxies such as 
market capitalisation, age, and cash-flow are used. Therefore the influence of the gambler’s 
fallacy on the representative investor in the presence of information uncertainty becomes 
more pronounced with increasing lengths of streaks of earnings surprises. 
When the distribution of earnings surprises in this chapter is compared with that in chapter 4, 
one point is obvious. There are far more temporary reversals in earnings surprises in this 
chapter than in chapter 4. The only possible reason for this could be the use of analysts’ 
forecast of earnings as a measure of investors’ earnings expectations. The presence of 
more temporary reversals here would generally reduce the intensity of the impact of the 
continuation in earnings surprises on price movements. Changing my model for calculating 
the change in investors’ expectations (in chapters 4 and 5) brings to the fore the implications 
that this choice may have for the reported results. Also the result from using an alternative 
model specification, viz; using analysts’ forecast revisions to represent the nature of 
earnings news and how that is revealed in stock prices, shows the robustness of my 
previous test analyses with streaks of earnings surprises when those surprises are 
measured by successive quarterly earnings forecast errors.  
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Table 5.1 
Panel A reports the summary statistics of the sample of quarterly earnings surprises, streaks, and temporary reversals of quarterly earnings surprises. The streaks 
and reversals are defined by the quarterly earnings surprises (ESURP). ESURP is the quarterly earnings surprise calculated as the I/B/E/S actual quarterly earnings 
minus the most recent consensus mean analysts’ earnings forecast scaled by prior year end stock price. A streak of quarterly earnings surprises occurs when at 
least the two most recent earnings surprises of my sample company are of the same sign (i.e. a continuation of quarterly earnings rises or falls). However, a 
temporary reversal of earnings surprises occurs when a streak is terminated. Year is my sample period beginning from January 1991 to December 2006. For each of 
the sample years, the average ESURP in my sample is reported along with the average firm size (MCAP – in millions of dollars) of the S&P500 companies in my 
sample. The number of streaks and reversals, and the percentage of streaks each year are also reported. 
                                                  Panel A: Descriptive statistics for earnings surprises, streaks, and reversals   
Panel A: Average firm characteristics by year 
Year 
No of firm-
quarters ESURP MCAP Number of Streaks No of Reversals 
Percentage of 
Streaks 
1991 1101 0.388 11317 620 481 0.56 
1992 1019 0.454 10926 473 546 0.46 
1993 1071 0.292 11364 578 493 0.54 
1994 1130 0.282 11319 618 512 0.55 
1995 1251 0.308 12484 668 583 0.53 
1996 1237 0.281 11031 638 599 0.52 
1997 1314 0.31 10178 775 539 0.59 
1998 1341 0.37 9465 738 603 0.55 
1999 1381 0.392 9302 697 684 0.50 
2000 1378 0.4 9582 656 722 0.48 
2001 1416 0.401 9986 610 806 0.43 
2002 1447 0.363 10638 707 740 0.49 
2003 1436 0.335 10090 631 805 0.44 
2004 1412 0.357 10058 710 702 0.50 
2005 1125 0.354 10765 649 476 0.58 
2006 291 0.376 12554 159 132 0.55 
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Panel B summarises some of the firm characteristics of my S&P500 companies for the streaks and reversals of quarterly earnings surprises. 
The characteristics include accumulated returns from months t-11 to t-1 (MRET), analyst coverage (ACOV) is the number of analysts following 
the company, company age (AGE) is the number of years since the company was added to the S&P500 index, Stock volatility (SVOL) is the 
standard deviation of weekly market excess returns over the year ending at the end of month t, and cash-flow volatility (CVOL) is the standard 
deviation of cash-flow from operations in the last five years (with a minimum of three years). *, **, *** represents the associated statistical 
significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively of the difference in average company characteristics between streaks and reversals in quarterly 
earnings surprises. 
 
 
 
Panel B: Average firm characteristics by streaks and reversals 
           ESURP MCAP MRET ACOV AGE SVOL CVOL 
Streaks 0.377 10872 0.129 5.684 8.438 0.053 0.0135 
Reversals     0.325 10092 0.119 5.885 8.368 0.048 0.0137 
Difference  0.052*** 780***   0.01***   -0.201***     0.070***     0.005***     -0.0002*** 
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Panel C: Descriptive statistics for the sample 
Panel C shows the descriptive statistics of the sample and Panel D the correlation matrix of all the variables used in analysis in this chapter. The statistics include 
the number of observations of each of the variables, average value, standard deviation, minimum, first quartile, median, third quartile, and maximum value 
respectively. The variables presented are the stocks’ three-day buy-and-hold Fama-French three-factor model adjusted returns (BHAR) around the earnings 
announcement date, CONSISTENCY is the streaks and reversals of quarterly earnings surprises in my sample, Stock volatility (SVOL) is the standard deviation of 
weekly market excess returns over the year ending at the end of the most recent month, and cash-flow volatility (CVOL) is the standard deviation of cash-flow from 
operations in the last five years (with a minimum of three years), MRET is the accumulated returns from months t-11 to t-1, analyst coverage (ACOV) is the number 
of analysts following the company, company age (AGE) is the number of years since the company was added to the S&P500 index, analysts’ forecast dispersion 
(AFORD) is the standard deviation of consensus analyst forecasts in the most current month scaled by prior year-end stock price, Firm size (MCAP) is the market 
capitalisation (in millions of dollars) at the end of the most current month. ESURP is the quarterly earnings surprise calculated as the I/B/E/S actual quarterly 
earnings minus the most recent mean consensus analysts’ earnings forecast scaled by prior year end stock price. The sample includes all the S&P500 constituent 
companies from January 1991 to December 2006. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
      
Variable No. of Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Q1 Median Q3 Max. 
CONSISTENCY 18249 3.418 6.5 -12 -2 3 10 12 
BHAR 18248 0.02% 0.71% -14.08% -0.24% 0.01% 0.30% 9.41% 
CVOL 18249 0.013 0.26 0 0.001 0.005 0.015 0.681 
SVOL 1818 0.05 0.109 0.009 0.026 0.037 0.054 4.206 
AFORD 18156 0.026 0.053 0 0.01 0.01 0.03 1.67 
ACOV 18249 5.78 6.829 0 1 3 9 44 
AGE 18203 8.404 4.491 1 5 8 12 20 
MCAP 18093 10490.7 22477.66 2.40 1561.78 4302.83 9747.65 499070 
MRET 18249 0.124 0.366 -2.498 0 0.045 0.253 3.781 
ESURP 18248 0.351 0.929 -10 -0.0001 0.043 0.861 10.25 
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Panel D: The Pearson correlation coefficient is above the diagonal and the Spearman correlation coefficient is below 
   
  CONSISTENCY BHAR ESURP MCAP SVOL AFORD ACOV MRET CVOL AGE 
CONSISTENCY 1 0.1262 -0.0152 0.0229 0.0136 0.0066 -0.0266 -0.0052 -0.0006 0.0554 
BHAR 0.1213 1 0.0106 -0.0036 -0.0598 -0.0029 -0.0485 -0.0113 -0.0088 0.0555 
ESURP 0.0292 0.0939 1 0.022 -0.0266 -0.0016 -0.017 0.022 0.0043 0.2822 
MCAP -0.0179 -0.0287 0.0252 1 -0.0778 -0.0039 0.0365 -0.0067 -0.0053 0.0229 
SVOL 0.0324 -0.0844 0.0003 0.1245 1 0.0008 0.0029 0.0175 0.0128 0.001 
AFORD -0.0057 0.0013 0.0181 0.083 0.1557 1 -0.0095 0.01 0.0294 -0.0002 
ACOV -0.0027 -0.0504 0.0163 0.0087 -0.0275 -0.0132 1 -0.0059 0.0256 0.0272 
MRET 0.01 -0.0221 0.0402 -0.0214 -0.0076 0.0091 0.0312 1 -0.0405 0.0015 
CVOL 0.0213 0.0012 0.0011 0.0334 0.0088 0.0235 0.0729 0.0169 1 -0.006 
AGE 0.0318 0.0552 0.646 0.0158 0.0441 0.0056 0.0171 -0.0194 0.0046 1 
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Table 5.2: Summary statistics for streaks and reversals in quarterly earnings surprises 
Table 5.2 reports the frequency of streaks and reversals in my S&P500 sample during the sample period from January 1991 to December 2006. In panel A, 
companies are sorted into positive and negative ESURP based on the sign of ESURP in the most recent quarter. The number of streaks of various lengths, total 
negative and positive streaks and reversals are then observed and reported. In panel B, companies are sorted into different quintiles based on their most recent 
ESURP. A streak of quarterly earnings surprises occurs when at least the two most recent earnings surprises of my sample company are of the same sign (i.e. a 
continuation of quarterly earnings rises or falls). A temporary reversal of earnings surprise occurs when a streak is terminated. ESURP is classified as negative if it is 
less than zero and positive if it is greater than zero. 
 
                                            Number of observations by streak and reversal of earnings surprises   
           Panel A: ESURP sign 
 
Panel B: ESURP quintile 
Streak length Negative Positive % Negative % Positive   Smallest 2 3 4 Largest 
2 1296 1916 7.2 10.5 
 
676 644 636 666 590 
3 657 1186 3.6 6.5 
 
388 338 453 335 329 
4 328 803 1.8 4.4 
 
160 205 281 168 317 
5 219 547 1.2 3 
 
119 93 140 122 292 
6 219 383 1.2 2.1 
 
128 152 94 98 130 
7 55 310 0.3 1.7 
 
47 102 51 60 105 
8 55 255 0.3 1.4 
 
67 44 79 54 66 
9 36 182 0.2 1 
 
34 39 68 44 33 
10 36 128 0.2 0.7 
 
33 15 46 23 47 
11 18 109 0.1 0.6 
 
24 28 27 31 17 
12 73 496 0.4 2.72 
 
62 90 207 79 131 
All Streaks 2992 6315 32.15 67.85 
 
1738 1750 2082 1680 2057 
Reversals 4289 4653 47.9 52.1 
 
1912 1900 1584 1960 1586 
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Table 5.3: Panel regressions of three-day buy-and-hold Fama-French three-factor model adjusted PEAD returns and consistency, earnings surprise streaks and 
reversals (reported coefficients are multiplied by 100) 
 
This table reports the panel regressions intercepts and estimates for the three-day buy-and-hold Fama-French three-factor adjusted PEAD returns. A total of thirteen model regression test 
results are reported in this table. The three-day earnings announcement window starts a day prior to I/B/E/S earnings announcement date and ends a day after. The various model 
specifications of the following panel regressions are estimated whose dependent variable, 𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡−1,𝑡+1, denotes the three-day buy-and-hold Fama-French three-factor model adjusted returns: 
 
𝑩𝑯𝑨𝑹𝒊𝒕−𝟏,𝒕+𝟏 =  𝜶 + 𝜷𝒊𝟏𝑪𝑶𝑵𝑺𝑰𝑺 +  𝜷𝒊𝟐𝚬𝑺𝑼𝑹𝑷 + 𝜷𝒊𝟑𝑪𝑶𝑵𝑺𝑰𝑺 ∗ 𝚬𝑺𝑼𝑹𝑷 + 𝜷𝒊𝟒𝑺𝑻𝑹 + 𝜷𝒊𝟓𝑺𝑻𝑹 ∗ 𝚬𝑺𝑼𝑹𝑷 + 𝜷𝒊𝟔𝑫𝑼𝑴𝑴𝒀𝟏 + 𝜷𝒊𝟕𝑫𝑼𝑴𝑴𝒀𝟐 + 𝜷𝒊𝟖𝑫𝑼𝑴𝑴𝒀𝟑 + 𝜷𝒊𝟗𝑫𝑼𝑴𝑴𝒀𝟒 +  𝝐𝒊𝒕.   
 
where 𝑩𝑯𝑨𝑹𝒊𝒕−𝟏,𝒕+𝟏 is the three-day buy-and-hold Fama-French three-factor model adjusted PEAD returns within a three-day earnings announcement window of (-1, +1), 
𝑪𝑶𝑵𝑺𝑰𝑺  (Consistency) is the length of streaks of quarterly earnings surprises and temporary reversals of 1, 2,,,,,,,, 11, and 12 denoting rises or falls in quarterly earnings surprise lasting 1 
quarter, 2 consecutive quarters, 3 consecutive quarters, 11 consecutive quarters, 12 consecutive quarters etc.; 𝚬𝑺𝑼𝑹𝑷 is the magnitude of the quarterly earnings surprise in the most recent 
quarter normalised by prior year end stock price, 𝑪𝑶𝑵𝑺𝑰𝑺 ∗ 𝚬𝑺𝑼𝑹𝑷 is  an interaction term measuring the interaction between Consistency and 𝚬𝑺𝑼𝑹𝑷, 𝑺𝑻𝑹 the streaks of quarterly earnings 
surprises is denoted as +1 for positive streaks and -1 for negative streaks (a streak of quarterly earnings surprises occurs when there are at least two earnings surprises of the same sign for 
two consecutive quarters), 𝑺𝑻𝑹 ∗ 𝚬𝑺𝑼𝑹𝑷 is an interaction term measuring the interaction between streaks and 𝚬𝑺𝑼𝑹𝑷, 𝑫𝑼𝑴𝑴𝒀𝟏 represents STR_POS (which is a dummy variable that equals 
1 for positive streaks of quarterly earnings surprises and zero otherwise), 𝑫𝑼𝑴𝑴𝒀𝟐 represents STR_NEG (which is a dummy variable that equals 1 for negative streaks of quarterly earnings 
surprises and zero otherwise), 𝑫𝑼𝑴𝑴𝒀𝟑 represents REVSL_POS (which is a dummy variable that equals 1 for positive reversal in quarterly earnings surprises and zero otherwise), 
𝑫𝑼𝑴𝑴𝒀𝟒 represents REVSL_NEG (which is a dummy variable that equals 1 for negative reversal in quarterly earnings surprises and zero otherwise), and 𝝐𝒊𝒕 is random error. The sample 
includes all the S&P500 constituent companies from January 1991 to December 2006. The associated t-statistics are reported in parenthesis and ***, **, * indicates statistical significance at a 
1%,5%, and 10% confidence level. The reported coefficients are multiplied by 100. 
 
 Model Intercept Consistency ESURP Streaks Consis*ESURP Streaks*ESURP STR_POS STR_NEG REVSL_POS REVSL_NEG N 
(1) BHARit-1, t+1      0.001 0.007 
        
18249 
 
(0.15) (1.79) 
         
(2) 0.008 
 
-0.005 
       
18249 
 
(0.94) 
 
(-0.20) 
        
(3) 0.00003 0.018** 0.011 
 
-0.0001 
     
18249 
 
(0.00) (2.09) (0.54) 
 
(-1.58) 
      
(4) -0.096*** -0.006 
 
0.211*** 
      
18249 
 
(-3.65) (-1.24) 
 
(4.04) 
       
(5) -0.084*** -0.006 -0.038 0.20*** 
      
18249 
 
(-3.60) (-1.22) (-0.11) (4.03) 
       
(6) -0.092*** -0.005 0.031 0.218*** -0.011* 
     
18249 
 
 
(-3.75) (-0.98) (0.83) (4.10) (-1.76) 
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Table 5.3 continued from the previous page 
  Intercept Consistency ESURP Streaks Consis*ESURP Streaks*ESURP STR_POS STR_NEG REVSL_POS REVSL_NEG N 
(7) -0.090*** -0.005 0.04 0.307*** 
 
-0.071 
    
18249 
 
(-3.72) (-1.12) (0.85) (4.11) 
 
(-1.10) 
     
(8) -0.045*** -0.01 -0.0005 
   
0.250*** 
   
18249 
 
(-2.61) (-1.94) (-0.02) 
   
(3.34) 
    
(9) -0.033 0.01*** -0.012 
    
-0.109* 
  
18249 
 
(-1.55) (2.63) (-0.42) 
    
(-1.90) 
   
(10) 0.041*** 0.004 -0.004 
     
-0.180*** 
 
18249 
 
(2.67) (1.05) (-0.15) 
     
(-3.06) 
  
(11) 0.026 0.003 -0.011 
      
-0.083 18249 
 
(1.20) (0.62) (-0.35) 
      
(-1.30) 
 
(12) -0.091*** -0.006 0.041 
  
-0.075 0.290*** -0.177** 
  
18249 
 
(-3.54) (-0.84) (0.85) 
  
(-1.09) (3.58) (-2.33) 
   
(13) 0.107*** -0.004 0.046 
  
-0.084 
  
-0.208*** -0.122** 18249 
 
(3.69) (-0.84) (0.93) 
  
(-1.18) 
  
(-3.96) (-2.59) 
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Table 5.4: Panel regressions of the three-day buy-and-hold Fama-French three-factor model adjusted post-earnings announcement returns and different 
streak lengths and signs. 
 
This table shows the regression estimates of the three-day buy-and-hold Fama-French three-factor model adjusted PEAD returns on positive and negative streaks of various lengths. 
Panel regression results are reported in panels A and B while pooled OLS regression results are reported in panels C and D. A total of twelve regression models are estimated here. 
The regression model is: 
 𝑩𝑯𝑨𝑹𝒊𝒕−𝟏,𝒕+𝟏 =  𝜶 + 𝜷𝒊𝟏𝑪𝑶𝑵𝑺𝑰𝑺 +  𝜷𝒊𝟐𝚬𝑺𝑼𝑹𝑷 + 𝜷𝒊𝟑𝑪𝑶𝑵𝑺𝑰𝑺 ∗ 𝚬𝑺𝑼𝑹𝑷 + 𝜷𝒊𝟒𝑫𝑼𝑴𝑴𝒀 + 𝝐𝒊𝒕.   
 
where 𝑩𝑯𝑨𝑹𝒊𝒕−𝟏,𝒕+𝟏 is the three-day buy-and-hold Fama-French three-factor model adjusted PEAD returns with a three-day earnings announcement window of (-1, +1), 
𝑪𝑶𝑵𝑺𝑰𝑺  (Consistency) is the length of streaks of quarterly earnings surprises and temporary reversals of 1, 2,,,,,,,, 11, and 12 denoting rises or falls in quarterly earnings surprises 
lasting 1 quarter, 2 consecutive quarters, 3 consecutive quarters, 11 consecutive quarters, 12 consecutive quarters etc.; 𝚬𝑺𝑼𝑹𝑷 is the magnitude of the quarterly earnings surprise 
normalised by prior year end stock price in the most recent quarter, 𝑪𝑶𝑵𝑺𝑰𝑺 ∗ 𝚬𝑺𝑼𝑹𝑷 is  an interaction term measuring the interaction between Consistency and 𝚬𝑺𝑼𝑹𝑷, 
𝑫𝑼𝑴𝑴𝒀 variable represents either STR_POS_2to4, STR_POS_5to8, STR_POS_9to12, STR_NEG_2to4, STR_NEG_5to8 or STR_NEG_9to12. STR_POS_2to4 is a dummy 
variable denoted as one for positive streaks of between 2 and 4 quarters and zero otherwise, STR_NEG_2to4 is a dummy variable denoted as 1 for negative streaks of between 2 and 
4 quarters and zero otherwise, STR_POS_5to8 is a dummy variable denoted as 1 for positive streaks of between 5 and 8 quarters and zero otherwise, STR_NEG_5to8 is a dummy 
variable denoted as 1 for negative streaks of between 5 and 8 quarters and zero otherwise, STR_POS_9to12 is a dummy variable denoted as 1 for positive streaks of between 9 and 
12 quarters and zero otherwise, and STR_NEG_9to12 is a dummy variable denoted as 1 for negative streaks of between 9 and 12 quarters and zero otherwise, and 𝝐𝒊𝒕 is random 
error. The sample includes all the S&P500 constituent stocks from January 1991 to December 2006. The t-statistics are reported in parenthesis and ***, **, * indicates statistical 
significance at a 1%, 5%, and 10% confidence level. The reported coefficients are multiplied by 100. In the OLS regressions, standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity correction 
following a Huber-White robust estimation approach. 
 
Panel A: Panel regressions of three-day buy-and-hold PEAD returns adjusted by the Fama-French three-factor model 
on different lengths of positive streaks (reported coefficients are multiplied by 100) 
 
  Intercept Consistency ESURP Consis*ESURP Streak Length N F 
        STR_POS_2to4 0.011*** -0.0003*** 0.0007 -0.0001 0.023*** 18203 53.24(0.00) 
 
(62.09) (-4.30) (1.41) (-1.05) (7.72) 
  STR_POS_5to8 0.024*** -0.0006*** 0.001*** -0.00001 0.011*** 18203 38.38(0.00) 
 
(95.2) (-7.94) (2.03) (-0.14) (3.65) 
  STR_POS_9to12 0.029*** -0.0007*** 0.001 -0.00001 0.004 18203 34.27(0.00) 
 
(115.9) (-10.10) (1.87) (-0.06) (0.76) 
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Panel B: Panel regressions of three-day buy-and-hold PEAD returns adjusted by the Fama-French three-factor model 
on different lengths of negative streaks (reported coefficients are multiplied by 100) 
 
  Intercept Consistency ESURP Consis*ESURP Streak Length N F 
        STR_NEG_2to4 0.02*** -0.0007*** 0.001 -0.0002 -0.001*** 18203 35.7(0.00) 
 
(99.8) (-9.95) (1.96) (-0.27) (-2.24) 
  STR_NEG_5to8 0.02*** -0.0006*** 0.001*** -0.00001 -0.003*** 18203 38.95(0.00) 
 
(123.9) (-8.07) (2.00) (-0.18) (-3.89) 
  STR_NEG_9to12 0.02*** -0.001*** 0.001*** -0.0001 0.009*** 18203 48.79(0.00) 
 
(129.9) (-13.21) (2.38) (-1.27) (6.76) 
                  
 
  
Panel C: Pooled OLS Regression of three-day buy-and-hold post-earnings announcement returns adjusted by the Fama-French three-
factor model on different lengths of positive streaks (reported coefficients are multiplied by 100) (vce(robust)) 
 
  Intercept Consistency ESURP Consis*ESURP Streak Length N R
2
 F 
         STR_POS_2to4 0.02*** -0.0001*** 0.0003*** 0.0001*** 0.001*** 18203 0.0092 41.65(0.00) 
 
(288.0) (-10.25) (3.07) (2.11) (2.95) 
   STR_POS_5to8 0.02*** -0.0001*** 0.0003*** 0.0001*** 0.001 18203 0.0089 39.66(0.00) 
 
(312.6) (-11.06) (3.03) (2.05) (1.58) 
   STR_POS_9to12 0.02*** -0.0002*** 0.0003*** 0.0001*** 0.00005 18203 0.0087 39.29(0.00) 
 
(318.92) (-11.65) (3.05) (2.09) (0.08) 
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Panel D: Pooled OLS regression of three-day buy-and-hold PEAD returns adjusted by the Fama-French three-factor model on different 
lengths of negative streaks (returns are multiplied by 100) (vce(robust)) 
 
  Intercept Consistency ESURP Consis*ESURP Streak Length N R
2
 F 
         STR_NEG_2to4 0.021*** -0.0002*** 0.0003*** 0.0001*** -0.0002 18203 0.0089 40.22(0.00) 
 
(296.1) (-11.46) (3.11) (2.05) (-1.92) 
   STR_NEG_5to8 0.021*** -0.0002*** 0.0003*** 0.0001*** -0.001*** 18203 0.0089 47.34(0.00) 
 
(320.38) (-8.720 (2.99) (2.20) (-5.99) 
   STR_NEG_9to12 0.02*** -0.0002*** 0.0003*** 0.0001*** 0.003*** 18203 0.01115 50.22(0.00) 
 
(323.3) (-13.79) 3.08) (2.07) (7.35) 
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Table 5.5: One-way sort of the three-day buy-and-hold Fama-French three-factor model adjusted PEAD returns by information uncertainty proxies 
and cumulative past stock return (reported coefficients are multiplied by 100) 
 
The table reports three-day buy-and-hold Fama-French three-factor model adjusted PEAD returns sorted by each information uncertainty proxy and the past 
11-month returns. In table 5.5, each quarter I sort stocks into five deciles based on each of the information uncertainty proxies in the most recent quarter. In the 
last column of table 5.5, I sort stocks into five deciles based on the past 11-month stock returns to verify the existence of momentum in my sample stock 
returns. Stock volatility (SVOL) is the standard deviation of weekly market excess returns over the year ending at the end of month t, and cash-flow volatility 
(CVOL) is the standard deviation of cash-flow from operations in the last five years (with a minimum of three years of data), MRET is the accumulated returns 
from months t-11 to t-1, analyst coverage (ACOV) is the number of analysts following the company, company age (AGE) is the number of years since the 
company was added to the S&P500 index, analysts’ forecast dispersion (AFORD) is the standard deviation of consensus analyst forecasts in the most current 
month scaled by prior year-end stock price, Firm size (MCAP) is the market capitalisation (in millions of dollars) at the end of the most current month. 1/MV, 
1/AGE, and 1/ACOV are the reciprocals of MV, AGE, and ACOV respectively. The sample includes all the S&P500 constituent stocks from January 1991 to 
December 2006. The associated t-statistics are reported in parenthesis and ***, **, * indicates statistical significance at a 1%, 5%, and 10% confidence level. 
The reported coefficients are multiplied by 100. 
 
 
    
Sorted by  
1/MV 
Sorted by 
 1/AGE 
Sorted by 
 1/ACOV 
Sorted by 
AFORD 
Sorted by 
SVOL 
Sorted by 
CVOL 
sorted by 
 MRET   
 
Q1(Low) 0.034 0.014 0.021 0.015 0.032 0.032    -0.046 
 
 
Q2 0.021 0.020 0.003 0.030 0.045 -0.001     0.012 
 
 
Q3 0.013 0.028 0.014 0.035 0.001 0.031     0.024 
 
 
Q4 0.030 0.037 0.023 -0.006 0.017 0.016     0.050 
 
 
Q5 (High) 0.010 0.001 0.010 0.012 0.007 0.025     0.080 
 
 
Difference(Q5-Q1) -0.024 -0.013 -0.011 -0.003 -0.025 -0.007     0.126*** 
 
  
(-1.43) (-0.91) (-0.55) (-0.34) (-1.55) (-0.48)     (6.66) 
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Table 5.6: A two-way sort of the three-day buy-and-hold Fama-French three-factor model adjusted PEAD returns by information uncertainty 
proxies and streaks of quarterly earnings surprises (reported coefficients are multiplied by 100) 
 
This table reports the three-day buy-and-hold Fama-French three-factor adjusted PEAD returns sorted by information uncertainty proxy and streaks of 
quarterly earnings surprises. First, I categorise the stocks into negative and positive streaks based on the sign of their streaks in the most current quarter. 
Each category is subsequently sorted by stocks into portfolios of high and low levels information uncertainty based on the median of each of the 
information uncertainty proxies. An information uncertainty level below the median is categorised as low, whereas an information uncertainty level above 
the median is categorised as high. Stock volatility (SVOL) is the standard deviation of weekly market excess returns over the year ending at the end of 
month t, and cash-flow volatility (CVOL) is the standard deviation of cash-flow from operations in the last five years (with a minimum of three years data), 
analyst coverage (ACOV) is the number of analysts following the company, company age (AGE) is the number of years since the company was added to 
the S&P500 index, analysts’ forecast dispersion (AFORD) is the standard deviation of consensus analyst forecasts in the most current month scaled by 
prior year-end stock price, Firm size (MCAP) is the market capitalisation (in millions of dollars) at the end of the most current month. 1/MV, 1/AGE, and 
1/ACOV are the reciprocals of MV, AGE, and ACOV respectively. Pos_STR is composed of positive quarterly earnings surprises of various lengths while 
Neg_STR is composed of negative quarterly earnings surprises of various lengths, HML represents a portfolio return of high information uncertainty 
portfolio minus low information uncertainty portfolio. The sample includes all the S&P500 constituent stocks from January 1991 to December 2006. The 
associated t-statistics are reported in parenthesis and ***, **, * indicates statistical significance at a 1%, 5%, and 10% confidence level. The reported 
coefficients are multiplied by 100. 
 
              
 
Sorted by 
1/MV 
    
Sorted by 
1/AGE 
    
Sorted by 
1/ACOV 
  
  High IU Low IU HML 
 
  High IU Low IU HML 
 
  High IU Low IU HML 
              
Pos_STR 0.038*** 0.0008 0.037** 
 
Pos_STR 0.040*** 0.005 0.037** 
 
Pos_STR 0.027** 0.009 0.021 
 
(3.45) (0.06) (2.15) 
  
(3.65) (0.24) (2.24) 
  
(2.37) (0.62) (1.45) 
Neg_STR 0.035** 0.035* 0.0007 
 
Neg_STR 0.005 0.067*** -0.058** 
 
Neg_STR 0.039** 0.030 0.016 
 
(2.12) (1.65) (0.03) 
  
(0.24) (4.16) (-2.23) 
  
(2.55) (1.25) (0.72) 
Pos_STR-
Neg_STR 0.004 -0.058** 
  
Pos_STR-
Neg_STR 0.027 -0.058** 
  
Pos_STR-
Neg_STR 0.009 -0.006 
 
 
(0.18) (-1.99) 
   
(1.46) (-2.21) 
   
(0.71) (-0.34) 
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Sorted by 
SVOL 
    
Sorted by 
CVOL 
    
Sorted by 
AFORD 
  
  High IU Low IU HML 
 
  High IU Low IU HML 
 
  High IU Low IU HML 
              
Pos_STR 0.012 0.031** -0.017 
 
Pos_STR 0.031** 0.008 0.029* 
 
Pos_STR 0.021 0.018 0.004 
 
(0.91) (2.45) (-1.02) 
  
(2.43) (0.64) (1.65) 
  
(1.57) (1.60) (0.23) 
Neg_STR 0.036* 0.035** -0.001 
 
Neg_STR 0.041** 0.030 0.009 
 
Neg_STR 0.013 0.056*** 
-
0.044* 
 
(1.69) (2.03) (-0.04) 
  
(2.32) (1.46) (0.34) 
  
(0.58) (3.32) (-1.74) 
Pos_STR-
Neg_STR -0.005 0.012 
  
Pos_STR-
Neg_STR 0.012 -0.007 
  
Pos_STR-
Neg_STR 0.015 -0.005 
 
 
(-0.31) (0.77) 
   
(0.84) (-0.44) 
   
(0.81) (-0.35) 
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Table 5.7: A two-way sort of the three-day buy-and-hold Fama-French three-factor model adjusted PEAD returns by information uncertainty proxies 
and streaks of quarterly earnings surprises of various lengths (reported coefficients are multiplied by 100) 
The table reports the three-day buy-and-hold Fama-French three-factor adjusted PEAD returns sorted by information uncertainty proxy and lengthening streaks of 
quarterly earnings surprises. First, I categorise the stocks into negative and positive streaks based on the sign and length of their streaks in the most current quarter. Each 
category is subsequently sorted by stocks into portfolios of high and low levels information uncertainty based on the median of each of the information uncertainty proxies. 
Panels A, B, and C show the returns when quarterly earnings surprises streaks of between two to four, five to eight, and nine to twelve consecutive quarters are employed 
respectively. Stock volatility (SVOL) is the standard deviation of weekly market excess returns over the year ending at the end of month t, and cash-flow volatility (CVOL) is 
the standard deviation of cash-flow from operations in the last five years (with a minimum of three years), analyst coverage (ACOV) is the number of analysts following the 
company, company age (AGE) is the number of years since the company was added to the S&P500 index, analysts’ forecast dispers ion (AFORD) is the standard 
deviation of consensus analyst forecasts in the most current month scaled by prior year-end stock price, Firm size (MCAP) is the market capitalisation (in millions of 
dollars) at the end of the most current month. 1/MV, 1/AGE, and 1/ACOV are the reciprocals of MV, AGE, and ACOV respectively. Pos_STR represents lengthening 
streaks of positive quarterly earnings surprises while Neg_STR represents lengthening streaks of negative quarterly earnings surprises; HML represents a portfolio return 
of high information uncertainty portfolio minus low information uncertainty portfolio. The sample includes all the S&P500 constituent stocks from January 1991 to 
December 2006. The associated t-statistics are reported in parenthesis and ***, **, * indicates statistical significance at a 1%, 5%, and 10% confidence level. The reported 
coefficients are multiplied by 100. 
 
 
Panel A: Returns by information uncertainty proxy and quarterly earnings surprises streaks of between 2 and 4 quarters in length (reported 
coefficients are multiplied by 100) 
 
              
 
Sorted by 1/MV 
   
Sorted by 1/AGE 
   
Sorted by 1/ACOV 
 
  High IU Low IU HML 
 
  High IU Low IU HML 
 
  High IU Low IU HML 
              
Pos_STR 0.049*** -0.012 0.061*** 
 
Pos_STR 0.036*** 0.004 0.034 
 
Pos_STR 0.015 0.024 -0.026 
 
(3.41) (-0.65) (2.58) 
  
(2.61) (0.24) (1.37) 
  
(0.97) (1.25) (-0.98) 
Neg_STR 0.037* 0.033 0.004 
 
Neg_STR -0.005 0.075*** -0.08** 
 
Neg_STR 0.037*** 0.032 0.015 
 
(1.82) (1.28) (0.12) 
  
(-0.19) (4.19) (-2.29) 
  
(2.09) (1.05) (0.51) 
Pos_STR-Neg_STR 0.028 -0.031 
  
Pos_STR-Neg_STR 0.037 -0.033 
  
Pos_STR-Neg_STR -0.007 0.004 
 
 
(1.02) (-0.83) 
   
(1.62) (-1.63) 
   
(-0.36) (0.16) 
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Sorted by 
SVOLNEW 
   
Sorted by CVOLNEW 
   
Sorted by AFORD 
 
  High IU Low IU HML 
 
  High IU Low IU HML 
 
  High IU Low IU HML 
              
Pos_STR 0.004 0.033** -0.029 
 
Pos_STR 0.020 0.017 0.004 
 
Pos_STR 0.013 0.015 -0.013 
 
(0.20) (2.25) -1.24 
  
(1.14) (1.06) (0.18) 
  
(0.73) (1.11) (-0.65) 
Neg_STR 0.037 0.033 0.002 
 
Neg_STR 0.033 0.037 -0.006 
 
Neg_STR 0.004 0.058*** -0.056 
 
(1.44) (1.61) 0.07 
  
(1.55) (1.50) (-0.20) 
  
(0.15) (3.11) (-1.92) 
Pos_STR-Neg_STR -0.017 0.013 
  
Pos_STR-Neg_STR 0.001 -0.006 
  
Pos_STR-Neg_STR 0.011 -0.011 
 
 
(-0.73) (0.68) 
   
(0.07) (-0.27) 
   
(0.42) (-0.58) 
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Panel B: Returns by information uncertainty proxy and quarterly earnings surprises streaks of between 5 and 8 quarters in length (reported coefficients are multiplied by 100) 
 
              
 
Sorted by 1/MV 
   
Sorted by 1/AGE 
   
Sorted by 1/ACOV 
 
  High IU Low IU HML 
 
  High IU Low IU HML 
 
  High IU Low IU HML 
              
Pos_STR 0.046*** -0.003 0.048** 
 
Pos_STR 0.047*** 0.001 0.050*** 
 
Pos_STR 0.029** 0.009 0.024 
 
(3.71) (-0.20) (2.43) 
  
(3.94) (0.08) (2.85) 
  
(2.31) (0.53) (1.45) 
Neg_STR 0.035** 0.035 -0.0005 
 
Neg_STR 0.006 0.067*** -0.056* 
 
Neg_STR 0.041*** 0.028 0.021 
 
(2.0) (1.60) (-0.02) 
  
(0.27) (3.97) (-1.91) 
  
(2.58) (1.08) (0.84) 
Pos_STR-Neg_STR 0.027* -0.022 
  
Pos_STR-Neg_STR 0.043* -0.029* 
  
Pos_STR-Neg_STR -0.007 -0.033 
 
 
(1.76) (-1.12) 
   
(1.86) (-1.71) 
   
(-0.26) (-1.01) 
 
              
              
              
 
Sorted by 
SVOLNEW 
   
Sorted by CVOLNEW 
   
Sorted by AFORD 
 
  High IU Low IU HML 
 
  High IU Low IU HML 
 
  High IU Low IU HML 
              
Pos_STR 0.012 0.031** -0.016 
 
Pos_STR 0.035** 0.007 0.028 
 
Pos_STR 0.023 0.020 (0.015) 
 
(0.87) (2.21) (-0.82) 
  
(2.37) (0.55) (1.41) 
  
(1.53) (1.49) (0.69) 
Neg_STR 0.034 0.036 -0.003 
 
Neg_STR 0.041 0.029 0.010 
 
Neg_STR 0.007 0.056*** -0.029 
 
(1.56) (2.01) (-0.12) 
  
(2.25) (1.38) (0.36) 
  
(0.31) (3.39) (-0.94) 
Pos_STR-Neg_STR -0.005 0.01 
  
Pos_STR-Neg_STR 0.013 -0.009 
  
Pos_STR-Neg_STR 0.019 -0.009 
 
 
(-0.25) (0.60) 
   
(0.77) (-0.49) 
   
(0.95) (-0.61) 
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Panel C: Returns by Information Uncertainty proxy and quarterly earnings surprises streaks of between 9 and 12 quarters in length (reported coefficients are multiplied by 
100) 
 
              
 
Sorted by 1/MV 
   
Sorted by 1/AGE 
   
Sorted by 1/ACOV 
 
  High IU Low IU HML 
 
  High IU Low IU HML 
 
  High IU Low IU HML 
              
Pos_STR 0.003 0.027 -0.025 
 
Pos_STR -0.005 0.025 -0.028 
 
Pos_STR 0.015 0.012 0.007 
 
(0.11) (0.97) (-0.61) 
  
(-0.19) (0.95) (-0.89) 
  
(0.59) (0.38) (0.23) 
Neg_STR 0.044 0.028 -0.002 
 
Neg_STR -0.014 0.064 -0.072 
 
Neg_STR 0.007 0.066 -0.059 
 
(0.86) (0.39) (-0.02) 
  
(-0.18) (1.29) (-1.04) 
  
(0.11) (1.13) (-0.72) 
Pos_STR-Neg_STR -0.005 0.021 
  
Pos_STR-Neg_STR -0.003 0.013 
  
Pos_STR-Neg_STR 0.014 -0.004 
 
 
(-0.17) (0.71) 
   
(-0.09) (0.47) 
   
(0.52) (-0.11) 
 
              
              
              
 
Sorted by 
SVOLNEW 
   
Sorted by 
CVOLNEW 
   
Sorted by AFORD 
 
  High IU Low IU HML 
 
  High IU Low IU HML 
 
  High IU Low IU HML 
              
Pos_STR 0.003 0.022 -0.019 
 
Pos_STR 0.015 0.012 0.006 
 
Pos_STR 0.012 0.015 -0.008 
 
(0.11) (0.82) (-0.54) 
  
(0.56) (0.41) (0.16) 
  
(0.38) (0.59) (-0.24) 
Neg_STR 0.052 0.018 0.036 
 
Neg_STR 0.036 0.038 -0.005 
 
Neg_STR -0.052 0.090 -0.12 
 
(0.88) (0.30) (0.49) 
  
(0.63) (0.60) (-0.07) 
  
(-0.69) (1.75) (-1.80) 
Pos_STR-Neg_STR -0.008 0.019 
  
Pos_STR-Neg_STR 0.010 0.003 
  
Pos_STR-Neg_STR 0.021 -0.001 
 
 
(-0.26) (0.67) 
   
(0.35) (0.12) 
   
(0.63) (-0.04) 
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Table 5.8: A one-way sort of the three-day buy-and-hold Fama-French three-factor model adjusted PEAD returns sorted by analyst forecast 
revisions (reported coefficients are multiplied by 100) 
 
This table reports the three-day buy-and-hold Fama-French three-factor model adjusted PEAD returns sorted by analyst forecast revision. First the stocks 
are sorted into three different groups based on their most current analyst forecast revision. The analyst forecast revision is the average of all the revisions 
reported by individual analysts following the company in the most current forecast. Analysts’ revisions are categorised as good news (upward revision), no 
news (no change in revision), and bad news (downward revision). The sample includes all the S&P500 constituent stocks from January 1991 to December 
2006. The associated t-statistics are reported in parenthesis and ***, **, * indicates statistical significance at a 1%, 5%, and 10% confidence level. The 
reported coefficients are multiplied by 100. 
 
                        
 
  Sample BHARit-1, t+1   
Bad News (AFORRt < 0) 21.24% 0.001 
 
  
(0.16) 
 No News (AFORRt = 0) 53.05% 0.010 
 
  
(1.07) 
 Good news (AFORRt > 0) 25.71%     0.030*** 
 
  
(4.45) 
 Good news - Bad news    0.029*** 
 
  
(3.90) 
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Table 5.9: The three-day buy-and-hold Fama-French three-factor model adjusted PEAD returns by information uncertainty Proxy and analyst 
forecast revisions (reported coefficients are multiplied by 100) 
 
This table reports the three-day buy-and-hold Fama-French three-factor model adjusted PEAD returns sorted by analyst forecast revision and information uncertainty 
proxy. First, I categorise the stocks into good news, no news, and bad news based on their most current analyst forecast revision. In each category stocks are 
subsequently sorted into portfolios of high and low levels of information uncertainty based on the median of each of the information uncertainty proxies. Stock volatility 
(SVOL) is the standard deviation of weekly market excess returns over the year ending at the end of month t, and cash-flow volatility (CVOL) is the standard deviation 
of cash-flow from operations in the last five years (with a minimum of three years), analyst coverage (ACOV) is the number of analysts following the company, 
company age (AGE) is the number of years since the company was added to the S&P500 index, analysts’ forecast dispersion (AFORD) is the standard deviation of 
consensus analyst forecasts in the most current month scaled by prior year-end stock price, Firm size (MCAP) is the market capitalisation (in millions of dollars) at the 
end of the most current month. 1/MV, 1/AGE, and 1/ACOV are the reciprocals of MV, AGE, and ACOV respectively. HML represents a portfolio return of high 
information uncertainty portfolio minus low information uncertainty portfolio. The sample includes all the S&P500 constituent stocks from January 1991 to December 
2006. The associated t-statistics are reported in parenthesis and ***, **, * indicates statistical significance at a 1%, 5%, and 10% confidence level. The reported 
coefficients are multiplied by 100. 
 
 
 
 
    
              
 
Sorted by 1/MV 
   
Sorted by 1/AGE 
   
Sorted by 1/ACOV 
 
  High IU Low IU HML 
 
  High IU Low IU HML 
 
  High IU Low IU HML 
Good News (AFORRt>0) 0.058*** 0.009 0.062** 
 
Good News (AFORRt>0) 0.028 0.026 0.006 
 
Good News (AFORRt>0) 0.034* 0.017 0.021 
 
(2.66) (0.23) (2.18) 
  
(1.52) (1.23) (0.21) 
  
(1.80) (1.02) 0.93 
Bad News (AFORRt<0) 0.019 -0.013 0.031 
 
Bad News (AFORRt<0) 0.010 -0.004 0.014 
 
Bad News (AFORRt<0) -0.002 0.011 -0.010 
 
(0.95) (-0.50) (0.98) 
  
(0.50) (-0.17) (0.43) 
  
(-0.13) (0.48) (-0.35) 
Good News - Bad News 0.046** -0.090 
  
Good News - Bad News 0.038 -0.018 
  
Good News - Bad News 0.043 0.008 
 
 
(2.18) (1.22) 
   
(1.15) (-0.40) 
   
(1.62) (0.28) 
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Table 5.9 continued from the previous page 
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
                    
 
 
 
 
 
Sorted by AFORD 
   
Sorted by SVOL 
   
Sorted by CVOL 
 
  High IU Low IU HML 
 
  High IU Low IU HML 
 
  High IU Low IU HML 
Good News (AFORRt>0) 0.028* 0.024 0.009 
 
Good News (AFORRt>0) 0.034* 0.020 0.013 
 
Good News (AFORRt>0) 0.058*** -0.004 0.062** 
 
(1.75) (1.04) (0.39) 
  
(1.78) (1.0) (0.47) 
  
(3.25) (-0.19) (2.23) 
Bad News (AFORRt<0) -0.015 0.016 -0.028 
 
Bad News (AFORRt<0) -0.010 0.016 -0.027 
 
Bad News (AFORRt<0) 0.036* -0.032 0.069** 
 
(-0.62) (0.78) (-1.01) 
  
(-0.42) (0.76) (-0.81) 
  
(1.81) (-1.25) (2.06) 
Good News - Bad News 0.037 0.012 
  
Good News - Bad News 0.059 -0.036 
  
Good News - Bad News 0.11 -0.106 
 
 
(1.20) (0.43) 
   
(1.40) (-0.59) 
   
(1.16) (-0.78) 
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Figure 5.1: The distribution frequency of streaks of quarterly earnings rises, falls and 
temporary reversals in the streaks of earnings surprises. 
Figure 5.1 below shows the distribution of the frequency of quarterly earnings falls, rises, 
and temporary reversals in streaks of earnings surprises. The distribution evidently shows 
that there are far more consecutive quarterly earnings rises than consecutive quarterly 
earnings falls in my S&P500 sample data. The figure shows a distribution consisting of 51% 
positive and negative streaks (continuations) and 49% temporary positive and negative 
reversals in earnings surprises continuations. A streak in an earnings surprise sequence 
occurs when there is a rise or fall in quarterly earnings outcomes for two consecutive 
quarters or more. However, a temporary reversal in earnings surprise continuation occurs 
when a growing streak is terminated by an earnings surprise of the opposing sign in the 
most recent quarter. 
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Figure 5.2: The mean of three-day buy-and-hold Fama-French three-factor model 
adjusted PEAD returns traced by streaks of earnings surprises over a period of twelve 
quarters. 
The figure plots the most recent streaks of quarterly earnings surprises and temporary 
reversals in streaks against the mean of the three-day buy-and-hold Fama-French three-
factor adjusted PEAD returns. The variable (meanbhar) is the mean of the three-day buy-
and-hold Fama-French three-factor adjusted returns grouped by streaks of quarterly 
earnings surprises of various lengths and by temporary positive and negative reversals in 
the most current quarter. A temporary reversal in quarterly earnings surprises occurs when a 
growing streak of either positive or negative earnings surprises is terminated at the most 
recent quarter. 
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Chapter Six 
Conclusion, limitations, and further research work 
6.1 Introduction 
In standard finance theory, security prices are assumed to fully reflect all of the available 
information (including the fundamental associated risks), and investors are fully Bayesian 
and are rational. According to the standard finance model, a rational representative investor 
is one who applies Bayes’ rule to make optimal investment decisions. This rational investor 
should also conform to the model of expected utility theory and all its prescriptions for how 
an investor should behave, as given by von Neumann and Morgenstern (1947). However, 
over the years this wonderful model has failed to hold up when researchers subject it to 
empirical tests employing security prices and other financial data.  
In view of the above, behavioural finance theory emerged to provide an alternative (or 
maybe complementary) paradigm to the standard finance theory. The propositions of rational 
expectation theory and the efficient market hypothesis do not seem to explain price 
behaviour in the face of some firm-related news events. Statman (1999) observes that 
‘market efficiency’ has two meanings. The first advocates that investors cannot 
systematically beat the market, while the second supports that securities are rationally priced 
in the markets. He argues that rational prices will only reflect utilitarian characteristics of the 
security such as risk and do not reflect its value-expressive characteristics such as 
sentiment, purpose and belief. Investments like sport, faith, and politics are inherently social 
activities in which purpose, meaning, and expression are vital. He advocates a model of 
asset pricing which reflects both the utilitarian and value-expressive characteristics to 
address the limitations of the rational expectation models. In addition, a number of empirical 
studies provide evidence which runs contrary to the propositions of efficient market 
hypothesis positing that new information is quickly incorporated into security prices and that 
any form of mispricing will be arbitraged away almost instantaneously by informed traders. 
Lee (2001) posits that this view of market efficiency is very naïve and narrow. The author 
advocates for a more encompassing, broader model which will find room for noise traders 
who trade for liquidity or simply the excitement released by doing so. Furthermore, the 
presence of anomalies such as earnings momentum or drift in stock prices after earnings 
announcements poses a great challenge to the efficient market hypothesis. To support their 
argument, advocates of a behavioural finance approach argue that investors and other 
market participants are influenced by cognitive biases and heuristics, while at the same time 
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arguing that the effect of arbitrage in correcting mispricing is limited because it is risky and 
expensive43. 
This thesis seeks to contribute to the on-going debate on how best to explain the earnings-
generated momentum or post-earnings announcement drift seen in stock returns after 
earnings announcements. There is growing interest in the study of earnings momentum for 
various reasons. First, there is evidence in the literature that earnings momentum-based 
portfolio strategies are profitable44. Other evidence from empirical studies shows that price 
momentum is subsumed by the systematic component of earnings momentum in both time 
series and cross-sectional models45. There is also growing interest in identifying the true 
innovation in quarterly earnings news (i.e. the systematic component of earnings news). 
Over the years, empirical behavioural finance researchers have focused on standardised 
unexpected earnings (SUE) and other measures of earnings surprise as the most important 
proxies to explain earnings momentum in stock returns. However, in more recent years, with 
empirical works based on the predictions of theoretical behavioural finance models such as 
Rabin (2002b), Rabin and Vayanos (2010), and Barberis, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998), this 
focus is shifting. Recent empirical works on earnings momentum are redirecting their focus 
to sequences of changes in earnings and streaks of earnings surprises as the true 
innovation (or the systematic component) in quarterly earnings news (see Loh and 
Warachka (2012), Forbes and Igboekwu (2013), Shanthikumar (2012)). ‘Streakiness’ in 
earnings is emerging as a new valuation characteristic. This recent shift has been 
occasioned by the predictions of the theoretical models mentioned above which show that 
when investors observe streaks of positive or negative earnings surprises, they are 
influenced by the law of small numbers (or other cognitive bias such as the gambler’s fallacy, 
which is one of the manifestations of the law of small numbers) to underreact to quarterly 
earnings news. This evidence points to the fact that quarterly earnings news in itself offers 
little or limited amount of information to the market, and that the real informativeness of 
quarterly earnings news lies in its ability to confirm or refute the continuation of a growing 
streak of earnings surprises of a particular sign. This confirmation, or termination, of a 
growing streak of earnings surprises seems to be the true force that drives earnings 
momentum in stock returns.  
Hirshleifer (2001) posits that cognitive bias is likely to be more prevalent when the 
fundamental value of assets is uncertain: the scope for muddled thinking is simply wider 
                                                          
43
 See Shleifer and Summers (1990); Shleifer and Vishny (1997). 
44
 See Chan et al (1996), Grundy and Martin (2001), Jegadeesh and Titman (2001), Rouwenhorst 
(1998). 
45
 See Chordia and Shivakumar (2006). 
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when widely diverging views can be held by equally well-reasoning investors. Uncertainty 
reduces the degree of anticipation of announced earnings and intensifies investors’ 
response to earnings at the announcement date, when uncertainty is partially or fully 
resolved. Further to the above position, information uncertainty has been identified in the 
existing empirical literature to have a positive relation with earnings momentum when it is 
conditioned on the nature of earnings news (i.e. bad or good news) (see Zhang (2006a, 
2006b), Jang et al (2005)). By conditioning information uncertainty upon streaks of negative 
and positive earnings surprises to examine its impact on earnings momentum, my thesis 
contributes to the stream of new research in the information uncertainty literature which 
sheds light on the way in which the wider financial markets operate.  
I show how my S&P500 sample companies’ returns change with increasing ‘streakiness’ in 
quarterly earnings over a period of twelve quarters. For those companies with lengthening 
streaks of positive earnings surprises I ask, how does the investor respond to price when in 
the grip of the gambler’s fallacy? Is the gambler’s fallacy weaker unconditionally for longer 
streaks? Rabin (2002b) predicts that the gambler’s fallacy is undermined by the hot-hand 
fallacy when investors update their beliefs after observing longer streaks of earnings 
surprises in a single direction. Loh and Warachka (2012) report that there is no unconditional 
evidence to support the position that investors update their earnings expectations after 
observing long streaks. However, by intuition, investors should expect extreme earnings 
growth paths to mean-revert in the long-term, because, as they say, “trees don’t grow to the 
sky”.  
Finally, this thesis contributes to the academic literature by way of the data sample and 
methods employed to carry out this study. Some academics believe that illiquid or thinly 
traded stocks drive momentum46; my thesis examines stocks of some of the most highly 
capitalised and liquid stocks not just in the United States but in the world. My work 
contributes to the literature in showing that the earnings momentum’s pervasiveness cuts 
across even the most liquid stocks in the market. This thesis also shows that earnings 
momentum is present in both the short- and medium-term windows, counteracting the 
argument that momentum is a result of external noise in the market or simply poor asset 
return benchmarking. The implication of this is that most major funds would naturally hold 
these stocks and could engage in portfolio rebalancing amongst them, via high frequency 
trades, with almost no trading costs and minimal liquidity risks.     
In the first empirical chapter of this thesis, I examine the predictive performance of two 
representative agent models of earnings momentum using my S&P500 sample data frame. 
                                                          
46
 See Bhootra (2011). 
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For lengthening sequences of positive and negative quarterly earnings changes over a 
period of a twelve-quarter horizon, I seek to establish whether these models can adequately 
capture the likelihood of reversion. I also examine the market’s response to observed 
sequences of quarterly earnings changes in my sample over four-, eight-, and twelve-quarter 
horizons. The chapter also examines the behaviour of a quasi-Bayesian representative 
investor when he is under the influence of a cognitive bias known as the law of small 
numbers. In the second empirical chapter, I seek to establish the impact of streaks of 
negative or positive earnings surprises on the market response to quarterly earnings news. 
In that chapter, I employ a different metric to capture quarterly earnings surprises by using 
monthly analysts’ forecasts and actual quarterly earnings, and thus an implicit analysts’ 
forecasts error. Evidence in the literature suggests that the monthly analyst forecast is a 
more accurate measure of market expectations, since it is adjusted once actual quarterly 
earnings are announced. It embeds non-earnings information such as current market 
conjectures about the regulatory and technological risks the company faces47. In a bid to 
validate the results of the market response to sequences of quarterly earnings changes 
found in chapter 4, I also examine in chapter 5 the market responses to negative and 
positive streaks of earnings surprises within a three-day window around the earnings 
announcement date. I examine the impact of information uncertainty variables on post-
earnings announcement drift conditioned on the negative and positive streaks of quarterly 
earnings surprises. Tests for robustness are conducted in both chapters 4 and 5. 
In this final chapter of the thesis, the next section summarises and discusses the main 
empirical findings of chapters 4 and 5. It also presents the implications of my findings and 
the contributions they make to our understanding of how stock markets incorporate 
information about quarterly earnings into equity prices. Section 6.3 reflects upon the 
limitations of this study and the final section discusses the possibilities for further research 
building on this research work. 
6.2 Summary, implications of results, and contributions to literature 
The failure of the efficient market and rational expectation-based models to unravel the 
puzzle behind anomalies prevalent in security returns has led scholars to seek an alternative 
theory to explain these puzzles. This led to the birth of an alternative paradigm to the 
standard finance theory known as behavioural finance theory. In recent decades, a number 
of partially integrative behavioural finance theoretical models have developed; these include 
those proposed by Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam (1998), Barberis, Shleifer, and 
Vishny (1998), Hong and Stein (1999), Rabin (2002b), and Rabin and Vayanos (2010) 
                                                          
47
 See Givoly and Lakonishok (1979, 1984), Givoly (1985). 
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amongst others. Prior to these behavioural models being propounded, the majority of 
empirical behavioural studies were based on an ad hoc approach with no fundamental 
backing from theory. A sort of ‘anomaly du jour’ cottage industry of empirical studies 
flourished. Subsequently, there has been a growing interest in empirical behavioural finance 
research in applying theory in order to ensure that such works have rigour and can withstand 
theoretical scrutiny. This growing interest in applying behavioural finance models in empirical 
studies is the major motivating factor behind this research work. The predictions of Barberis, 
Shleifer, and Vishny (1998) and the Rabin (2002b) model motivated me to investigate the 
response of the representative investor whose investment decision-making becomes flawed 
when he is under the influence of certain cognitive biases and heuristics. The cognitive 
biases involved in this study are the law of small numbers and the gambler’s fallacy. The 
results of the empirical chapters seem to suggest that investors underreact to earnings news 
when they observe sequences or streaks of quarterly earnings changes and persistent 
forecast errors; these lead to the earnings momentum effect in stock returns. This 
underreaction is thought to be attributed to the influence of the law of small numbers and the 
gambler’s fallacy. 
The first empirical chapter (chapter 4) examines the predictive performance of the Barberis, 
Shleifer, and Vishny (1998) model and the Rabin (2002b) model and how their predictions fit 
into the quarterly earnings change distribution of my S&P500 constituent companies’ sample 
frame. Barberis et al’s (1998) model makes a prediction of symmetry between momentum 
and reversion regimes whereas the Rabin (2002b) model makes no such predictions for 
symmetry. In the Barberis et al (1998) model, the investor believes he is observing an 
earnings process that constantly cycles between eras of momentum and reversion despite 
the fact that in reality, earnings always follow a random process. What this belief shows is 
that in the Barberis et al (1998) model, the investor seems to be completely irrational: he is 
“always wrong but never in doubt”. In order words, there is never any form of learning in the 
world of this type of investor. However, for the Rabin (2002b) model, the representative 
investor (Freddy) is just an imperfect Bayesian in the projection of earnings. This believer in 
the law of small numbers is at least quasi-Bayesian; however his predictions become more 
extreme when he observes two successive quarterly earnings increases. Rabin recognises 
this overinference based on successive increases in quarterly earnings as the effect of the 
gambler’s fallacy on the investor. So the Barberis et al (1998) model makes more dramatic 
claims about investor rationality than the Rabin (2002b) model. From the results of my 
analysis, the distribution of the quarterly earnings changes is in fact asymmetric across 
streaks of positive and negative earnings outcomes. The observed distribution of quarterly 
earnings shows that there is more momentum in earnings than earnings reversals. The 
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Barberis et al (1998) model’s prediction is quite the opposite of the results of my analysis, as 
the model assigns a higher probability of reversal than continuation of quarterly earnings. 
From the above findings, I conclude that it is most probably not wise to pool consistent 
quarterly earnings rises and falls into the same state, as the Barberis et al (1998) model 
seems to require. The requisite symmetry this sort of model (the BSV model) implies is not 
present in my sample data. This is more so because the cumulative impact of extreme 
quarterly earnings falls on abnormal returns is far more dramatic than that of smaller 
extreme consecutive quarterly earnings rises. Furthermore, consistent quarterly earnings 
rises are common; more than 21% of my sample derives from consistent quarterly earnings 
rises of twelve quarters’ duration. Hence it is unlikely they will have a dramatic stock market 
impact. Furthermore, because of the simplicity of the distinction between trending and mean-
reverting regimes in the Barberis et al (1998) model, and without regard to the length of each 
sequence that prevails, I conclude that the model is unlikely to capture true investor 
behaviour in the real world. My data shows that the length of sequence of earnings changes 
is crucial to explaining momentum in stock returns. Following the above findings, I choose 
the predictions of Rabin (2002b) as my preferred model for testing my hypotheses. From the 
above, I make a direct contribution to the literature by showing that the distribution of 
quarterly earnings falls and rises of my S&P500 companies does not fit the symmetrical 
distribution predicted by the Barberis et al (1998) model. 
The remaining part of chapter 4 seeks to ascertain how surprised investors are by 
consecutive quarterly earnings changes regardless of their frequency or intensity, and 
consequently, what is the price impact of that? Does it matter for price continuation what the 
consistency, sign and intensity of quarterly earnings changes are? 
The next empirical test in chapter 4 examines the impact of sequences of positive and 
negative quarterly earnings changes on the returns, assuming the investor is under the 
influence of the law of small numbers. The test examines the overinference exhibited by the 
quasi-Bayesian investor in the Rabin (2002b) model when he observes more than two 
successive quarterly earnings increases. The results show that the impact of the sequences 
of quarterly earnings falls and rises on abnormal returns is reversed for consecutive 
sequences of more than eight quarters. Therefore, the intensity and sign of quarterly 
earnings change sequences do matter, as their impact on returns shows. As the sequences 
of quarterly earnings rises continues to grow, the market seems ‘less surprised’ at the arrival 
of yet another confirming quarterly earnings news, and the market response to such news is 
more muted. However, companies reporting consecutive quarterly earnings falls beyond 
eight quarters appear to pay premia to their long-suffering investors, as returns are larger, 
positive, and highly statistically significant. 
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This finding contributes to the literature in establishing that the true innovation in quarterly 
earnings news lies either in the confirmation, or refutation, of a continuation in a growing 
trend of quarterly earnings rises or falls. The absolute change in quarterly earnings which 
represents the shock in quarterly earnings magnitude does not carry much information to 
have significant impact on my sample stock prices. Another contribution is that there 
appears to be a potential portfolio strategy that could be exploited by going long on stocks 
with sequences of quarterly earnings rises and shorting those with sequences of quarterly 
earnings falls. My results suggest that this portfolio strategy is profitable.  
In addition, I examine the impact of sequences of quarterly earnings rises and falls in sub-
periods and in the different industry sectors to ascertain whether the main results are driven 
by certain industry sectors, or a particular time period. The results of these tests show that 
the behaviour is widespread amongst all the industry sectors represented and that earnings 
momentum is not confined to any particular time period. This finding is inconsistent with the 
findings of Moskowitz and Grinblatt (1999), who argue that momentum in their sample is 
driven by industry sectors. While I am not certain as to why there is inconsistency between 
their finding and the finding of this thesis, I do note the difference between the scope and 
nature of their sample firms and mine. Their data sample covers a wider range of firms in 
terms of size (their sample includes stocks from the NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ), while my 
sample of S&P500 constituent companies represents the top end of the most capitalised and 
liquid companies in the United States. Following Da, Gurun, and Warachka’s (2014) 
procedures, I also test for the impact of information discreteness on earnings momentum in 
my sample. The results suggest that information discreteness is indeed a factor that helps in 
fomenting earnings momentum as well as price momentum. However, it is important to note 
that controlling for information discreteness in the tests does not appear to weaken the role 
of my consistency/streakiness in earnings proxy in determining the extent of recorded 
quarterly earnings-driven momentum observed in my data sample. 
In chapter 5, I employ alternative metrics to measure change in investors’ expectations of 
earnings and the impact of earnings streaks on market returns for three days around the 
quarterly earnings announcement date. Earnings surprises are calculated in every quarter in 
my sample by subtracting the monthly analysts’ forecast of quarterly EPS from the actual 
EPS reported in the current quarter and then scaling by the prior year end stock price. To 
ascertain the impact of streaks of positive and negative quarterly earnings surprises on stock 
returns in a shorter window, I employ the three-day buy-and-hold Fama-French three-factor 
adjusted returns measured for three days around the earnings announcement date. In this 
chapter, I ask if the streaks of quarterly earnings surprises and reversals have significant 
impacts on post-earnings announcement drift over these three days. I also ask whether the 
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length of either positive or negative earnings surprises matters on the strength of its impact 
on post-earnings announcement drift. Furthermore, I ask whether information uncertainty 
conditioned on the streaks of earnings surprises exacerbates earnings-generated 
momentum in price. Does the gambler’s fallacy influence the investor’s response when he 
observes streaks of quarterly earnings surprises of a particular sign around quarterly 
earnings announcements? Does the impact of the gambler’s fallacy weaken as the streaks 
of quarterly earnings surprise grow longer? 
The findings from this empirical analysis strengthen the case for the informativeness of 
streaks of quarterly earnings surprises in explaining earnings momentum in stock returns. 
This is interesting, given that in this chapter, the investigation is carried out to test the 
explanatory power of streaks of earnings surprises in a shorter event window of three days - 
within the period when the effect of the nature of earnings news is most intense in the 
markets. Within this window, the magnitude of earnings surprises lacks any explanatory 
power, while the streak of earnings surprises maintains its explanatory power, thus 
supporting the claim that streaks of earnings surprises possess better explanatory power 
than any single earnings surprise arriving at the most recent earnings announcement. As 
Fama (1998) suggests, studies involving short event windows of, say, a few days have one 
obvious advantage in that the daily expected returns are very close to zero, therefore the 
choice of the model for measuring expected returns does not have much impact on the 
interpretation and inference drawn from the abnormal returns so measured. So the chance 
of a benchmarking or research method error confounding my reported results is far less in 
this empirical chapter.   
Furthermore, the findings suggest that there is significant impact of streaks of earnings 
surprises on market returns in a three-day window around the earnings announcement date. 
Quarterly earnings reversals also have a significant impact on market returns at around the 
earnings announcement date. However, their impact is less pronounced and could be 
attributed to investors’ reactions being less dramatic when a growing trend of quarterly 
earnings falls is terminated at the earnings announcement date. This result suggests that, 
although these companies are some of the most followed by analysts, are likely to have 
abundant information in the public domain, nevertheless; investors underreact when the sign 
of the earnings surprises suddenly changes. For those companies that show a positive 
earnings surprise in the most current quarter after several streaks of negative quarterly 
earnings surprise, investors’ reaction is more muted, and this response might be a result of 
investors taking their time to digest the most current information in the earnings news. As the 
evidence from my results shows, there are more positive quarterly earnings reversals than 
negative reversals. This may not be unconnected to some sort of earnings management to 
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meet and beat targets characterising my S&P500 data sample. Some investors might think 
that this sudden change in the companies’ woes must be transitory and will hardly last. The 
strength of the impact of streaks of earnings surprise tends to weaken as the streak in 
quarterly earnings lengthens for both positive and negative streaks.  
There are a number ways to describe the behaviour seen above. First, it might be explained 
in line with Rabin (2002b), who suggests that the effect of the gambler’s fallacy begins to 
fade as the streak length grows. However, it is uncertain whether this also means that as 
Rabin and Vayanos (2010) suggest, another cognitive bias called the hot-hand fallacy is 
replacing the gambler’s fallacy as the streaks grow even longer. Furthermore, it could also 
be suggestive of the fact that there is some form of learning going on among the investors. 
Investors might be interpreting increasing earnings rises to mean that those companies are 
engaging in some sort of earnings management. This may lead to more muted reactions 
from investors as the streaks continue to grow from quarter to quarter. However, the 
investors in companies posting consistent quarterly earnings falls over many quarters enjoy 
larger and positive returns for longer streaks than those posting consistent quarterly 
earnings rises for many quarters. This could also be suggesting that these companies are 
paying a premium to their long-suffering investors who are still holding their shares despite 
consistent quarterly earnings falls. Another reason could be that the shares of those 
companies with long streaks of quarterly earnings surprises falls become illiquid as time 
passes, and holders of such shares are unable to sell with the continual decline of the 
companies’ earnings.  
In chapter 5, the findings show that unconditional information uncertainty has little or no 
explanatory power for earnings momentum in returns. However, conditional upon streaks of 
earnings surprise, high information uncertainty exacerbates earnings momentum in those 
companies with positive streaks of earnings surprises, suggesting that streakiness and 
uncertainty are cumulative, rather than substitutive, in their mutual impact. For those 
companies that are young in the S&P500 index, are less highly capitalised by the market, or 
have high dispersion in their cash-flows, earnings momentum is exacerbated in their returns 
when they run streaks of positive earnings surprises. So the impact of streaks in earnings 
and information uncertainty about earnings announcements are clearly separable 
phenomena but have a cumulative effect. Earnings streakiness is a distinct element in the 
gradual dissolution of valuation uncertainty. On the other hand, since information uncertainty 
cannot explain returns, this implies that it cannot be attributed to risk which must be priced; 
rather it must be a behavioural characteristic of the firm. 
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Overall chapter 5 makes a number of contributions to the literature. First, the chapter shows 
that through the informativeness of streaks of earnings surprises, as Rabin (2002b) 
suggests, the gambler’s fallacy could be the cause of underreaction/earnings momentum 
when companies report consistent earnings falls or rises. Again, the results suggest that 
there are potential portfolio trading strategies which could be exploited within the models 
employed in this chapter. Portfolio trading strategies which are long in stocks with positive 
streaks of earnings surprises, funding their purchase by going short in stocks with streaks of 
negative earnings surprises, appear to be profitable. Portfolio trading strategies which are 
long (short) in high uncertainty (low uncertainty) stocks when conditioned on positive streaks 
of earnings surprises are also profitable.  
This study is one of the first to popularise the use of streaks of earnings surprises as a 
potential explanatory variable for earnings momentum studies. Furthermore, it is perhaps the 
first study to provide a clear theoretical basis for including a measure of earnings 
‘streakiness’ in explaining stock market momentum. Chapter 5 also contributes to the debate 
on what exactly constitutes innovation in earnings news, as the shocks in quarterly earnings 
do not explain much. The confirmation or termination of a growing trend of quarterly earnings 
surprises seems to possess a stronger explanatory power. Therefore, as shown in chapter 4, 
the variable Consistency, or streakiness in quarterly earnings changes, possesses a 
stronger explanatory power than the simple absolute values of quarterly earnings changes. 
So, overall, the empirical evidence shared in my thesis has a number of implications both for 
the investor and for fund managers. In addition, it has investment implications for investors 
and fund managers to time their investment by investing in different stocks considering the 
streak lengths of such stocks. This should also inform the holding period of the portfolios so 
formed in this manner. 
6.3 Limitations 
It is important to state that this study, just like any other empirical research, is limited in its 
conclusions and inferences. A number of specific shortcomings identified in the empirical 
chapters are discussed in this section. I encourage the reader to pay attention to the 
identified limitations while interpreting the results and evidence shown in the empirical 
chapters. 
In every empirical research study in the social sciences, it is always crucial to state the 
limitations of the sample data used in carrying out the research. The quarterly earnings data 
used for this work are from the I/B/E/S database. Although I did not winsorise, I did delete 
EPS changes data of 200% and above which most likely are a result of errors in the 
database. There is also the issue of missing data in the various datasets which I used. This 
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study adopts a number of proxies to capture information uncertainty surrounding the value of 
my S&P500 constituent stocks. The stock price data and other data used in constructing the 
information uncertainty proxies are from the Thomson Financial DataStream database. 
Inasmuch as these proxies are the ones prevalent in the literature, there is no consensus in 
the literature as to what should be the proxy for information uncertainty. Indeed there is a 
tension between attempting to capture true Knightian uncertainty, which precludes the 
construction of a probability distribution based on past events, and the sort of statistical 
inference I conduct here. It is therefore possible that each of these proxies on their own 
might capture more than one firm characteristic. It is also likely that an information 
uncertainty proxy’s suitability for capturing a particular form of uncertainty might be limited. 
However, jointly, information uncertainty proxies could provide sufficient power to capture 
the effects of information uncertainty in stock returns. For instance, the evidence from my 
results shows that information uncertainty proxies such as market capitalisation, analyst 
following, and company age capture similar kinds of information uncertainty. These control 
variables might also interact and confound other controls that I employ such as the Fama-
French three-factor ‘risk’ adjustment with its ‘small minus big’ premium prominent in the 
model’s power.  The use of standardised databases also means that, as in all cases where 
secondary data is used for investigation, the results from the data are only as good as the 
underlying data themselves. Furthermore, the common use of S&P500 companies suggests 
some degree of ‘data snooping’ in my study, since I draw on previous results derived from 
very similar data.   
In both chapters 4 and 5, one cannot accept the behavioural explanations given as definite. 
This is because it is very difficult to say for certain whether one or two cognitive biases 
and/or heuristics are responsible for the underreaction that leads to earnings momentum in 
market returns. As in all empirical behavioural finance studies, it is important to approach the 
explanations offered with caution, knowing that in reality, the underreaction could have 
occurred as a result of mixture of a number of cognitive biases and heuristics interplaying 
simultaneously. Nor should the impact of the main risk-adjustment and market 
microstructure issues that standard finance tends to concentrate on be minimised in the 
hurry to assert the authority of behavioural insights. This is especially true while we await a 
single unifying theoretical framework for behavioural research in asset pricing. The 
conclusions and inferences drawn from the results should be treated as speculative, as it is 
difficult to exclusively test for a particular behavioural trait. The problem posed by the joint 
hypothesis of the efficiency of the market and a particular asset pricing model should be 
considered when reading the results of the empirical chapters. The test for zero abnormal 
returns directly invokes this joint hypothesis problem, which remains unresolved in my work. 
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This is because it is not possible to state with certainty that my findings are not due to some 
omitted risk control variables in my models. 
My period of study covers a relatively short period (1991 to 2006). Some points to note from 
this are the following: first, the data sample is somewhat old and comes from highly 
capitalised companies in the United States, which is a mature market. Many well-established 
markets, such as the Cairo or Beijing markets, have had far more disruptive histories which 
are certainly equally worthy of study. My findings may be specific to this period and may not 
be representative of other periods. Second, it is possible that the results are peculiar to the 
United States and not anywhere else. 
Third, I use the Fama-French three-factor model as my benchmark model to calculate 
abnormal returns. Although this is a popular benchmark model in similar empirical studies, 
there is no consensus that this model correctly captures true expected returns or that these 
factors are truly risk proxies, as opposed to measures of asset mispricing. Moreover, in the 
first empirical chapter, the buy-and-hold abnormal returns were calculated over the three 
months adjoining two quarterly earnings announcements. Therefore, it might not be 
completely accurate to assume that no other firm-specific news filtered into price during this 
period. Earnings momentum in this medium term might just be one of the factors driving 
momentum in stock returns. This would require me to enhance my benchmark to include 
Carhart’s (1997) momentum factor. 
6.4 Further research work 
The results of this thesis show that there is enormous potential research that could be 
carried out in the area of earnings momentum and its models. My thesis is a departure point 
as well as an end point in my academic life. In some sense, it is the end of a beginning and 
not the beginning of an end. There are now quite a few theoretical papers proffering 
predictions on how investors behave when they are under the influence of certain cognitive 
biases and heuristics when observing particular firm fundamental variables such as quarterly 
earnings outcomes. This brings together different theoretical and empirical research issues 
in economics, finance, psychology, and the financial markets in general. 
First, this empirical study focuses on the United States market which is a much more mature, 
long-lasting market with companies having the largest market capitalisation. This research 
can be developed further by investigating other markets outside the United States and also 
including companies that are not as highly capitalised as my S&P500 constituent companies.  
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In a recent paper, Rabin and Vayanos (2010) suggest not only that the influence of the 
gambler’s fallacy on investors weakens as the streaks of earnings surprises lengthen, but 
that simultaneously, another bias, the hot-hand fallacy, takes over at some trigger point in 
the sequence. According to the authors, this happens at the point when the investor might 
begin to learn that he is under the influence of the gambler’s fallacy. However, the learning is 
wrong, as it leads the investor into the trap of committing simply another error; the hot-hand 
fallacy. It will be interesting to investigate this prediction to see if it is supported by empirical 
evidence. 
Furthermore, the evidence from the results of this thesis shows that investors pay extra 
attention to news events that are repetitive in nature and also take into consideration the 
distribution of the signals. It will be interesting to examine how this model could be applied 
for further empirical research on price momentum and its earnings-based component. 
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